Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (δ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as δ → 1. The optimal contract when δ << 1 is partially characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of efficiency wages and the threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally, Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.

Debt and default in a growth model

This paper presents a small open economy model with capital accumulation and without commitment to repay debt. The optimal debt contract specifies debt relief following bad shocks and debt increase following good shocks and brings first order benefits if the country's borrowing constraint is binding. Countries with less capital (with higher marginal productivity of capital) have a higher debt-GDP ratio, are more likely to default on uncontingent bonds, require higher debt relief after bad shocks and pay a higher spread over treasury. Debt relief prescribed by the optimal contract following the interest rate hikes of 1980-81 is more than half of the debt forgiveness obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.

Localização e preço de contrato ótimo da geração distribuída em sistemas de distribuição radiais de energia elétrica

Pós-graduação em Engenharia Elétrica - FEIS

A Principal-Agent Model of Contracting in Major League Baseball

Traditional economic analyses of the reserve clause in major league baseball view it as having arisen from the superior bargaining of owners compared to players. This article interprets it instead as promoting efficient investment by teams in player development, given the transferability of player skills to other teams. Using a principal-agent framework, the article shows that limited player mobility emerges as part of the optimal contract between players (principals) and teams (agents).

Application of the agency theory for the analysis of performance-based mechanisms in road management

El WCTR es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte, y aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper develops a model based on agency theory to analyze road management systems (under the different contract forms available today) that employ a mechanism of performance indicators to establish the payment of the agent. The base assumption is that of asymmetric information between the principal (Public Authorities) and the agent (contractor) and the risk aversion of this latter. It is assumed that the principal may only measure the agent?s performance indirectly and by means of certain performance indicators that may be verified by the authorities. In this model there is presumed to be a relation between the efforts made by the agent and the performance level measured by the corresponding indicators, though it is also considered that there may be dispersion between both variables that gives rise to a certain degree of randomness in the contract. An analysis of the optimal contract has been made on the basis of this model and in accordance with a series of parameters that characterize the economic environment and the particular conditions of road infrastructure. As a result of the analysis made, it is considered that an optimal contract should generally combine a fixed component and a payment in accordance with the performance level obtained. The higher the risk aversion of the agent and the greater the marginal cost of public funds, the lower the impact of this performance-based payment. By way of conclusion, the system of performance indicators should be as broad as possible but should not overweight those indicators that encompass greater randomness in their results.

Fixed wages and bonuses in agency contracts: the case of a continuous state space

In this paper, we extend the state-contingent production approach to principal–agent problems to the case where the state space is an atomless continuum. The approach is modelled on the treatment of optimal tax problems. The central observation is that, under reasonable conditions, the optimal contract may involve a fixed wage with a bonus for above-normal performance. This is analogous to the phenomenon of "bunching" at the bottom in the optimal tax literature.

Bilevel approach for optimal location and contract pricing of distributed generation in radial distribution systems using mixed-integer linear programming

In this study, a novel approach for the optimal location and contract pricing of distributed generation (DG) is presented. Such an approach is designed for a market environment in which the distribution company (DisCo) can buy energy either from the wholesale energy market or from the DG units within its network. The location and contract pricing of DG is determined by the interaction between the DisCo and the owner of the distributed generators. The DisCo intends to minimise the payments incurred in meeting the expected demand, whereas the owner of the DG intends to maximise the profits obtained from the energy sold to the DisCo. This two-agent relationship is modelled in a bilevel scheme. The upper-level optimisation is for determining the allocation and contract prices of the DG units, whereas the lower-level optimisation is for modelling the reaction of the DisCo. The bilevel programming problem is turned into an equivalent single-level mixed-integer linear optimisation problem using duality properties, which is then solved using commercially available software. Results show the robustness and efficiency of the proposed model compared with other existing models. As regards to contract pricing, the proposed approach allowed to find better solutions than those reported in previous works. © The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2013.

A model for determining the optimal project life span and concession period of BOT projects

The concession agreement is the core feature of BOT projects, with the concession period being the most essential feature in determining the time span of the various rights, obligations and responsibilities of the government and concessionaire. Concession period design is therefore crucial for financial viability and determining the benefit/cost allocation between the host government and the concessionaire. However, while the concession period and project life span are essentially interdependent, most methods to date consider their determination as contiguous events that are determined exogenously. Moreover, these methods seldom consider the, often uncertain, social benefits and costs involved that are critical in defining, pricing and distributing benefits and costs between the various parties and evaluating potentially distributable cash flows. In this paper, we present the results of the first stage of a research project aimed at determining the optimal build-operate-transfer (BOT) project life span and concession period endogenously and interdependently by maximizing the combined benefits of stakeholders. Based on the estimation of the economic and social development involved, a negotiation space of the concession period interval is obtained, with its lower boundary creating the desired financial return for the private investors and its upper boundary ensuring the economic feasibility of the host government as well as the maximized welfare within the project life. The outcome of the new quantitative model is considered as a suitable basis for future field trials prior to implementation. The structure and details of the model are provided in the paper with Hong Kong tunnel project as a case study to demonstrate its detailed application. The basic contributions of the paper to the theory of construction procurement are that the project life span and concession period are determined jointly and the social benefits taken into account in the examination of project financial benefits. In practical terms, the model goes beyond the current practice of linear-process thinking and should enable engineering consultants to provide project information more rationally and accurately to BOT project bidders and increase the government's prospects of successfully entering into a contract with a concessionaire. This is expected to generate more negotiation space for the government and concessionaire in determining the major socioeconomic features of individual BOT contracts when negotiating the concession period. As a result, the use of the model should increase the total benefit to both parties.

What Determines Stock Option Contract Design?

This paper analyzes factors driving the design of stock option plans for Finnish firms. We examine determinants of the scope of plans, exercise price, target group, and dividend protection. The scope is found to be negatively related to Tobin’s Q and positively related to proxies for monitoring costs. The scope is also greater in broad-based plans, and in plans with dividend protection. Prior stock return is found to be negatively related to the size of the premium (out-of-the-moneyness), whereas dividend protection increases the premium. The results also suggest that investment intensity, cash flow, and monitoring costs are associated with the likelihood of granting premium (out-of-the-money) stock options. Furthermore, the likelihood of granting broad-based plans is increasing in institutional ownership and cash flow constraints, and decreasing in firm size. Broad-based plans are also more likely among firms in growth industries. We find support that the likelihood of dividend protection is decreasing in foreign ownership. In addition, firms paying zero-dividends are less likely to include dividend protection, whereas higher unsystematic risk is associated with a greater likelihood of including dividend protection.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.

Analysis of the Optimal Sharing of Construction Risk in Public Procurement Contracts

This paper discusses a model based on the agency theory to analyze the optimal transfer of construction risk in public works contracts. The base assumption is that of a contract between a principal (public authority) and an agent (firm), where the payment mechanism is linear and contains an incentive mechanism to enhance the effort of the agent to reduce construction costs. A theoretical model is proposed starting from a cost function with a random component and assuming that both the public authority and the firm are risk averse. The main outcome of the paper is that the optimal transfer of construction risk will be lower when the variance of errors in cost forecast, the risk aversion of the firm and the marginal cost of public funds are larger, while the optimal transfer of construction risk will grow when the variance of errors in cost monitoring and the risk aversion of the public authority are larger