On the efficiency of equal sacrifice income tax schedules

In an economy which primitives are exactly those in Mirrlees (1971), we investigate the efficiency of labor income tax schedules derived under the equal sacrifice principle. Starting from a given government revenue level, we use Werning’s (2007b) approach to assess whether there is an alternative tax schedule to the one derived under the equal sacrifice principle that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one. For our preferred parametrizations of the problem we find that inefficiency only arises at very high levels of income. We also show how the multipliers of the Pareto problem may be extracted from the data and used to find the implicit marginal social weights associated with each level of income.

Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance

We investigate optimal commodity taxation in a social insurance framework based on Varian (1980). We show that the tax prescriptions in this moral hazard framework are notably similar to those deriveMirrlees' (1971) self-selection framework. In particular, Atkinson and Stiglitz's (1976) results on uniform commodity taxation are valid in this setup. We incorporate pre-committed goods - those whose consumption must be decided before the resolution of uncertainty - and show that tax prescriptions are also analogous to the existing literature. The robustness of tax rules across these setups is explained by the relaxation of incentive compatibility constraints.

Yet another reason to tax goods

When, in a dynamic model, choices by an agent : i) are not observed, and; ii) affect preferences conditional on the realization of types, new and unexpected features come up in Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation frame- work. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration may be incorporated, we show how these two characteristics make it neces- sary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and we are able to show that uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general. Clean results regarding capital income taxation are not easy to come about because usual assumption on preferences do not allow for determining which constraints bind at the optimum. However, in the most ’natural’ cases, we show that return on capital ought to be taxed.

Nonlinear pricing beyond the demand profile approach

Wilson [16] introduced a general methodology to deal with monopolistic pricing in situations where customers have private information on their tastes (‘types’). It is based on the demand profile of customers: For each nonlinear tariff by the monopolist the demand at a given level of product (or quality) is the measure of customers’ types whose marginal utility is at least the marginal tariff (‘price’). When the customers’ marginal utility has a natural ordering (i.e., the Spence and Mirrlees Condition), such demand profile is very easy to perform. In this paper we will present a particular model with one-dimensional type where the Spence and Mirrlees condition (SMC) fails and the demand profile approach results in a suboptimal solution for the monopolist. Moreover, we will suggest a generalization of the demand profile procedure that improves the monopolist’s profit when the SMC does not hold.

Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets

We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare function tries to induce allocations that maximize its objective. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation of constrained efficient allocations using tax schedules. All allocations that are implementable by a tax schedule display negative marginal tax rates for almost all workers. Not all allocations that are implementable in a competitive setting are implementable in this noncompetitive environment.

Tributação de energia elétrica e bem-estar social: uma análise regional

Os reflexos da tributação sobre o setor elétrico ultrapassam as questões meramente arrecadatórias de estados, municípios e União, envolvem toda a produção do país e o bem-estar de sua população. Neste contexto, e com o intuito de trazer as questões de eficiência e redistributividade ao ambiente de tributação de energia elétrica, o presente trabalho pretende apresentar um panorama da tributação atual do consumo residencial de energia elétrica, principalmente em relação ao ICMS, juntamente com um cálculo simplificado de alíquotas considerando dois modelos de tributação ótima, estabelecidos por F. R. Ramsey e Diamond e Mirrlees, a partir dos quais é possível realizar comparações em relação ao modelo atual e sintetizar uma visão nacional de uma tributação realizada em sua maior parte regionalmente. O primeiro modelo considera apenas eficiência na definição das alíquotas aplicadas aos produtos, partindo da premissa de que todos os consumidores são idênticos e não há preocupações com equidade. As elasticidades necessárias para aplicação do critério de Ramsey são estimadas a partir de dados em painel das 64 distribuidoras de energia elétrica do país, utilizando um modelo em dois estágios com variável instrumental. O segundo modelo, proposto por Diamond e Mirrlees, incorpora a equidade na modelagem, introduzindo a diferenciação entre os indivíduos.

Taxation of couples: a mirrleesian approach for non-unitary households

Optimal tax theory in the Mirrlees’ (1971) tradition implicitly relies on the assumption that all agents are single or that couples may be treated as individuals, despite accumulating evidence against this view of household behavior. We consider an economy where agents may either be single or married, in which case choices result from Nash bargaining between spouses. In such an environment, tax schedules must play the double role of: i) defining households’ objective functions through their impact on threat points, and; ii) inducing the desired allocations as optimal choices for households given these objectives. We find that the taxation principle, which asserts that there is no loss in relying on tax schedules is not valid here: there are constrained efficient allocations which cannot be implemented via taxes. More sophisticated mechanisms expand the set of implementable allocations by: i) aligning the households’ and planner’s objectives; ii) manipulating taxable income elasticities, and; iii) freeing the design of singles’ tax schedules from its consequences on households’ objectives.

Decidiendo entre eficiencia y equidad un análisis del impuesto a la renta

La decisión de fijar impuestos inevitablemente implica un análisis de eficiencia y equidad, relación que ha sido extensamente estudiada en la literatura económica; sin embargo, los estudios asociados a impuestos óptimos para la economía peruana son reducidos, por lo que el presente trabajo busca dar un alcance de las tasas óptimas del impuesto a la renta que tendrían que pagar las familias, dadas las características de la economía de nuestro país. El marco teórico utilizado es el de Mirrlees (1971: 175-208), que es el autor de mayor aceptación y cuyo modelo continúa desarrollándose. Se propone un esquema de tasas de impuestos dependientes de la edad de los individuos, las cuales generan ganancias intra-temporales así como inter-temporales. Se analiza este esquema tributario bajo distintos enfoques del modelo de Mirrlees, considerándose el enfoque estándar, el de preferencias heterogéneas, y un modelo con preferencias implícitas del gobierno. De las simulaciones realizadas se encuentra que las personas menores a 35 años tendrían que pagar tasas marginales topes o máximas de 26%, mientras que las personas mayores a 35 años pagarían una tasa máxima de 31%.