Surface features of coral reefs /

Mode of access: Internet.

Research product - U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Latest issue consulted: 2005/03 (Jan. 2005) (CD-ROM).

Records relating to American prisoners of war and missing in action from the Vietnam War /

Includes index.

Salerno, American operations from the beaches to the Volturno (9 September-6 October 1943)

Sequel: From the Volturno to the winter line.

Waterways of Korea,

Mode of access: Internet.

CIA's analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 : a documentary collection /

Includes bibliographical references.

Drones y el orden legal internacional. Tecnología, estrategia y largas cadenas de acción

The main thesis of this article is that the increasing recourse to the use of unmanned aerial systems in asymmetric warfare and the beginning routinization of U.S. drone operations represent part of an evolutionary change in the spatial ordering of global politics -- Using a heuristic framework based on actor-network theory, it is argued that practices of panoptic observation and selective airstrikes, being in need of legal justification, contribute to a reterritorialization of asymmetric conflicts -- Under a new normative spatial regime, a legal condition of state immaturity is constructed, which establishes a zone of conditional sovereignty subject to transnational aerial policing -- At the same time, this process is neither a deterministic result of the new technology nor a deliberate effect of policies to which drones are merely neutral instruments -- Rather, military technology and political decisions both form part of a long chain of action which has evolved under the specific circumstances of recent military interventions

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Strategic intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Alliance Diplomacy in Anglo-French relations before the Second World War

Jackson, Peter, and Joe Maiolo, 'Strategic intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Alliance Diplomacy in Anglo-French relations before the Second World War', Military History (2006) 65(2) pp.417-461 RAE2008

Balkan battlegrounds : a military history of the Yugoslav conflict, 1990-1995.

Vol. 2 no longer available for sale from the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O.

Politico-military relationships in Communist China.

Mode of access: Internet.

Espionage against Poland in the Documents and Analyses of the Polish Special Services (1944 - 1989) - as Illustrated by the Intelligence Activities of the USA

The text analyses the intelligence activity against Poland in the period 1944-1989. The paper also contains a case study, i.e. an analysis of the American intelligence service activity held against Poland. While examining the research thesis, the author used the documents and analyses prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In order to best illustrate the point, the author presented a number of cases of persons who spied for the USA, which was possible thanks to the analysis of the training materials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs directed to the officers of the Security Service and the Citizens’ Militia. The text tackles the following issues: (1) to what extent did the character of the socio-political system influence the number of persons convicted for espionage against Poland in the period under examination?, (2) what was the level of interest of the foreign intelligence services in Poland before the year 1990?, (3) is it possible to indicate the specificity of the U.S. intelligence activity against Poland? 1) The analysis of data indicates that the period 1946-1956 witnessed a great number of convictions for espionage, which is often associated with the peculiar political situation in Poland of that time. Up to 1953, the countries of the Eastern bloc had reproduced the Stalin’s system, which only ceased due to the death of Stalin himself. Since then, the communist systems gradually transformed into the system of nomenklatura. Irrespective of these changes, Poland still witnessed a wave of repressions, which resulted from the threats continuously looming over the communist authorities – combating the anti-communist underground movement, fighting with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Polish government-in-exile, possible revisionism of borders, social discontent related to the socio-political reforms. Hence, a great number of convictions for espionage at that time could be ascribed to purely political sentences. Moreover, equally significant was the fact that the then judicial practice was preoccupied assessing negatively any contacts and relations with foreigners. This excessive number of convictions could ensue from other criminal-law provisions, which applied with respect to the crimes against the State, including espionage. What is also important is the fact that in the Stalin’s period the judiciary personnel acquired their skills and qualifications through intensive courses in law with the predominant spirit of the theory of evidence and law by Andrey Vyshinsky. Additionally, by the decree of 1944 the Penal Code of the Polish Armed Forces was introduced; the code envisaged the increase in the number of offences classified as penalised with death penalty, whereas the high treason was subject to the military jurisdiction (the civilians were prosecuted in military courts till 1955; the espionage, however, still stood under the military jurisdiction). In 1946, there was introduced the Decree on particularly dangerous crimes in the period of the State’s recovery, which was later called a Small Penal Code. 2) The interest that foreign intelligence services expressed in relation to Poland was similar to the one they had in all countries of Eastern and Central Europe. In the case of Poland, it should be noted that foreign intelligence services recruited Polish citizens who had previously stayed abroad and after WWII returned to their home country. The services also gathered information from Poles staying in immigrant camps (e.g. in FRG). The activity of the American intelligence service on the territory of FRG and West Berlin played a key role. The documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs pointed to the global range of this activity, e.g. through the recruitment of Polish sailors in the ports of the Netherlands, Japan, etc. In line with the development in the 1970s, espionage, which had so far concentrated on the defence and strategic sectors, became focused on science and technology of the People’s Republic of Poland. The acquisition of collaborators in academic circles was much easier, as PRL opened to academic exchange. Due to the system of visas, the process of candidate selection for intelligence services (e.g. the American) began in embassies. In the 1980s, the activity of the foreign intelligence services concentrated on the specific political situation in Poland, i.e. the growing significance of the “Solidarity” social movement. 3) The specificity of the American intelligence activity against Poland was related to the composition of the residency staff, which was the largest in comparison to other Western countries. The wide range of these activities can be proved by the quantitative data of convictions for espionage in the years 1944-1984 (however, one has to bear in mind the factors mentioned earlier in the text, which led to the misinterpretation of these data). Analysing the data and the documents prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, one should treat them with caution, as, frequently, the Polish counter-intelligence service used to classify the ordinary diplomatic practice and any contacts with foreigners as espionage threats. It is clearly visible in the language of the training materials concerned with “secret service methods of the intelligence activity” as well as in the documents on operational activities of the Security Service in relation to foreigners. The level of interest the USA had in Poland was mirrored in the classification of diplomatic posts, according to which Warsaw occupied the second place (the so-called Group “B”) on the three-point scale. The CIA experienced spectacular defeats during their activity in Poland: supporting the Polish underground anti-communist organisation Freedom and Independence and the so-called Munich-Berg episode (both cases took place in the 1950s). The text focuses only on selected issues related to the espionage activities against Poland. Similarly, the analysis of the problem has been based on selected sources, which has limited the research scope - however, it was not the aim of the author to present the espionage activity against Poland in a comprehensive way. In order to assess the real threat posed by the espionage activity, one should analyse the case of persons convicted for espionage in the period 1944-1989, as the available quantitative data, mentioned in the text, cannot constitute an explicit benchmark for the scale of espionage activity. The inaccuracies in the interpretation of data and variables, which can affect the evaluation of this phenomenon, have been pointed out in the text.

Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance como Agente de Mudança

O século XXI introduziu profundas mudanças no espaço onde a atuação militar se desenvolve. Esta mutação, que agora inclui o domínio físico e cognitivo na ação militar, impõe a adoção de novos conceitos de operação e estruturas organizacionais mais ágeis, de forma a fazerem face a um ambiente altamente volátil, imprevisível e complexo. Tal contexto torna as organizações, hoje mais do que nunca, dependentes de informação (e dos sistemas que as geram), e no âmbito das organizações militares, uma capacidade em particular assume, na atualidade, uma preponderância fulcral para o sucesso destas, que se designa por Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR). Considerando a complexidade de sistemas, processos e pessoas que envolvem toda esta capacidade, torna-se relevante estudar como a Força Aérea Portuguesa (FAP) está a acomodar este conceito no interior da sua estrutura, uma vez que a sua adaptação requer uma organização da era da informação, onde o trabalho em rede assume particular destaque. A presente investigação analisa formas de estruturas organizacionais contemporâneas e cruza-as com as recomendações da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (também designada por Aliança), comparando-as posteriormente com a atualidade da FAP. No final, são efetuadas propostas tangíveis, que podem potenciar as capacidades existentes, de onde se destaca a criação de uma matriz de análise quanto à eficiência organizacional, uma nova forma de organização das capacidades residentes no que ao ISR concerne, bem como o modo de potenciar o trabalho em rede com base nos meios existentes. Abstract: The 21st century has caused profound changes in the areas where military action takes place. This mutation, which now includes the physical and cognitive domain in military action, requires the adoption of new concepts of operation and more agile organizational structures in order to cope with a highly volatile, unpredictable and complex environment. Thus, more than ever, this makes the present organizations dependent of information (and the systems that generate them), in the case of military organizations, a particular capability undertakes today a strong impact on the success of military organizations. It is known as Intelligence, Surveillance& Reconnaissance (ISR). Taking into account the complexity of systems, processes and people involving all this capability, it is relevant to study how the Portuguese Air Force (PAF) is accommodating this concept within its structure, since the adaptation requires an organization adapted to the information era, where networking is particularly prominent. This research aims to analyze contemporary forms of organizational structures and cross them with the recommendations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (also known as Alliance), later comparing them with today's PAF. At the end of this investigation, some tangible proposals are made which can enhance existing capabilities: we can highlight the creation of an analysis matrix for organizational efficiency, a new form of organization of the resident capabilities in the ISR concerns, as well as the way of enhancing networking, based on existing means.

KNOWING THE ENEMY: NAZI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN WAR, HOLOCAUST, AND POSTWAR

“Knowing the Enemy: Nazi Foreign Intelligence in War, Holocaust and Postwar,” reveals the importance of ideologically-driven foreign intelligence reporting in the wartime radicalization of the Nazi dictatorship, and the continued prominence of Nazi discourses in postwar reports from German intelligence officers working with the U.S. Army and West German Federal Intelligence Service after 1945. For this project, I conducted extensive archival research in Germany and the United States, particularly in overlooked and files pertaining to the wartime activities of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Abwehr, Fremde Heere Ost, Auswärtiges Amt, and German General Staff, and the recently declassified intelligence files pertaining to the postwar activities of the Gehlen Organization, Bundesnachrichtendienst, and Foreign Military Studies Program. Applying the technique of close textual analysis to the underutilized intelligence reports themselves, I discovered that wartime German intelligence officials in military, civil service, and Party institutions all lent the appearance of professional objectivity to the racist and conspiratorial foreign policy beliefs held in the highest echelons of the Nazi dictatorship. The German foreign intelligence services’ often erroneous reporting on Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and international Jewry simultaneously figured in the radicalization of the regime’s military and anti-Jewish policies and served to confirm the ideological preconceptions of Hitler and his most loyal followers. After 1945, many of these same figures found employment with the Cold War West, using their “expertise” in Soviet affairs to advise the West German Government, U.S. Military, and CIA on Russian military and political matters. I chart considerable continuities in personnel and ideas from the wartime intelligence organizations into postwar West German and American intelligence institutions, as later reporting on the Soviet Union continued to reproduce the flawed wartime tropes of innate Russian military and racial inferiority.