From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach

Is it important to negotiate on proportions rather than on numbers? To answer this question, we analyze the behavior of well-known bargaining solutions and the claims rules they induce when they are applied to a "proportionally transformed" bargaining set SP -so-called bargaining-in-proportions set. The idea of applying bargaining solutions to claims problems was already developed in Dagan and Volij (1993). They apply the bargaining solutions over a bargaining set that is the one de ned by the claims and the endowment. A comparison among our results and theirs is provided. Keywords: Bargaining problem, Claims problem, Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Nash bargaining solution. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

Parental investments in children: how bargaining and educational homogamy affect time allocation

This study examines parental time investment in their children, distinguishing between developmental and non-developmental care. Our analyses centre on three influential determinants: educational background, marital homogamy, and spouses' relative bargaining power. We find that the emphasis on quality care time is correlated with parents' education, and that marital homogamy reduces couple specialization, but only among the highly educated. In line with earlier research, we identify gendered parental behaviour. The presence of boys is an important condition for fathers' time dedication, but primarly among lower educated fathers. To the extent that parental stimulation is decisive for child outcomes, our findings suggest the persistence of important inequalities. This emerges through our special attention to behavioural differences across the educational distribution among households.

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy,in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitionsof finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with theWalrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalenceresults between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the caseof indivisible goods.

Equity considerations in health care: An axiomatic bargaining approach

The general issues of equity and efficiency are placed at the center of the analysis of resource allocation problems in health care. We examine them using axiomatic bargaining theory. We study different solutions that have been proposed and relate them to previous literature on health care allocation. In particular, we focus on the solutions based on axiomatic bargaining with claims and suggest that they may be particularly appealing as distributive criteria in health policy. Finally, we present the results of a survey that tries to elicit moral intuitions of people about resource allocation problems and their different solutions.

SPOC Collective Bargaining Agreement 2007-2009, July 2007

This Agreement made and entered into this 1st day of July 2007 at Des Moines, Iowa, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Iowa Code, by and between the State of Iowa (hereinafter referred to as the Employer) and the State Police Officers Council, and its appropriate affiliated sub-organizations (hereinafter referred to as the Council), as representatives of employees employed by the State of Iowa, as set forth specifically in the Recognition Clause.

AFSCME Collective Bargaining Agreement 2007-2009, July 2007

This Agreement made and entered into this 1st day of July 2007, at Des Moines, Iowa, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Code of Iowa, by and between the State of Iowa (hereinafter referred to as the Employer) and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Iowa Public Employees Council 61, AFL-CIO (hereinafter referred to as the Union), and its appropriate affiliated locals, as representatives of employees employed by the State of Iowa, as set forth specifically in Appendix A.

IUP Social Services Collective Bargaining Agreement, July 2007

This agreement made and entered in to this 1st day of July 2007, at Des Moines, Iowa pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Iowa code, by and between the State of Iowa (hereinafter referred to as the Employer) and UE Local 893/Iowa United Professionals, and it's appropriate affiliated locals, as representatives of employees employed by the State of Iowa, as set forth specifically in appendix A (hereinafter referred to as the Union).

Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the consistent field is intimately related to the concept of subgame perfection for finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. The solutions of the dynamic system associated to the consistent field characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the noncooperative bargaining games. We show that for transferable utility, hyperplane and pure bargaining games, the dynamics of the consistent fields converge globally to the unique consistent value. However, in the general NTU case, the dynamics of the consistent field can be complex. An example is constructed where the consistent field has cyclic solutions; moreover, the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria do not approach the consistent value.

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Endogenous bargaining power

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea thatthe agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the directconflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic buildingblock is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomesinto a disagreement point. Using this function and a weak axiom basedon individual rationality we reach a unique solution: the agreement inthe shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limitof a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a functionof the parties relative power. We examine the connection between ASC andasymmetric Nash solutions. We show the connection between the power ofthe parties embodied in the ASC solution and the bias in the SWF thatwould select ASC as an asymmetric Nash solution.

Bargaining on networks: An experiment

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or restricted communication flows. For example, information may be transmitted only through word-of-mouth, as is often the case for job openings, business opportunities, and confidential transactions. Bargaining can be considered to occur over a network that summarizes the structure of linkages among people. We conduct an alternating-offer bargaining experiment using separate simple networks, which are then joined during the session by an additional link. The results diverge sharply depending on how this connection is made. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link. We use a graph-theoretic analysis to show that any two-sided network can be decomposed into simple networks of three types, so that our result can be generalized to more complex bargaining environments. Participants appear to grasp the essential characteristics of the networks and we observe a rather consistently high level of bargaining efficiency.

On the quantitative importance of wage bargaining models

Four general equilibrium search models are compared quantitatively. Thebaseline framework is a calibrated macroeconomic model of the US economydesigned for a welfare analysis of unemployment insurance policy. Theother models make three simple and natural specification changes,regarding tax incidence, monopsony power in wage determination, and therelevant threat point. These specification changes have a major impacton the equilibrium and on the welfare implications of unemploymentinsurance, partly because search externalities magnify the effects ofwage changes. The optimal level of unemployment insurance dependsstrongly on whether raising benefits has a larger impact on searcheffort or on hiring expenditure.