A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for decentralized supply chain formation

In this paper we consider a decentralized supply chain formation problem for linear multi-echelon supply chains when the managers of the individual echelons are autonomous, rational, and intelligent. At each echelon, there is a choice of service providers and the specific problem we solve is that of determining a cost-optimal mix of service providers so as to achieve a desired level of end-to-end delivery performance. The problem can be broken up into two sub-problems following a mechanism design approach: (1) Design of an incentive compatible mechanism to elicit the true cost functions from the echelon managers; (2) Formulation and solution of an appropriate optimization problem using the true cost information. In this paper we propose a novel Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting the true cost functions. This improves upon existing solutions in the literature which are all based on the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, requiring significant incentives to be paid to the echelon managers for achieving dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The proposed solution, which we call SCF-BIC (Supply Chain Formation with Bayesian Incentive Compatibility), significantly reduces the cost of supply chain formation. We illustrate the efficacy of the proposed methodology using the example of a three echelon manufacturing supply chain.

Design of an optimal auction for sponsored search auctions

In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we design a novel auction which we call the OPT (optimal) auction. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We show that the OPT mechanism is superior to two of the most commonly used mechanisms for sponsored search namely (1) GSP (Generalized Second Price) and (2) VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves). We then show an important revenue equivalence result that the expected revenue earned by the search engine is the same for all the three mechanisms provided the advertisers are symmetric and the number of sponsored slots is strictly less than the number of advertisers.

Design of incentive compatible protocols for wireless networks: A game theoretic approach

In this thesis work, we design rigorous and efficient protocols/mechanisms for different types of wireless networks using a mechanism design [1] and game theoretic approach [2]. Our work can broadly be viewed in two parts. In the first part, we concentrate on ad hoc wireless networks [3] and [4]. In particular, we consider broadcast in these networks where each node is owned by independent and selfish users. Being selfish, these nodes do not forward the broadcast packets. All existing protocols for broadcast assume that nodes forward the transit packets. So, there is need for developing new broadcast protocols to overcome node selfishness. In our paper [5], we develop a strategy proof pricing mechanism which we call immediate predecessor node pricing mechanism (IPNPM) and an efficient new broadcast protocol based on IPNPM. We show the efficacy of our proposed broadcast protocol using simulation results.

A strategy-proof and budget-balanced mechanism for carbon footprint reduction by global companies

The problem addressed in this paper is concerned with an important issue faced by any green aware global company to keep its emissions within a prescribed cap. The specific problem is to allocate carbon reductions to its different divisions and supply chain partners in achieving a required target of reductions in its carbon reduction program. The problem becomes a challenging one since the divisions and supply chain partners, being autonomous, may exhibit strategic behavior. We use a standard mechanism design approach to solve this problem. While designing a mechanism for the emission reduction allocation problem, the key properties that need to be satisfied are dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) (also called strategy-proofness), strict budget balance (SBB), and allocative efficiency (AE). Mechanism design theory has shown that it is not possible to achieve the above three properties simultaneously. In the literature, a mechanism that satisfies DSIC and AE has recently been proposed in this context, keeping the budget imbalance minimal. Motivated by the observation that SBB is an important requirement, in this paper, we propose a mechanism that satisfies DSIC and SBB with slight compromise in allocative efficiency. Our experimentation with a stylized case study shows that the proposed mechanism performs satisfactorily and provides an attractive alternative mechanism for carbon footprint reduction by global companies.

A scalable and automatic mechanism for resource allocation in self-organizing cloud

Taking advantage of the huge potential of consumers’ untapped computing power, self-organizing cloud is a novel computing paradigm where the consumers are able to contribute/sell their computing resources. Meanwhile, host machines held by the consumers are connected by a peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay network on the Internet. In this new architecture, due to large and varying multitudes of resources and prices, it is inefficient and tedious for consumers to select the proper resource manually. Thus, there is a high demand for a scalable and automatic mechanism to accomplish resource allocation. In view of this challenge, this paper proposes two novel economic strategies based on mechanism design. Concretely, we apply the Modified Vickrey Auction (MVA) mechanism to the case where the resource is sufficient; and the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism is employed when the resource is insufficient. We also prove that aforementioned mechanisms have dominant strategy incentive compatibility. Finally, extensive experiment results are conducted to verify the performance of the proposed strategies in terms of procurement cost and execution efficiency.

Investigation of the Design of a Bistable Micro-Chemical-Mechanical Device Utilizing Lateral Buckling

The Gracias Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University has developed microgrippers which utilize chemically-actuated joints to be used in micro-surgery. These grippers, however, take up to thirty minutes to close fully when activated biochemicals in the human body. This is very problematic and could limit the use of the devices in surgery. It is the goal of this research to develop a gripper that uses theGracias Laboratory's existing joints in conjunction with mechanical components to decrease the closing time. The purpose of including the mechanical components is to induce a state of instability at which time a small perturbation would cause the joint to close fully.The main concept of the research was to use the lateral buckling of a triangular gripper geometry and use a toggle mechanism to decrease the closure time of the device. This would create a snap-action device mimicking the quick closure of a Venus flytrap. All developed geometries were tested using finite element analysis to determine ifloading conditions produced the desired buckled shape. This research examines lateral buckling on the micro-scale and the possibility ofusing this phenomenon in a micro-gripper. Although a final geometry with the required deformed shaped was not found, this document contains suggestions for future geometries that may produce the correct deformed shape. It was determined through this work that in order to obtain the desired deformed shape, polymeric sections need to be added to the geometry. This simplifies the analysis and allows the triangular structure to buckle in the appropriate way due to the added joints. Future work for this project will be completed by undergraduate students at Bucknell University. Fabrication and testing of devices will be done at Johns Hopkins University in the Gracias Laboratory.

DESIGN, MODELING, AND FABRICATION OF MICROROBOT LEGS

This dissertation presents work done in the design, modeling, and fabrication of magnetically actuated microrobot legs. Novel fabrication processes for manufacturing multi-material compliant mechanisms have been used to fabricate effective legged robots at both the meso and micro scales, where the meso scale refers to the transition between macro and micro scales. This work discusses the development of a novel mesoscale manufacturing process, Laser Cut Elastomer Refill (LaCER), for prototyping millimeter-scale multi-material compliant mechanisms with elastomer hinges. Additionally discussed is an extension of previous work on the development of a microscale manufacturing process for fabricating micrometer-sale multi-material compliant mechanisms with elastomer hinges, with the added contribution of a method for incorporating magnetic materials for mechanism actuation using externally applied fields. As both of the fabrication processes outlined make significant use of highly compliant elastomer hinges, a fast, accurate modeling method for these hinges was desired for mechanism characterization and design. An analytical model was developed for this purpose, making use of the pseudo rigid-body (PRB) model and extending its utility to hinges with significant stretch component, such as those fabricated from elastomer materials. This model includes 3 springs with stiffnesses relating to material stiffness and hinge geometry, with additional correction factors for aspects particular to common multi-material hinge geometry. This model has been verified against a finite element analysis model (FEA), which in turn was matched to experimental data on mesoscale hinges manufactured using LaCER. These modeling methods have additionally been verified against experimental data from microscale hinges manufactured using the Si/elastomer/magnetics MEMS process. The development of several mechanisms is also discussed: including a mesoscale LaCER-fabricated hexapedal millirobot capable of walking at 2.4 body lengths per second; prototyped mesoscale LaCER-fabricated underactuated legs with asymmetrical features for improved performance; 1 centimeter cubed LaCER-fabricated magnetically-actuated hexapods which use the best-performing underactuated leg design to locomote at up to 10.6 body lengths per second; five microfabricated magnetically actuated single-hinge mechanisms; a 14-hinge, 11-link microfabricated gripper mechanism; a microfabricated robot leg mechansim demonstrated clearing a step height of 100 micrometers; and a 4 mm x 4 mm x 5 mm, 25 mg microfabricated magnetically-actuated hexapod, demonstrated walking at up to 2.25 body lengths per second.

Towards a game theoretic authorisation model

Authorised users (insiders) are behind the majority of security incidents with high financial impacts. Because authorisation is the process of controlling users’ access to resources, improving authorisation techniques may mitigate the insider threat. Current approaches to authorisation suffer from the assumption that users will (can) not depart from the expected behaviour implicit in the authorisation policy. In reality however, users can and do depart from the canonical behaviour. This paper argues that the conflict of interest between insiders and authorisation mechanisms is analogous to the subset of problems formally studied in the field of game theory. It proposes a game theoretic authorisation model that can ensure users’ potential misuse of a resource is explicitly considered while making an authorisation decision. The resulting authorisation model is dynamic in the sense that its access decisions vary according to the changes in explicit factors that influence the cost of misuse for both the authorisation mechanism and the insider.

Open Access and Scholarly Books: Workshop Report, 19 June 2013

On 19 June 2013 Knowledge Unlatched and the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School jointly convened a one-day workshop titled Open Access and Scholarly Books in Cambridge, MA. The workshop brought together a group of 21 invited publishers, librarians, academics and Open Access innovators to discuss the challenge of making scholarly books Open Access. This report captures discussions that took place on the day.

"I take care of my own" : a field study on how leadership handles conflict between individual and collective incentives

From the early literature on the role of firm managers (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) to the industrial organisation on contracts and mechanism design (Laont and Martimort 2009), economists have given a lot of attention to find solutions to the imperfect alignment between individuals' incentives and an organisation's collective goals (Prendergast 1999). In that literature a key role of managers is to monitor individuals to reward behaviour aligned with the collective goals and reduce sub- optimal behaviour, such as shirking. How- ever, another strand of literature, since Akerlof (1982), has put forward a vision of reciprocal behaviour between an organisation's leadership and its members: gifts (high wages, recognition) from the organisation are reciprocated by high effort from the members of the organisation. By rewarding individual members (rather than strictly monitoring them), organisations may benefit from greater effort and cohesion. Experimental research in organizational economics has provided mixed results suggesting that agents do react to personal incentives but also that reciprocal behaviour can play a substantial role (Camerer and Weber 2012).

Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks

Query incentive networks capture the role of incentives in extracting information from decentralized information networks such as a social network. Several game theoretic tilt:Kids of query incentive networks have been proposed in the literature to study and characterize the dependence, of the monetary reward required to extract the answer for a query, on various factors such as the structure of the network, the level of difficulty of the query, and the required success probability.None of the existing models, however, captures the practical andimportant factor of quality of answers. In this paper, we develop a complete mechanism design based framework to incorporate the quality of answers, in the monetization of query incentive networks. First, we extend the model of Kleinberg and Raghavan [2] to allow the nodes to modulate the incentive on the basis of the quality of the answer they receive. For this qualify conscious model. we show are existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and study the impact of quality of answers on the growth rate of the initial reward, with respect to the branching factor of the network. Next, we present two mechanisms; the direct comparison mechanism and the peer prediction mechanism, for truthful elicitation of quality from the agents. These mechanisms are based on scoring rules and cover different; scenarios which may arise in query incentive networks. We show that the proposed quality elicitation mechanisms are incentive compatible and ex-ante budget balanced. We also derive conditions under which ex-post budget balance can beachieved by these mechanisms.

An efficient pricing based protocol for broadcasting in wireless ad hoc networks

In many applications of wireless ad hoc networks, wireless nodes are owned by rational and intelligent users. In this paper, we call nodes selfish if they are owned by independent users and their only objective is to maximize their individual goals. In such situations, it may not be possible to use the existing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks as these protocols assume that nodes follow the prescribed protocol without deviation. Stimulating cooperation among these nodes is an interesting and challenging problem. Providing incentives and pricing the transactions are well known approaches to stimulate cooperation. In this paper, we present a game theoretic framework for truthful broadcast protocol and strategy proof pricing mechanism called Immediate Predecessor Node Pricing Mechanism (IPNPM). The phrase strategy proof here means that truth revelation of cost is a weakly dominant-strategy (in game theoretic terms) for each node. In order to steer our mechanism-design approach towards practical implementation, we compute the payments to nodes using a distributed algorithm. We also propose a new protocol for broadcast in wireless ad hoc network with selfish nodes based on IPNPM. The features of the proposed broadcast protocol are reliability and a significantly reduced number of packet forwards compared to the number of network nodes, which in turn leads to less system-wide power consumption to broadcast a single packet. Our simulation results show the efficacy of the proposed broadcast protocol.

Incentive Compatible Influence Maximization in Social Networks with Application to Viral Marketing

Information diffusion and influence maximization are important and extensively studied problems in social networks. Various models and algorithms have been proposed in the literature in the context of the influence maximization problem. A crucial assumption in all these studies is that the influence probabilities are known to the social planner. This assumption is unrealistic since the influence probabilities are usually private information of the individual agents and strategic agents may not reveal them truthfully. Moreover, the influence probabilities could vary significantly with the type of the information flowing in the network and the time at which the information is propagating in the network. In this paper, we use a mechanism design approach to elicit influence probabilities truthfully from the agents. Our main contribution is to design a scoring rule based mechanism in the context of the influencer-influencee model. In particular, we show the incentive compatibility of the mechanisms and propose a reverse weighted scoring rule based mechanism as an appropriate mechanism to use.

轮腿复合移动机器人自主越障姿态设定及轮腿运动协调算法实现

轮腿复合移动机器人具有很好的地面适应能力和越障能力。本文通过对机器人系统结构的分析和其越障高度的静态分析,计算出机器人能够越障的最大高度,并提出了针对典型地形环境(沟、坎、台)越障问题的机器人构型优化以及轮腿运动协调控制算法,而且通过实验验证了算法的有效性。

基于二维位置敏感探测器的空间对接过程研究

为了准确地捕捉机器人空间对接的传感器信息,从对接机构的设计入手,研究了空间对接中传感器的选择、改制和基于传感器信息的空间对接问题.考虑到安装空间的限制和处理的信息量太多,提出了利用二维位置敏感探测器(PSD)配合红外发光器阵列的方法完成机器人的空间对接.通过对位置敏感探测器工作原理的分析和对传感器特性的试验,提出了在PSD光敏面上增加光学装置的方法以扩大它的探测范围和精度,同时大大减小了它对光信号的依赖程度.把该方法应用于可重构模块化探测机器人系统中,提出了基于传感器信息的轨迹规划方法,对子机器人空间对接过程的仿真试验验证了轨迹规划和空间对接的可行性.