Transparency Proposals for European Sovereign Bond Markets

The debate over the possible extension of transparency regulation in Europe to include sovereign bonds has opened up a number of other issues in need of serious consideration. One such issue is the appropriateness of the entire infrastructure supporting the trading of European sovereign bonds. In recent years sovereign issuers have supported the development of an electronic inter-dealer market but have remained unconcerned with the opacity of dealer-to-customer trading. The degree of segmentation in this market is high relative to what exists in nearly all other financial markets. This paper explores why European sovereign bond markets have developed in such a segmented way and considers how this structure could be altered to improve transparency without adversely affecting liquidity, efficiency or the benefits enjoyed by primary dealers and issuers. It is suggested that the structure of the market could be improved greatly if the largest and most active investors were permitted access to the inter-dealer electronic trading platforms. This would solve a number of market imperfections and increase the proportion of market activity that is conducted in a transparent way. The paper argues that sovereign issuers in Europe have the means to provide incentives that would influence dealers to support reduced segmentation. Some practical examples of how this could be achieved are provided and the potential benefits are outlined.

Price Discovery in the Dual-Platform US Treasury Market

Inter-dealer trading in US Treasury securities is almost equally divided between two electronic trading platforms that have only slight differences in terms of their relative liquidity and transparency. BrokerTec is more active in the trading of 2-, 5-, and 10-year T-notes while eSpeed has more active trading in the 30-year bond. Over the period studied, eSpeed provides a more pre-trade transparent platform than BrokerTec. We examine the contribution to ‘price discovery’ of activity in the two platforms using high frequency data. We find that price discovery does not derive equally from the two platforms and that the shares vary across term to maturity. This can be traced to differential trading activities and transparency of the two platforms.

The enchained potential of the local food market

There is a rising demand for local food which traveled only short distances and is marketed directly by the producer. With growing importance of local food also the amount of literature in this field increased. Yet, literature is lacking to examine the challenges and burdens consumers face while trying to purchase local food. Evidence is shown that a gap exists between the intention of consumers who would like to purchase local food and their actual behavior. However, reasons for this gap are only discovered as byproducts of other research objectives. Consequently, this study investigates the specific reasons for the intention-behavior gap of consumers in the local food market. The study makes use of semi-structured face-to-face interviews with rural and urban respondents. The interviews are analyzed by qualitative content analysis based on Elo and Kyngäs (2008). Revealed key drivers for the intention-behavior gap are (1) the lack of awareness where to purchase local food products, (2) the limited reachability of local food producers, (3) the assortment of the local producer in regard to size and composition and (4) the lack in transparency of the prices of local food. Consequently, it is the producers turn to eliminate the revealed barriers by proactively bringing their products closer to the consumer.

The information content of REIT credit rating actions and transparency

We examine the short-run and long-run price reaction of equity REIT shares following credit rating actions, testing the transparency of the REIT structure. Generally, the economic effect on the stock price is subdued for both upgrades and downgrades compared to prior literature examining the broader U.S. equity market. An examination of trading volume revealed a significant increase in trading in reaction to downgrade credit rating changes, with a more subdued response to upgrades. The findings support the notion that REITs are more publicly forthcoming about the expectation of positive news in comparison to negative news.

Barriers to Latin American and Caribbean exports in the US market, 1998-1999

Includes bibliography

Barriers to Latin American and Caribbean exports in the US market, 2000-2001

Includes bibliography

Access to Latin American and Caribbean exports in the U.S. market 2001-2002

Access to Latin American and Caribbean Exports in the United States market, 2001-2002 is the seventh annual report released by the ECLAC Washington Office, updating information contained in previous reports. Its aim is to compile and make available information on trade inhibiting measures that Latin American and Caribbean exports encounter in the United States market. This report needs to be placed in the context of a trade relationship between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean, which has grown strongly over the years to the benefit of both economies. Moreover, it must be viewed against the background of the commitment to achieve the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), through which barriers to trade and investment will be progressively eliminated. In this regard, it is hoped that this report will further contribute to transparency and the elimination of obstacles to the free flow of trade in the Americas. The classification of trade inhibiting measures follows the definition used in the U.S. Trade Representatives (USTR) yearly publication National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. Based on this structure, the report focuses on the three areas of greatest relevance for Latin America and the Caribbean: Imports Policies (e.g., tariffs and other import charges, quantitative restrictions, import licensing, customs barriers). Standards, testing, labeling and certification (e.g., unnecessarily restrictive application of phytosanitary standards). Export subsidies (e.g., export financing on preferential terms and agricultural export subsidies that displace other foreign exports in third country markets).

Access of Latin American and Caribbean exports in the U.S. market 2002-2003

Access to Latin American and Caribbean Exports in the United States market, 2001-2002 is the eighth annual report released by the ECLAC Washington Office, updating information contained in previous reports. Its aim is to compile and make available information on trade inhibiting measures that Latin American and Caribbean exports encounter in the United States market. This report needs to be placed in the context of a trade relationship between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean, which has grown strongly over the years to the benefit of both economies. Moreover, it must be viewed against the background of the commitment to achieve the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), through which barriers to trade and investment will be progressively eliminated. In this regard, it is hoped that this report will further contribute to transparency and the elimination of obstacles to the free flow of trade in the Americas. The classification of trade inhibiting measures follows the definition used in the U.S. Trade Representatives (USTR) yearly publication National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. Based on this structure, the report focuses on the three areas of greatest relevance for Latin America and the Caribbean: Imports Policies (e.g., tariffs and other import charges, quantitative restrictions, import licensing, customs barriers). Standards, testing, labeling and certification (e.g., unnecessarily restrictive application of phytosanitary standards). Export subsidies (e.g., export financing on preferential terms and agricultural export subsidies that displace other foreign exports in third country markets).

Access of Latin American and Caribbean exports to the US market 2003-2004

Includes bibliography

Access of Latin American and Caribbean exports to the US market 2004-2005

Includes bibliography

Evaluation of the trading development in the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market

The efficiency of the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market in its first five and a half years is assessed in terms of volume, open interest and price. The continuous market shows steady liquidity growth. Its volume is strongly correlated to that of the Over The Counter (OTC) market, the amount of market makers, the enrolment of financial agents and generation companies belonging to the integrated group of last resort suppliers, and the OTC cleared volume in its clearing house. The hedging efficiency, measured through the ratio between the final open interest and the cleared volume, shows the lowest values for the Spanish base load futures as they are the most liquid contracts. The ex-post forward risk premium has diminished due to the learning curve and the effect of the fixed price retributing the indigenous coal fired generation. This market is quite less developed than the European leaders headquartered in Norway and Germany. Enrolment of more traders, mainly international energy companies, financial agents, energy intensive industries and renewable generation companies is desired. Market monitoring reports by the market operator providing post-trade transparency, OTC data access by the energy regulator, and assessment of the regulatory risk can contribute to efficiency gains.

Propuestas regulatorias para el diseño de un mercado ibérico a plazo eficiente de la energía = Regulatory proposals for the development of an efficient iberian energy forward market

El mercado ibérico de futuros de energía eléctrica gestionado por OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, con sede en Lisboa), también conocido como el mercado ibérico de derivados de energía, comenzó a funcionar el 3 de julio de 2006. Se analiza la eficiencia de este mercado organizado, por lo que se estudia la precisión con la que sus precios de futuros predicen el precio de contado. En dicho mercado coexisten dos modos de negociación: el mercado continuo (modo por defecto) y la contratación mediante subasta. En la negociación en continuo, las órdenes anónimas de compra y de venta interactúan de manera inmediata e individual con órdenes contrarias, dando lugar a operaciones con un número indeterminado de precios para cada contrato. En la negociación a través de subasta, un precio único de equilibrio maximiza el volumen negociado, liquidándose todas las operaciones a ese precio. Adicionalmente, los miembros negociadores de OMIP pueden liquidar operaciones “Over-The-Counter” (OTC) a través de la cámara de compensación de OMIP (OMIClear). Las cinco mayores empresas españolas de distribución de energía eléctrica tenían la obligación de comprar electricidad hasta julio de 2009 en subastas en OMIP, para cubrir parte de sus suministros regulados. De igual manera, el suministrador de último recurso portugués mantuvo tal obligación hasta julio de 2010. Los precios de equilibrio de esas subastas no han resultado óptimos a efectos retributivos de tales suministros regulados dado que dichos precios tienden a situarse ligeramente sesgados al alza. La prima de riesgo ex-post, definida como la diferencia entre los precios a plazo y de contado en el periodo de entrega, se emplea para medir su eficiencia de precio. El mercado de contado, gestionado por OMIE (“Operador de Mercado Ibérico de la Energía”, conocido tradicionalmente como “OMEL”), tiene su sede en Madrid. Durante los dos primeros años del mercado de futuros, la prima de riesgo media tiende a resultar positiva, al igual que en otros mercados europeos de energía eléctrica y gas natural. En ese periodo, la prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser negativa en los mercados de petróleo y carbón. Los mercados de energía tienden a mostrar niveles limitados de eficiencia de mercado. La eficiencia de precio del mercado de futuros aumenta con el desarrollo de otros mecanismos coexistentes dentro del mercado ibérico de electricidad (conocido como “MIBEL”) –es decir, el mercado dominante OTC, las subastas de centrales virtuales de generación conocidas en España como Emisiones Primarias de Energía, y las subastas para cubrir parte de los suministros de último recurso conocidas en España como subastas CESUR– y con una mayor integración de los mercados regionales europeos de energía eléctrica. Se construye un modelo de regresión para analizar la evolución de los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo durante sus cuatro primeros años como una función de doce indicadores potenciales de liquidez. Los únicos indicadores significativos son los volúmenes negociados en las subastas obligatorias gestionadas por OMIP, los volúmenes negociados en el mercado OTC y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear. El número de creadores de mercado, la incorporación de agentes financieros y compañías de generación pertenecientes a grupos integrados con suministradores de último recurso, y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear muestran una fuerte correlación con los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo. La liquidez de OMIP está aún lejos de los niveles alcanzados por los mercados europeos más maduros (localizados en los países nórdicos (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) y Alemania (EEX)). El operador de mercado y su cámara de compensación podrían desarrollar acciones eficientes de marketing para atraer nuevos agentes activos en el mercado de contado (p.ej. industrias consumidoras intensivas de energía, suministradores, pequeños productores, compañías energéticas internacionales y empresas de energías renovables) y agentes financieros, captar volúmenes del opaco OTC, y mejorar el funcionamiento de los productos existentes aún no líquidos. Resultaría de gran utilidad para tales acciones un diálogo activo con todos los agentes (participantes en el mercado, operador de mercado de contado, y autoridades supervisoras). Durante sus primeros cinco años y medio, el mercado continuo presenta un crecimento de liquidez estable. Se mide el desempeño de sus funciones de cobertura mediante la ratio de posición neta obtenida al dividir la posición abierta final de un contrato de derivados mensual entre su volumen acumulado en la cámara de compensación. Los futuros carga base muestran la ratio más baja debido a su buena liquidez. Los futuros carga punta muestran una mayor ratio al producirse su menor liquidez a través de contadas subastas fijadas por regulación portuguesa. Las permutas carga base liquidadas en la cámara de compensación ubicada en Madrid –MEFF Power, activa desde el 21 de marzo de 2011– muestran inicialmente valores altos debido a bajos volúmenes registrados, dado que esta cámara se emplea principalmente para vencimientos pequeños (diario y semanal). Dicha ratio puede ser una poderosa herramienta de supervisión para los reguladores energéticos cuando accedan a todas las transacciones de derivados en virtud del Reglamento Europeo sobre Integridad y Transparencia de los Mercados de Energía (“REMIT”), en vigor desde el 28 de diciembre de 2011. La prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser positiva en todos los mecanismos (futuros en OMIP, mercado OTC y subastas CESUR) y disminuye debido a la curvas de aprendizaje y al efecto, desde el año 2011, del precio fijo para la retribución de la generación con carbón autóctono. Se realiza una comparativa con los costes a plazo de generación con gas natural (diferencial “clean spark spread”) obtenido como la diferencia entre el precio del futuro eléctrico y el coste a plazo de generación con ciclo combinado internalizando los costes de emisión de CO2. Los futuros eléctricos tienen una elevada correlación con los precios de gas europeos. Los diferenciales de contratos con vencimiento inmediato tienden a ser positivos. Los mayores diferenciales se dan para los contratos mensuales, seguidos de los trimestrales y anuales. Los generadores eléctricos con gas pueden maximizar beneficios con contratos de menor vencimiento. Los informes de monitorización por el operador de mercado que proporcionan transparencia post-operacional, el acceso a datos OTC por el regulador energético, y la valoración del riesgo regulatorio pueden contribuir a ganancias de eficiencia. Estas recomendaciones son también válidas para un potencial mercado ibérico de futuros de gas, una vez que el hub ibérico de gas –actualmente en fase de diseño, con reuniones mensuales de los agentes desde enero de 2013 en el grupo de trabajo liderado por el regulador energético español– esté operativo. El hub ibérico de gas proporcionará transparencia al atraer más agentes y mejorar la competencia, incrementando su eficiencia, dado que en el mercado OTC actual no se revela precio alguno de gas. ABSTRACT The Iberian Power Futures Market, managed by OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, located in Lisbon), also known as the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market, started operations on 3 July 2006. The market efficiency, regarding how well the future price predicts the spot price, is analysed for this energy derivatives exchange. There are two trading modes coexisting within OMIP: the continuous market (default mode) and the call auction. In the continuous trading, anonymous buy and sell orders interact immediately and individually with opposite side orders, generating trades with an undetermined number of prices for each contract. In the call auction trading, a single price auction maximizes the traded volume, being all trades settled at the same price (equilibrium price). Additionally, OMIP trading members may settle Over-the-Counter (OTC) trades through OMIP clearing house (OMIClear). The five largest Spanish distribution companies have been obliged to purchase in auctions managed by OMIP until July 2009, in order to partly cover their portfolios of end users’ regulated supplies. Likewise, the Portuguese last resort supplier kept that obligation until July 2010. The auction equilibrium prices are not optimal for remuneration purposes of regulated supplies as such prices seem to be slightly upward biased. The ex-post forward risk premium, defined as the difference between the forward and spot prices in the delivery period, is used to measure its price efficiency. The spot market, managed by OMIE (Market Operator of the Iberian Energy Market, Spanish Pool, known traditionally as “OMEL”), is located in Madrid. During the first two years of the futures market, the average forward risk premium tends to be positive, as it occurs with other European power and natural gas markets. In that period, the ex-post forward risk premium tends to be negative in oil and coal markets. Energy markets tend to show limited levels of market efficiency. The price efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures Market improves with the market development of all the coexistent forward contracting mechanisms within the Iberian Electricity Market (known as “MIBEL”) – namely, the dominant OTC market, the Virtual Power Plant Auctions known in Spain as Energy Primary Emissions, and the auctions catering for part of the last resort supplies known in Spain as CESUR auctions – and with further integration of European Regional Electricity Markets. A regression model tracking the evolution of the traded volumes in the continuous market during its first four years is built as a function of twelve potential liquidity drivers. The only significant drivers are the traded volumes in OMIP compulsory auctions, the traded volumes in the OTC market, and the OTC cleared volumes by OMIClear. The amount of market makers, the enrolment of financial members and generation companies belonging to the integrated group of last resort suppliers, and the OTC cleared volume by OMIClear show strong correlation with the traded volumes in the continuous market. OMIP liquidity is still far from the levels reached by the most mature European markets (located in the Nordic countries (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) and Germany (EEX)). The market operator and its clearing house could develop efficient marketing actions to attract new entrants active in the spot market (e.g. energy intensive industries, suppliers, small producers, international energy companies and renewable generation companies) and financial agents as well as volumes from the opaque OTC market, and to improve the performance of existing illiquid products. An active dialogue with all the stakeholders (market participants, spot market operator, and supervisory authorities) will help to implement such actions. During its firs five and a half years, the continuous market shows steady liquidity growth. The hedging performance is measured through a net position ratio obtained from the final open interest of a month derivatives contract divided by its accumulated cleared volume. The base load futures in the Iberian energy derivatives exchange show the lowest ratios due to good liquidity. The peak futures show bigger ratios as their reduced liquidity is produced by auctions fixed by Portuguese regulation. The base load swaps settled in the clearing house located in Spain – MEFF Power, operating since 21 March 2011, with a new denomination (BME Clearing) since 9 September 2013 – show initially large values due to low registered volumes, as this clearing house is mainly used for short maturity (daily and weekly swaps). The net position ratio can be a powerful oversight tool for energy regulators when accessing to all the derivatives transactions as envisaged by European regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (“REMIT”), in force since 28 December 2011. The ex-post forward risk premium tends to be positive in all existing mechanisms (OMIP futures, OTC market and CESUR auctions) and diminishes due to the learning curve and the effect – since year 2011 – of the fixed price retributing the indigenous coal fired generation. Comparison with the forward generation costs from natural gas (“clean spark spread”) – obtained as the difference between the power futures price and the forward generation cost with a gas fired combined cycle plant taking into account the CO2 emission rates – is also performed. The power futures are strongly correlated with European gas prices. The clean spark spreads built with prompt contracts tend to be positive. The biggest clean spark spreads are for the month contract, followed by the quarter contract and then by the year contract. Therefore, gas fired generation companies can maximize profits trading with contracts of shorter maturity. Market monitoring reports by the market operator providing post-trade transparency, OTC data access by the energy regulator, and assessment of the regulatory risk can contribute to efficiency gains. The same recommendations are also valid for a potential Iberian gas futures market, once an Iberian gas hub – currently in a design phase, with monthly meetings amongst the stakeholders in a Working Group led by the Spanish energy regulatory authority since January 2013 – is operating. The Iberian gas hub would bring transparency attracting more shippers and improving competition and thus its efficiency, as no gas price is currently disclosed in the existing OTC market.

Supervisory transparency in the European banking union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/01, 3 January 2004

Bank supervisors should provide publicly accessible, timely and consistent data on the banks under their jurisdiction. Such transparency increases democratic accountability and leads to greater market efficiency. There is greater supervisory transparency in the United States compared to the member states of the European Union. The US supervisors publish data quarterly and update fairly detailed information on bank balance sheets within a week. By contrast, based on an attempt to locate similar data in every EU country, in only 11 member states is this data at least partially available from supervisors, and in no member state is the level of transparency as high as in the US. Current and planned European Union requirements on bank transparency are either insufficient or could be easily sidestepped by supervisors. A banking union in Europe needs to include requirements for greater supervisory transparency.

Financial regulatory transparency: new data and implications for EU policy. Bruegel Policy Brief 2015/20, December 2015

International financial institutions have promoted financial regulatory transparency, or the publication by supervisors of financial industry data. Financial regulatory transparency enhances market stability and increases democratic legitimacy. • We introduce a new index of financial regulatory data transparency: the FRT Index. It measures how countries report to international financial institutions basic macroprudential data about their financial systems.The Index covers 68 high-income and emerging-market economies over 22 years (1990-2011). • We find a number of striking trends over this period. European Union members are generally more opaque than other high-income countries.This finding is especially relevant given efforts to create an EU capital markets union. • Globally, financial regulatory data transparency has increased. However, there is considerable variation. Some countries have become significantlymore transparent, while others have become much more opaque. Reporting tends to decline during financial crises. • We propose that the EU institutions take on a greater role in coordinating and possibly enforcing reporting of bank and non-bank institution data. Similar to the United States, a reporting requirement should be part of any EU general deposit insurance scheme.

Participation and transparency in food law

La governance del settore alimentare si fonda su una struttura multilivello, ove poteri locali, nazionali, sovranazionali e globali interagiscono. In tale assetto, ogni regolatore è chiamato a proteggere interessi diversi tra loro, tra cui l'ambiente, la salute umana, il benessere animale e la libera concorrenza. La regolazione del settore alimentare, inoltre, impone la considerazione di aspetti etici e culturali, dotati di una forte matrice territoriale. In questo sistema, i valori che entrano in gioco non sono egualmente rappresentati, ma quelli considerati "minori" sono sovente sovrastati dalle esigenze di protezione di un unico interesse: la libera concorrenza su scala globale. Ne deriva che la regolazione del settore alimentare necessita di un nuovo equilibrio. Questo può richiedere sia l'adozione di nuove regole - soprattutto a livello sovranazionale - sia un'interpretazione maggiormente inclusiva dei principi e delle regole già esistenti da parte delle Corti. Tuttavia, risulta maggiormente urgente e di immediata efficacia permettere ai soggetti interessati, siano essi privati o pubblici, di partecipare alla formulazione delle politiche e delle decisioni inerenti il settore alimentare. La partecipazione procedurale è in grado di soddisfare esigenze differenti e talvolta opposte, pertanto essa è regolata dal legislatore a seconda dello scopo finale prefissato. Principalmente, essa è vista come una applicazione diretta dei principi di democrazia e trasparenza; tuttavia, il suo reale impatto sul risultato finale delle decisioni pubbliche può scostarsi considerevolemente da tale paradigma. Lo scopo di tale lavoro è analizzare i diversi modelli partecipativi implementati nei vari livelli di governo, al fine di determinarne il reale impatto sui soggetti interessati e sul bilanciamento degli interessi in gioco. La conclusione dimostra un certo livello di perplessità per ciò che riguarda l'assetto di tali garanzie nella regolazione del settore alimentare, dove lo sviluppo del concetto di democrazia partecipativa e di bilancio tra gli interessi rilevanti è ancora acerbo.