A new institutional approach to Japanese firms' foreign direct investment under free trade agreements

This paper examines the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) under free trade agreements (FTAs) from a new institutional perspective. First, the determinants of FDI are theoretically discussed from a new institutional perspective. Then, FDI is statistically analyzed at the aggregate level. Kernel density estimation of firm-size reveals some evidence of "structural changes" after FTAs, as characterized by the investing firms' paid-up capital stock. Statistical tests of the average and variance of the size distribution confirm this in the case of FTAs with Asian partner countries. For FTAs with South American partner countries, the presence of FTAs seems to promote larger-scale FDIs. These results remain correlational instead of causal, and more statistical analyses would be needed to infer causality. Policy implications suggest that participants should consider "institutional" aspects of FTAs, that is, the size matters as a determinant of FDI. Future work along this line is needed to study "firm heterogeneity."

Local economic development initiatives and the transition from training and enterprise councils to new institutional structures in England

Current British government economic development policy emphasises regional and sub-regional scale, multi-agent initiatives that form part of national frameworks to encourage a 'bottom up' approach to economic development. An emphasis on local multi-agent initiatives was also the mission of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs). Using new survey evidence this article tracks the progress of a number of initiatives established under the TECs, using the TEC Discretionary Fund as an example. It assesses the ability of successor bodies to be more effective in promoting local economic development. Survey evidence is used to confirm that many projects previously set up by the TECs continue to operate successfully under new partnership arrangements. However as new structures have developed, and policy has become more centralized, it is less likely that similar local initiatives will be developed in future. There is evidence to suggest that with the end of the TECs a gap has emerged in the institutional infrastructure for local economic development, particularly with regard to workforce development. Much will depend in future on how the Regional Development Agencies deploy their growing power and resources.

New Public Management Reforms: Institutions matter!

New Public Management (NPM) has played a decisive role and has had a radical effect on the productivity and efficiency of the public sector in the Anglo-Saxon countries. However, the effective introduction of the NPM reforms is not an easy task. The scientific community is zealously analyzing the experiences of the developing countries. The stories, they tell, are full of failures, and ineffective reforms. The goal of the current study is to uncover the factors that might influence the successful implementation of the NPM reforms. In our analysis, by relying on the theories of new institutional economics, we developed a model with which we wish to prove that in regards to the success of the reforms the informal and the formal institutions characteristic of the given country are the decisively determining factors. When answering the question, we introduced a new indicator based on public choice theory – the politicians’ interest index – by which we could measure the success of the NPM. We tested our hypothesis by a comparative statistical analysis using the data from 31 countries. Based on our results, we find that informal institutions, the culture shared by the members of society, fundamentally determine the probability of the successful implementation of the NPM reforms, these results having a significant practical relevance.

Transaction Cost Analysis of PPP Risk Share

PPP (Public Private Partnerships) is a new operation mode of infrastructure projects, which usually undergo long periods and have various kinds of risks in technology, market, politics, policy, finance, society, natural conditions and cooperation. So the government and the private agency should establish the risk-sharing mechanism to ensure the successful implementation of the project. As an important branch of the new institutional economics, transaction cost economics and its analysis method have been proved to be beneficial to the proper allocation of risks between the two parts in PPP projects and the improvement of operation efficiency of PPP risk-sharing mechanism. This paper analyzed the transaction cost of the projects risk-sharing method and the both risk carriers. It pointed out that the risk-sharing method of PPP projects not only reflected the spirit of cooperation between public sector and private agency, but also minimized the total transaction cost of the risk sharing mechanism itself. Meanwhile, the risk takers had to strike a balance between the beforehand cost and the afterwards cost so as to control the cost of risk management. The paper finally suggested three ways which might be useful to reduce the transaction cost: to choose appropriate type of contract of PPP risk-sharing mechanism, to prevent information asymmetry and to establish mutual trust between the two participants.

Shareholder values, not shareholder value : the role of 'ethical funds' and 'ethical entrepreneurs' in connecting shareholders' values with their investments

This article rebuts the still-common assumption that managers of capitalist entities have a duty, principally or even exclusively, to maximise the monetary return to investors on their investments. It argues that this view is based on a misleadingly simplistic conception of human values and motivation. Not only is acting solely to maximise long-term shareholder value difficult, it displays, at best, banal single-mindedness and, at worst, sociopathy. In fact, real investors and managers have rich constellations of values that should be taken account of in all their decisions, including their business decisions. Awareness of our values, and public expression of our commitment to exemplify them, make for healthier investment and, in the long term, a healthier corporate world. Individuals and funds investing on the basis of such values, in companies that express their own, display humanity rather than pathology. Preamble I always enjoyed the discussions that Michael Whincop and I had about the interaction of ethics and economics. Each of us could see an important role for these disciplines, as well as our common discipline of law. We also shared an appreciation of the institutional context within which much of the drama of life is played out. In understanding the behaviour of individuals and the choices they make, it seemed axiomatic to each of us that ethics and economics have a lot to say. This was also true of the institutions in which they operate. Michael ·had a strong interest in 'the new institutional economics' I and I had a strong interest in 'institutionalising ethics' right through the 1990s.' This formed the basis of some fascinating and fruitful discussions. Professor Charles Sampford is Director, Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance, Foundation Professor of Law at Griffith University and President, International Institute for Public Ethics.DrVirginia Berry is a Research Fellow at theKey Centre for Ethics, Law,Justice andGovernance, Griffith University. Oliver Williamson, one of the leading proponents of the 'new institutional economics', published a number of influential works - see Williamson (1975, 1995,1996). Sampford (1991),' pp 185-222. The primary focus of discussions on institutionalising ethics has been in public sectorethics: see, for example, Preston and Sampford (2002); Sampford (1994), pp 114-38. Some discussion has, however, moved beyond the public sector to include business - see Sampford 200408299

Enfoques de la teoría de la firma y su vinculación con el cambio tecnológico y la innovación

Resumen: A partir de la escuela neoclásica, las ideas de Ronald Coase y la teoría evolucionista representada por Joseph Schumpeter, el artículo presenta la evolución del concepto de empresa desde una perspectiva estática y exógena, a analizarse dinámicamente, a una perspectiva evolutiva y endógena al sistema económico. La firma es desde este punto de vista, el principal agente innovador de la economía, y se concibe en la nueva economía institucional como respuesta a los problemas de información inherentes a los procesos productivos. En la coyuntura actual, el desarrollo económico está basado en la información; por lo tanto, cada empresa debe capitalizar la cualificación de sus recursos humanos, su saber-hacer, y la creación y difusión de tecnología innovadora.

O fundamento das improbidades na administração pública municipal brasileira

Ao longo da história, poucos fenômenos despertaram tanto interesse dos cidadãos, dispenderam tantos recursos do Estado e contribuíram tanto para o atraso de seu desenvolvimento quanto o problema da corrupção dos agentes públicos. Nesta tese, uso o conceito de improbidade para definir um tipo particular de fenômeno e distingui-lo de outros geralmente abrangidos pelo conceito de corrupção. A partir daí procuro responder as seguintes questões: quais elementos influenciam o processo de tomada de decisão do agente público para que considere o engajamento em uma improbidade? Que fatores estão associados à ocorrência de improbidades na Administração Pública municipal brasileira? Sob a perspectiva da nova economia institucional, a primeira parte da tese procede com a análise conceitual e metodológica do fenômeno, consubstanciado no referencial analíticos das improbidades, sustentando que: a) as improbidades correspondem a um gênero de atitudes oportunistas, dentre as quais se destaca uma espécie denominada transação corrupta; b) o processo de tomada de decisão do agente público, inserido no contexto de racionalidade limitada, orienta-se igualmente por elementos da análise custo-benefício (maximização da utilidade esperada), da dinâmica dos processos de aprendizagem e da barreira ético-moral dos próprios indivíduos. As demais partes da tese apresentam os resultados de uma investigação empírica sistemática, baseada nas informações de uma amostra aleatória de 960 municípios brasileiros auditados pela Controladoria-Geral da União. A análise evidencia os fatores associados à ocorrência das improbidades, tanto sob o ponto vista da literatura tradicional (modernização, capital social e rent-seeking), quanto da nova perspectiva analítica proposta, baseada nos mecanismos de governança. O teste a partir dos modelos tradicionais da literatura demonstra: a) a associação negativa entre a ocorrência das improbidades e os indicadores de desempenho institucional e de desenvolvimento socioeconômico dos municípios (em consonância com os efeitos comumente atribuídos as improbidades); b) a associação negativa entre a ocorrência das improbidades e os indicadores de modernização e de capital social dos municípios (em consonância com as causas comumente atribuídas as improbidades); c) a não associação entre a ocorrência das improbidades nos municípios brasileiros e os indicadores de incentivo ao comportamento rent-seeking (em oposição à clássica proposição de que quanto maior o tamanho do Estado, maior será a ocorrência de improbidades em razão dos incentivos oriundos de seu monopólio). Com base nos resultados obtidos, incorporo os supostos neoinstitucionalistas a análise das improbidades, interpretando-os como decorrência da inadequação das estruturas de governança dos contratos. Assim, para além do impacto do arranjo institucional, que abarca o controle parlamentar, administrativo e jurisdicional interno e externo dos recursos públicos federais transferidos aos municípios, apresento evidências de que as variações observadas na contagem de improbidades nos municípios brasileiros estão diretamente relacionadas à qualidade de seus mecanismos de governança. Dentre esses, destacam-se aqueles de natureza democrática: os mecanismos de controle social (os conselhos municipais de políticas públicas); os mecanismos de promoção da transparência (a qualidade do governo eletrônico); e os mecanismos de accountability (a disputa político-eleitoral). De acordo com o referencial analítico das improbidades, a existência e operação desses mecanismos elevam os custos de transação do agente público que, mesmo superando as limitações da barreira ético-moral e de aprendizado, ainda considera um eventual engajamento nesse gênero de atitudes oportunistas.