Soft power as the new norm: How the Chinese-Russian strategic partnership (soft) balances American hegemony in an era of unipolarity

This study explores how great powers not allied with the United States formulate their grand strategies in a unipolar international system. Specifically, it analyzes the strategies China and Russia have developed to deal with U.S. hegemony by examining how Moscow and Beijing have responded to American intervention in Central Asia. The study argues that China and Russia have adopted a soft balancing strategy of to indirectly balance the United States at the regional level. This strategy uses normative capabilities such as soft power, alternative institutions and regionalization to offset the overwhelming material hardware of the hegemon. The theoretical and methodological approach of this dissertation is neoclassical realism. Chinese and Russian balancing efforts against the United States are based on their domestic dynamics as well as systemic constraints. Neoclassical realism provides a bridge between the internal characteristics of states and the environment which those states are situated. Because China and Russia do not have the hardware (military or economic power) to directly challenge the United States, they must resort to their software (soft power and norms) to indirectly counter American preferences and set the agenda to obtain their own interests. Neoclassical realism maintains that soft power is an extension of hard power and a reflection of the internal makeup of states. The dissertation uses the heuristic case study method to demonstrate the efficacy of soft balancing. Such case studies help to facilitate theory construction and are not necessarily the demonstrable final say on how states behave under given contexts. Nevertheless, it finds that China and Russia have increased their soft power to counterbalance the United States in certain regions of the world, Central Asia in particular. The conclusion explains how soft balancing can be integrated into the overall balance-of-power framework to explain Chinese and Russian responses to U.S. hegemony. It also suggests that an analysis of norms and soft power should be integrated into the study of grand strategy, including both foreign policy and military doctrine.

Os processos de normalização e desenvolvimento da doutrina militar combinada nas Forças Armadas Portuguesas

O emprego das Forças Armadas Portuguesas em Operações Conjuntas e Combinadas faz-se no âmbito do quadro de alianças de que Portugal faz parte, das quais destacamos a Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte. No sentido de melhorar a eficácia operacional, a normalização assume um papel fundamental para que se possa atingir a interoperabilidade entre as forças da Aliança. Assim, este trabalho teve como objetivo principal, analisar e sintetizar os processos de normalização e desenvolvimento de doutrina Militar Conjunta e Combinada nas Forças Armadas Portuguesas. Tem ainda como finalidade, identificar lacunas nos processos nacionais, de forma a contribuir para uma melhor integração e harmonização da doutrina da Aliança, tendo em consideração a doutrina nacional e os interesses nacionais. A nossa investigação baseou-se num raciocínio hipotético-dedutivo, apoiado por uma estratégia qualitativa. O modelo de análise desenvolvido teve por hipóteses, que foram deduzidas de questões derivadas da questão central. Neste processo analítico, identificámos indicadores que permitiram a validação das hipóteses, para este efeito, recorremos a dois estudos de caso e uma análise SWOT. O desenvolvimento de um plano de ação que permita a integração dos processos analisados constitui o principal contributo desta investigação. A necessidade de criar uma Estrutura Coordenadora de Normalização, primordial para agilizar os procedimentos de normalização entre o Ministério da Defesa Nacional, o Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas e os Ramos, juntamente, com a criação de um Conselho Superior de Doutrina nas Forças Armadas, que defina as prioridades e orientações gerais para o desenvolvimento de doutrina, constituem os principais resultados desta investigação. Abstract: The use of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Combined and Joint Operations is made within the framework of alliances that Portugal is a member, of which we highlight the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In order to improve the operational efficiency, standardization plays a key role in achieving the interoperability between the forces of the Alliance. The aim of this study is to analyse and synthesize the standardization and development processes of Combined and Joint Military Doctrine in the Portuguese Armed Forces. Identify gaps in national processes, in order to contribute to a better integration and harmonization of the Alliance Doctrine, taking into account the national doctrine and national interests. Our research was based on a hypothetical-deductive argument, supported by a qualitative strategy. The analysis model developed based on assumptions, deducted from derivatives questions of the central question. In this analytical process, we identify indicators that allowed the validation of hypotheses, to achieve this purpose we used two case studies and resort to a SWOT analysis. The development of an action plan that allows the integration of the analysed processes is the main contribution of this research. The need to create a Standardization Coordination Structure it´s crucial to streamline the procedures of normalization between the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces General Joint Staff and the Services, along with the establishment of a Doctrine Supreme Council in the Armed Forces, which set the priorities and guidelines for the development of doctrine. This are the main outputs of this research.

Observations on the history and doctrine of Christianity, and, as historically connected, on the primeval religion, on the Judaic and on the heathen, public, mystical, and philosophical. The latter proposed as an appendix to the political and military history of Greece.

Pages 33-38 of the second part omitted, replaced by p. 32-2--32-31.

Israel's airstrike on Syria's Al-Kibar facility : a test case for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence?

This article analyses the legality of Israel’s 2007 airstrike on an alleged Syrian nuclear facility at Al-Kibar—an incident that has been largely overlooked by international lawyers to date. The absence of a threat of imminent attack from Syria means Israel’s military action was not a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defence. Yet, despite Israel’s clear violation of the prohibition on the use of force there was remarkably little condemnation from other states, suggesting the possibility of growing international support for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. This article argues that the muted international reaction to Israel’s pre-emptive action was the result of political factors, and should not be seen as endorsement of the legality of the airstrike. As such, a lack of opinio juris means the Al-Kibar episode cannot be viewed as extending the scope of the customary international law right of self-defence so as to permit the use of force against non-imminent threats. However, two features of this incident—namely, Israel’s failure to offer any legal justification for its airstrike, and the international community’s apparent lack of concern over legality—are also evident in other recent uses of force in the ‘war on terror’ context. These developments may indicate a shift in state practice involving a downgrading of the role of international law in discussions of the use of force. This may signal a declining perception of the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum, at least in cases involving minor uses of force.

The doctrine of command responsibility in the midst of war : legal fallacy or reflection of reality

The history of war is blighted with astonishing reminders of man’s ability to cast his sense of humanity aside and inflict unspeakable harm upon one another. The ruthless bombing of Dresden, the callousness of the Nazi concentration camps and the massacre of the Tutsis are but a few of the atrocities that have haunted our past. In response to these atrocities, society has imposed an ever-increasing number of laws and rules to regulate warfare. Amongst these is the doctrine of command responsibility. The doctrine of command responsibility states that a commander is criminally liable for the crimes of his subordinates if he knew or should have known of their crimes. This paper will examine whether the doctrine is an appropriate and realistic legal standard to hold commanders accountable to or whether the doctrine is more a reflection of social sentiment and legal rhetoric. If the doctrine, and indeed the law of war in general, is unrealistic then the law cannot fulfil its purpose - that is, the prevention of atrocities. Instead of being solely a reflection of moral authority and social sentiments the law must also be a tool that guides and shapes the decisions and actions of the military through the chaotic and brutal nature of war...

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

The Putin doctrine: The formation of a conceptual framework for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area. OSW Commentary No. 131, 28.03.2014

The statements made in recent weeks by Russian officials, and especially President Vladimir Putin, in connection with Moscow’s policy towards Ukraine, may suggest that the emergence of a certain doctrine of Russian foreign and security policy is at hand, especially in relation to the post-Soviet area. Most of the arguments at the core of this doctrine are not new, but recently they have been formulated more openly and in more radical terms. Those arguments concern the role of Russia as the defender of Russian-speaking communities abroad and the guarantor of their rights, as well as specifically understood good neighbourly relations (meaning in fact limited sovereignty) as a precondition that must be met in order for Moscow to recognise the independence and territorial integrity of post-Soviet states. However, the new doctrine also includes arguments which have not been raised before, or have hitherto only been formulated on rare occasions, and which may indicate the future evolution of Russia’s policy. Specifically, this refers to Russia’s use of extralegal categories, such as national interest, truth and justice, to justify its policy, and its recognition of military force as a legitimate instrument to defend its compatriots abroad. This doctrine is effectively an outline of the conceptual foundation for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area. It offers a justification for the efforts to restore the unity of the ‘Russian nation’ (or more broadly, the Russian-speaking community), within a bloc pursuing close integration (the Eurasian Economic Union), or even within a single state encompassing at least parts of that area. As such, it poses a challenge for the West, which Moscow sees as the main opponent of Russia’s plans to build a new order in Europe (Eurasia) that would undermine the post-Cold War order.

Doctrine and procedures for airspace control in the combat zone /

At head of title: Aerospace doctrine.

The PLA at home and abroad : assessing the operational capabilities of China's military /

The chapters presented in this volume have demonstrated first, Chinese and PLA leaders have a strong sense of mission and concern for China's security and well-being. Second, the PLA is committed to the transformation in military affairs with Chinese characteristics. Third, the PLA is eager to learn from the U.S. military to expand and improve its operational capabilities. Finally, the PLA has made progress in its transformation and operational capabilities. For a long time, American leaders have been surprised with the PLA's advances. This volume (and many of the previous volumes from past PLA conferences) show that these advances did not come out of the blue. Although much of the learning and many of the improvements are still far from what is desired (from Chinese expectations and American critiques), and some of the learning has even created contradictions for the PLA, these persistent and diligent learning practices will eventually bring the PLA to a higher level of proficiency in its capabilities. The emergence of a much more sophisticated PLA in the coming years should not be a surprise.

Joint doctrine for amphibious embarkation.

Includes index.

Beyond the battle line : US air attack theory and doctrine, 1919-1941 /

"April 1996."

Identifying and implementing adaptive strategy in the U.S. military

Changes in the environment, including increased environmental complexity, require military supply units to employ a more adaptive strategy in order to enhance military agility. We extend the Lumpkin and Dess (1996) model and develop propositions that explore the interrelationships between/amongst entrepreneurial orientation (EO); opportunity recognition, evaluation and exploitation; environmental and organizational factors; and organizational performance. We propose that the innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk-taking dimensions of EO are of primary importance in identifying adaptive solutions and that these relationships are moderated by environmental factors. The autonomy and competitive aggressiveness dimensions of EO are important in implementing solutions as adaptive strategies, especially in a military context, and these relationships are moderated by organizational factors. This chapter extends existing theory developed primarily for the civilian sector to the military. Military organizations are more rigid hierarchical structures, and have different measures of performance. At an applied level, this research provides insights for military commanders that can potentially enhance agility and adaptability.