Heterogeneidad de trayectorias laborales y temporalidades juveniles

Las trayectorias laborales de los jóvenes se diversifican en función de las duraciones, las etapas y las edades en las que ocurren los acontecimientos y se alcanzan ciertos roles. Sin embargo, factores clásicos asociados al origen social o al mundo del trabajo no alcanzan para comprender la diferenciación en los modos de inserción. Este artículo propone la inclusión de las temporalidades juveniles como factor clave para la comprensión de trayectorias laborales de jóvenes. Las temporalidades juveniles sirven para observar conjuntamente los marcos temporales dominantes de la inserción y la manera en la que los mismos son vividos por los sujetos. Las mismas discuten las tesis que señalan que en Argentina los jóvenes son prisioneros de un presentismo sin proyecto o que se someten inevitablemente a un contexto laboral incierto. Cuatro tipo des temporalidades han emergido en el análisis cualitativo y longitudinal de las trayectorias : los "planificadores", los "ejecutantes", los "latentes" y los "oportunistas"

Heterogeneidad de trayectorias laborales y temporalidades juveniles

Las trayectorias laborales de los jóvenes se diversifican en función de las duraciones, las etapas y las edades en las que ocurren los acontecimientos y se alcanzan ciertos roles. Sin embargo, factores clásicos asociados al origen social o al mundo del trabajo no alcanzan para comprender la diferenciación en los modos de inserción. Este artículo propone la inclusión de las temporalidades juveniles como factor clave para la comprensión de trayectorias laborales de jóvenes. Las temporalidades juveniles sirven para observar conjuntamente los marcos temporales dominantes de la inserción y la manera en la que los mismos son vividos por los sujetos. Las mismas discuten las tesis que señalan que en Argentina los jóvenes son prisioneros de un presentismo sin proyecto o que se someten inevitablemente a un contexto laboral incierto. Cuatro tipo des temporalidades han emergido en el análisis cualitativo y longitudinal de las trayectorias : los "planificadores", los "ejecutantes", los "latentes" y los "oportunistas"

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Heterogeneidad de trayectorias laborales y temporalidades juveniles

Las trayectorias laborales de los jóvenes se diversifican en función de las duraciones, las etapas y las edades en las que ocurren los acontecimientos y se alcanzan ciertos roles. Sin embargo, factores clásicos asociados al origen social o al mundo del trabajo no alcanzan para comprender la diferenciación en los modos de inserción. Este artículo propone la inclusión de las temporalidades juveniles como factor clave para la comprensión de trayectorias laborales de jóvenes. Las temporalidades juveniles sirven para observar conjuntamente los marcos temporales dominantes de la inserción y la manera en la que los mismos son vividos por los sujetos. Las mismas discuten las tesis que señalan que en Argentina los jóvenes son prisioneros de un presentismo sin proyecto o que se someten inevitablemente a un contexto laboral incierto. Cuatro tipo des temporalidades han emergido en el análisis cualitativo y longitudinal de las trayectorias : los "planificadores", los "ejecutantes", los "latentes" y los "oportunistas"

Calcareous dinocysts and grain size distribution along profile Stevns-Klint

The distribution patterns of calcareous dinoflagellate cysts were studied in the classic Cretaceous Tertiary (K-T) boundary section of Stevns Klint, Denmark, focusing mainly on the response of the cyst association to an abrupt environmental catastrophe. A major part of the Fish Clay, which covers the K-T boundary at its base and is exposed in the investigated section, contains fallout produced by an asteroid impact. Calcareous dinoflagenate cysts are the best preserved remains of carbonate-producing phytoplankton in this layer. The potential of this group of microfossils for the analysis of survival strategies and extinction patterns has been underestimated. The cyst species of the investigated section can be grouped into four assemblages that represent victims, survivors, opportunists, and specially adapted forms. The victims (Pithonelloideae) were an extremely successful group throughout the Upper Cretaceous, but were restricted to the narrow outer shelf. This restriction minimized their spatial distribution, which generally should be large to facilitate escape from unfavorable conditions. Spatial restriction optimized the population decrease by mass mortality, disabling a successful recovery. In contrast, the survivors that became the dominating group in the Danian had a wide spatial range from the shelf environment to the oceanic realm. A unique calcareous dinocyst assemblage in the Fish Clay shows that even under the stressed conditions immediately following the impact event, some species flourished due to special adaptation or high ecological tolerance. The ability of these dinoflagellate species to form calcareous resting cysts in combination with their generally wide spatial distribution in a variety of environments appears to be the main reason for a low extinction rate at the K-T boundary as opposed to the high extinction rate of other phytoplankton groups, such as the coccolithophorids.

Late Cretaceous planktonic foraminiferal assemblages from the Exmouth Plateau, ODP Sites 122-762 and 122-763, eastern Indian Ocean

The evolution of planktonic foraminifera during the Late Cretaceous is marked in the Santonian by the disappearance of complex morphotypes (the marginotruncanids), and the contemporary increasing importance and diversification of another group of complex taxa, the globotruncanids. Upper Turonian to lower Campanian planktonic foraminiferal assemblages from Holes 762C and 763B (Ocean Drilling Program, Leg 122, Exmouth Plateau, 47°S palaeolatitude) were studied in detail to evaluate the compositional variations at the genus and species level based on the assumption that, in the Cretaceous oceans as in the modern, any faunal change was associated with changes in the characteristics and the degree of stability of the oceanic surface waters. Three major groups were recognised based on gross morphology, and following the assumption that Cretaceous planktonic foraminifera, although extinct, had life-history strategies comparable to those of modern planktonics: 1 - r-selected opportunists; 2 - k-selected specialists; 3 - r/k intermediate morphotypes which include all genera that display a range of trophic strategies in-between opportunist and specialist taxa. Although planktonic foraminiferal assemblages are characterised by a progressive appearance of complex taxa, this trend is discontinuous. Variation in number of species and specimens within genera has allowed recognition of five discrete intervals each of them reflecting different oceanic conditions based on fluctuations in diversity and abundance of the major morphotypes. Planktonic forms show cyclical fluctuations in diversity and abundance of cold (r-strategists) and warm taxa (k-strategists), perhaps representing alternating phases of unstable conditions (suggesting a weakly stratified upper water column in a mesotrophic environment), and well-stratified surface and near-surface waters (indicating a more oligotrophic environment). Interval 1, middle Turonian to early Coniacian in age, is dominated by the r/k intermediate morphotypes which alternate with r-strategists. These cyclical alternations are used to identify three additional subintervals. Interval 2, aged middle to late Coniacian, is characterised by the increasing number of species and relative abundance of k-strategists. After this maximum diversification the k-strategists show a progressive decrease reaching a minimum value in Interval 3 (early to late Santonian), which corresponds to the extinction of the genus Marginotruncana. In the Interval 4, latest Santonian in age, the k-strategists, represented mainly by the genera Globotruncana, increase again in diversity and abundance. The last Interval 5 (early Campanian) is dominated by juvenile globotruncanids and r-strategists which fluctuate in opposite phase. The positive peak (Interval 2) related to the maximum diversification of warm taxa (k-strategists) in the Coniacian seems to correspond to a warmer episode. It is followed by a marked decrease in the relative abundance of warm taxa (k-strategists crisis) with a minimum in the late Santonian (Interval 3), reflecting a decrease in temperature. Detailed analysis of faunal variations allows the Santonian faunal turnover to be ascribed to a cooling event strong enough to cause the extinction of the marginotruncanids.

Incidência de fungos em pós-colheita de banana 'Prata anã'(Musa AAB)

Este trabalho teve por objetivo determinar a ocorrência e a freqüência de fungos em banana 'Prata anã' e elucidar o agente causal das podridões em pós-colheita de frutos provenientes do norte de Minas Gerais. Dois métodos de isolamento foram adotados: diluição em placas, a partir da lavagem de frutos verdes, e direto de frutos maduros. Os fungos Colletotrichum musae, Trichoderma harzianum, Fusarium equisetii, Penicillium sp. Aspergillus parasiticus, Trichothecium roseum, Colletotrichum acutatum, Alternaria sp., Cladosporium musae e Curvularia lunata foram os mais freqüentemente associados aos frutos. A patogenicidade desses fungos foi testada pela substituição de discos da casca de frutos verdes por discos de micélio. Colletotrichum musae apresentou área média lesionada em torno do ponto de inoculação igual a 5,8 cm², enquanto para os demais fungos testados não passou de 1,50 cm². Os resultados mostraram que C. musae é o agente primário das podridões dos frutos examinados com 100 % de incidência e os demais fungos limitaram-se a necrosar os ferimentos em torno do ponto de inoculação. O modo de infecção latente, causada por C. musae, parece favorecer, primeiramente, a colonização interna dos tecidos e, posteriormente, a ação dos fungos oportunistas, que aceleram as podridões nos frutos e na coroa.

Early Triassic disaster and opportunistic foraminifers in South China

Survival and recovery are important dynamic processes of biotic evolution during major geological transitions. Disaster and opportunistic taxa are two significant groups that dominate the ecosystem in the aftermath of mass extinction events. Disaster taxa appear immediately after such crises whilst opportunists pre-date the crisis but also bloom in the aftermath. This paper documents three disaster foraminiferal species and seven opportunistic foraminiferal species from Lower Triassic successions of South China. They are characterized by extreme high abundance and low diversity and occurred occasionally in Griesbachian, Smithian and Spathian strata. The characteristics (small size, simple morphology) and stratigraphic ranges of these groups suggest that r-selection is a commonly used strategy for survivors to cope with either harsh post-extinction conditions and/or environments lacking incumbents.