Strike hard, strike sure - Operation Musketeer : British military planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

Operation Musketeer, a combined joint Anglo-French operation aimed at regaining control of the Suez Canal in 1956, has received much attention from scholars. The most common approach to the crisis has been to examine the political dimension. The political events that led Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s cabinet to decide to use military force against the wishes of their superior American ally and in the face of American economic pressure and a Soviet threat to attack Paris and London with rockets have been analysed thoroughly. This is particularly the case because the ceasefire and eventual withdrawal were an indisputable defeat of British policy in the Middle East. The military operation not only ruined Prime Minister Eden’s career, but it also diminished the prestige of Britain. It was the beginning of the end, some claim. The British Empire would never be the same. As the consequences of using force are generally considered more important than the military operations themselves, very little attention has been paid to the military planning of Operation Musketeer. The difference between the number of publications on Operation Corporate of the Falklands War and Operation Musketeer is striking. Not only has there been little previous research on the military aspects of Musketeer, the conclusions drawn in the existing works have not reached a consensus. Some historians, such as Correlli Barnett, compare Musketeer to the utter failures of the Tudor landings and Gallipoli. Among significant politicians, Winston Churchill, who had retired from the prime ministership only a year before the Suez Crisis, described the operation as “the most ill-conceived and ill-executed imaginable”. Colin McInnes, a well-known author on British defence policy, represents the middle view when he describes the execution as “far from failure”. Finally, some, like Julian Thompson, the Commander of 3 Commando Brigade during the Falklands War, rate the military action itself as being successful. The interpretation of how successful the handling of the Suez Crisis was from the military point of view depends very much on the approach taken and the areas emphasised in the subject. Frequently, military operations are analysed in isolation from other events. The action of a country’s armed forces is separated from the wider context and evaluated without a solid point of comparison. Political consequences are often used as validated criteria, and complicated factors contributing to military performance are ignored. The lack of comprehensive research on the military action has left room for an analysis concentrating on the military side of the crisis.

Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.

Civilian casualties – do we really care? The failure of the revolution in military affairs of non-lethal weapons in the U.S., Russia and Israel

Causing civilian casualties during military operations has become a much politicised topic in international relations since the Second World War. Since the last decade of the 20th century, different scholars and political analysts have claimed that human life is valued more and more among the general international community. This argument has led many researchers to assume that democratic culture and traditions, modern ethical and moral issues have created a desire for a world without war or, at least, a demand that contemporary armed conflicts, if unavoidable, at least have to be far less lethal forcing the military to seek new technologies that can minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage. Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) – weapons that are intended to minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage – are based on the technology that, during the 1990s, was expected to revolutionise the conduct of warfare making it significantly less deadly. The rapid rise of interest in NLW, ignited by the American military twenty five years ago, sparked off an entirely new military, as well as an academic, discourse concerning their potential contribution to military success on the 21st century battlefields. It seems, however, that except for this debate, very little has been done within the military forces themselves. This research suggests that the roots of this situation are much deeper than the simple professional misconduct of the military establishment, or the poor political behaviour of political leaders, who had sent them to fight. Following the story of NLW in the U.S., Russia and Israel this research focuses on the political and cultural aspects that have been supposed to force the military organisations of these countries to adopt new technologies and operational and organisational concepts regarding NLW in an attempt to minimise enemy civilian casualties during their military operations. This research finds that while American, Russian and Israeli national characters are, undoubtedly, products of the unique historical experience of each one of these nations, all of three pay very little regard to foreigners’ lives. Moreover, while it is generally argued that the international political pressure is a crucial factor that leads to the significant reduction of harmed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure, the findings of this research suggest that the American, Russian and Israeli governments are well prepared and politically equipped to fend off international criticism. As the analyses of the American, Russian and Israeli cases reveal, the political-military leaderships of these countries have very little external or domestic reasons to minimise enemy civilian casualties through fundamental-revolutionary change in their conduct of war. In other words, this research finds that employment of NLW have failed because the political leadership asks the militaries to reduce the enemy civilian casualties to a politically acceptable level, rather than to the technologically possible minimum; as in the socio-cultural-political context of each country, support for the former appears to be significantly higher than for the latter.

Official history (naval and military) of the Russo-Japanese war.

Vol. I. To 24th August, 1904.--vol. II. To 13th January, 1905.--vol. II. To 13th September, 1905.

Knowledge, attitudes, and practices affecting health behaviors in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command population of Rangers

Malaria is a threat to United States military personnel operating in endemic areas, from which there have been hundreds of cases reported over the past decade. Each of these cases might have been avoided with proper adherence to malaria chemoprophylaxis medications. Military operations may detract from the strict 100% adherence required of these preventive medications. However, the reasons for non-adherence in military populations are not well understood. This behavior was investigated using a cross sectional study design on a convenience sample of U.S. Army Ranger volunteers (n=150) located at three military instillations. Theoretical support was based on components of the Health Belief Model, the Theory of Reasoned Action/Theory of Planned Behavior, and the Social Cognitive Theory. ^ Data on knowledge, attitudes, and practices, as well as multiple environmental domains was collected using an original yet unvalidated questionnaire. The data was analyzed using bivariate Pearson correlations, binary logistic regression, and moderated logistic regressions employing a 0.05 criterion of statistical significance. Power analyses predicted 96-98% power for this analysis. ^ Multiple significant medium strength Pearson correlation coefficients were identified relative to the two dependent variables Take medications as directed and Intend to take the medications as directed the next time. Binary logistic regression analyses identified multiple variables that may predict behavioral intentions to adhere to these preventive medications, as a proxy for behavioral change. Moderated logistic regression analyses identified Command Support for adherence to these medications as a potential significant moderator that interacts with independent variables within three domains of the survey questionnaire. ^ The findings indicate that there may be potential significant beneficial effects, which may improve this behavior in this population of Rangers through 1) promoting affirmative interpersonal communications that emphasize adherence to these medications, 2) including malaria chemoprophylaxis medications in the mission planning process, and 3) military command support, in the form of including the importance of proper adherence to these medications in the unit safety briefings.^

DIGRA (Digital Graffiti) um protótipo de apoio à realização de percursos topográficos

Dissertação apresentada como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Estatística e Gestão de Informação

Álcool e tabaco nos militares em Forças Nacionais Destacadas

RESUMO - Introdução: Segundo a Organização Mundial de Saúde, a evolução verificada nos últimos anos no consumo de álcool e tabaco e outras substâncias psicoactivas está a aumentar rapidamente e a contribuir de maneira importante para a carga das doenças em todo o mundo. A nível militar e nos elementos destacados para as missões de apoio à paz, é pertinente conhecer e caracterizar os padrões de consumo de álcool e tabaco a que estão sujeitos nestes contextos específicos de modo a compreender esta realidade e a sua importância e a poder intervir face às suas consequências. De ainda referir que existe escassez de estudos nesta área em Portugal. Objectivo: O objectivo deste estudo consiste em caracterizar os padrões de consumo de álcool e de tabaco dos militares das Forças Nacionais Destacadas, em missão de apoio à paz, no pré-deslocamento ainda em Portugal, no deslocamento em Teatro de Operações e no pós-deslocamento em território nacional. Metodologia: Apresenta-se o delineamento do estudo e o tipo de estudo que é longitudinal e analítico, a metodologia utilizada, bem como, as hipóteses colocadas, consolidadas na revisão de literatura efectuada previamente; faz-se a caracterização das variáveis sócio demográficas e instrumentais utilizadas. São definidos os critérios de inclusão e exclusão assim como aspectos éticos necessários. Definem-se ainda os testes estatísticos considerados apropriados para este tipo de estudo. Simulação de resultados, discussão e conclusões: Faz-se uma simulação do modo de apresentação dos resultados de acordo com os objectivos e hipóteses traçados tendo em conta a aplicação estatística considerada mais conveniente. Quanto ao ponto de discussão e conclusões dever-se-á após a realização do estudo comparar os resultados obtidos com os resultados de outros estudos análogos e no mesmo âmbito e tecer algumas considerações pertinentes sobre os mesmos. Assim seria importante sugerir novas orientações para outros estudos tendo em conta os resultados mais significativos que possam ser apurados e ainda ser reflectido e até apontado algumas respostas em termos de intervenção neste contexto.

Siirtomaasodasta sisäisen turvallisuuden operaatioon : Sir Robert Thompsonin periaatteet Britannian operaatioissa Malaijilla ja Pohjois-Irlannissa

Sir Robert Thompson määritti vuonna 1966 julkaistussa kirjassaan Defeating Communist Insurgency viisi vastakumoukselliselle sodankäynnille keskeistä periaatetta, jotka ovat: - Hallituksella tulee olla selkeä poliittinen tavoite. - Hallituksen täytyy toimia lainmukaisesti. - Hallituksella pitää olla kaikille toimijoilleen yhteinen yleissuunnitelma ja suunnittelu. - Hallituksen tulee asettaa painopiste poliittisen kumouksellisuuden, ei sissien voittamiseen. - Kumouksellisen sodan ollessa sissisodan vaiheessa, hallituksen tulee turvata ensimmäisenä omat tukialueensa Thompsonin periaatteet pohjautuvat hänen kokemuksiinsa Malaijin kriisin aikana 1948 – 60 ja ne siirtyivät osaksi ensimmäisiä brittiläisiä vastakumouksellisen sodankäynnin ohjesääntöjä, jotka julkaistiin vuonna 1969. Samana vuonna alkoi Pohjois-Irlannin konflikti (1969 – 98). Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää miten Thompsonin periaatteita toteutettiin ne pääosin synnyttäneessä Malaijin kriisissä ja Pohjois-Irlannin konfliktissa. Tutkimuskysymyksiä ovat: Mitä Thompsonin periaatteet tarkoittavat ja miten ne ovat ilmenneet brittiläisessä ohjesääntökirjallisuudessa? Mikä periaatteiden toteutuksessa yhdisti Malaijin ja Pohjois-Irlannin konflikteja? Mitä eroja periaatteiden toteuttamisessa oli konfliktien välillä? Mitkä tekijät aiheuttivat keskeiset erot periaatteiden toteuttamisessa konfliktien välillä?Tutkimuksen käytetty lähdemateriaali koostuu täysin laadullisesta aineistosta. Tutkimusmenetelmänä on käytetty laadullista, teorialähtöistä sisällönanalyysiä Eri lähteitä vertailemalla tehtyä analyysiä on ohjannut Thompsonin määrittämien periaatteiden kehys. Malaijin ja Pohjois-Irlannin konflikteista saatua analysoitua tietoa on verrattu keskenään käyttäen teoriakehystä, ja näin on pyritty löytämään yhtäläisyyksiä ja eroja Thompsonin periaatteiden toteuttamisessa konfliktien välillä. Tutkimuksen kannalta keskeisiä lähdeteoksia ovat: Sir Robert Thompson: Defeating Communist Insurgency, David McKittrick ja David McVea: Making Sense of the Troubles, Magne Haugseng: The Tightening Grip: Northern Ireland – The Military and 35 Years of Terror. Tutkimuksen kannalta keskeisiä lähdeasiakirjoja ovat Britannian asevoimien Pohjois-Irlannin konfliktista kirjoittama tutkimusraportti Operation Banner - An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland ja Riley Sunderlandin RAND-tutkimuslaitokselle vuonna 1964 laatimat Malaiji-raportit. Keskeisin ohjesääntölähde oli Britannian asevoimien vuosina 1969 – 70 julkaisema kolmiosainen vastakumouksellisen sodankäynnin ohjesääntö Land Operations Volume III Counter Revolutionary Operations. Tutkimuksessa havaittiin, että Britannian hallituksella oli molemmissa operaatioissa selkeät tavoitteet. Molemmissa operaatioissa hätätilavaltuudet laadittiin mahdollistamaan asevoimille ja poliisille laajat toimivaltuudet. Tästä huolimatta molemmissa operaatioissa tapahtui turvallisuusjoukkojen väärinkäytöksiä. Pohjois-Irlannin väärinkäytöksiä on tuotu selkeämmin esille PIRA:n propagandan ja tiedotusvälineiden läsnäolon takia. Kummassakaan operaatiossa ei ole ollut yhtä selkeää suunnitelmaa, vaan sarja erilaisia suunnitelmia. Malaijilla kaikkien toimijoiden yhteinen suunnittelu toimi koska sitä varten luotiin organisaatiorakenne. Pohjois-Irlannissa yhteisen suunnittelun periaatetta ei toteutettu poliitikkojen haluttomuuden takia. Sekä Malaijilla että Pohjois-Irlannissa toiminnan kohdentaminen kumouksellisuuteen toteutettiin häiritsemällä kumouksellisen vastustajan huoltoa. Malaijilla kumouksellisuuden oikeutusta heikennettiin myös muilla keinoilla kuten yhteiskunnallisia oloja kehittämällä sekä käynnistämällä Malaijin itsenäistymiskehitys. Kummassakaan operaatiossa hallituksen tukialueet eivät olleet vakavasti uhattuna. Keskeinen erottava tekijä operaatioiden välillä johtui tapahtumapaikasta ja – ajasta. Vastustajana PIRA oli kehittyneempi ja se kykeni muuttamaan toimintaansa vastaamaan muutoksia turvallisuusjoukkojen toiminnassa.

Modeling short-range ballistic missile defense and Israel's Iron Dome system

This paper develops a model of short-range ballistic missile defense and uses it to study the performance of Israel’s Iron Dome system. The deterministic base model allows for inaccurate missiles, unsuccessful interceptions, and civil defense. Model enhancements consider the trade-offs in attacking the interception system, the difficulties faced by militants in assembling large salvos, and the effects of imperfect missile classification by the defender. A stochastic model is also developed. Analysis shows that system performance can be highly sensitive to the missile salvo size, and that systems with higher interception rates are more “fragile” when overloaded. The model is calibrated using publically available data about Iron Dome’s use during Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012. If the systems performed as claimed, they saved Israel an estimated 1778 casualties and $80 million in property damage, and thereby made preemptive strikes on Gaza about 8 times less valuable to Israel. Gaza militants could have inflicted far more damage by grouping their rockets into large salvos, but this may have been difficult given Israel’s suppression efforts. Counter-battery fire by the militants is unlikely to be worthwhile unless they can obtain much more accurate missiles.

The salvo combat model with area fire

This paper analyzes versions of the salvo model of missile combat where area fire is used by one or both sides in a battle. While these models share some properties with the area fire Lanchester model and the aimed fire salvo model, they also display some interesting differences, especially over the course of several salvos. Whereas the relative size of each force is important with aimed fire, with area fire it is the absolute size that matters. Similarly, while aimed fire exhibits square law behavior, area fire shows approximately linear behavior. When one side uses area and the other uses aimed fire, the model displays a mix of square and linear law behavior.

Impact de l'art de la guerre napoléonien dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle

Le 18 juin 1815, Napoléon fut renversé à Waterloo, mais son art de la guerre survécut. Il s'agit de cet art militaire qu'il avait révolutionné et dont d'autres firent de nombreuses applications longtemps après sa disparition. S'inspirant des méthodes des théoriciens du XVIIIe siècle, il avait privilégié la stratégie d'anéantissement dans la conduite d'opérations militaires et se classait ainsi dans la catégorie des stratèges recherchant avant tout la bataille décisive en vue de détruire les forces ennemies. À la lumière des tactiques et stratégies que Bonaparte utilisa dans ses plus célèbres campagnes, cette thèse tentera de dégager les méthodes napoléoniennes qui furent le plus souvent utilisées au cours de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle. Les conflits étudiés durant cette période seront la guerre de Crimée (1853-1856), la campagne d'Italie (1859), la guerre de Sécession américaine (1861-1865), la guerre austro-prussienne (1866) et la guerre franco-prussienne (1870-1871). Cette recherche tiendra compte non seulement de l'influence des progrès de l'armement et des moyens de transport et de communication sur l'art de la guerre en général, mais aussi du contexte économique, financier, politique et militaire des États bélligérants de cette époque. Parmi les nombreux exégètes de Bonaparte du XIXe siècle, deux théoriciens militaires en particulier, Clausewitz et Jomini, se distinguèrent dans l'interprétation savante de la guerre napoléonienne. Tout en analysant l'impact des méthodes de l'Empereur dans les guerres selectionnées, nous allons déterminer dans quelle mesure la vision jominienne des campagnes de Bonaparte divergeait de celle de Clausewitz en ce qui concerne les conflits traités. Nous aborderons ensuite l'influence napoléonienne sur l'administration, l'organisation et les marches des armées impliquées dans les guerres en question et nous porterons une attention particulière à l'impact du système militaire de Bonaparte sur certains aspects du déroulement même des combats. Nous terminerons cette étude par un bref aperçu sur les enseignements que les militaires au XIXe siècle purent dégager des campagnes napoléoniennes pour la conduite des guerres de l'avenir.

Pratiques et usages de l'Europe dans le maintien de la paix : la coopération franco-irlandaise au Tchad

Thèse réalisé en cotutelle avec l'Université libre de Bruxelles (Belgique)

El discurso sobre la victimización de la mujer afgana como estrategia y justificación para la permanencia de las tropas estadounidenses en Afganistán (2001-2013)

La presente investigación pretende demostrar que la principal estrategia estadounidense para justificar su intervención y permanencia en territorio afgano ha sido el discurso. Donde se pueden identificar dos etapas a lo largo de esta última década. Inicialmente para explicar su incursión en Afganistán se utilizó el discurso de la seguridad y la guerra contra el terrorismo, años después frente al agotamiento y la critica tanto interna como internacional, el tema de la situación de la mujer en Afganistán cobra mayor importancia y con ello a través de los diferentes pronunciamientos y la exposición de casos específicos los diferentes gobiernos intentan cohesionar la opinión internacional y nacional frente a la necesidad de permanecer con sus tropas en el territorio.

A intervenção cubana em Angola revisitada

Documentos entretanto desclassificados nos arquivos cubanos e russos permitem um novo olhar sobre a intervenção cubana em Angola. Esta não só foi decidida autonomamente pelos cubanos, como teve, evidentemente o beneplácito sociético. Porém, essa mesma operação político-militar não foi produto das circunstâncias, antes se enquadrando nas tradicionais linhas orientadoras da política externa do regime castrista.

The Copenhagen principles on the handling of detainees: implications for the procedural regulation of internment

The Copenhagen Principles on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations were released in October 2012 after a five-year long process involving states and certain organizations. The Principles address a number of issues concerning the handling and transfer of detainees. They apply in military operations conducted by states abroad in the context of non-international armed conflicts and peace operations. This article focuses on those principles that address the procedural regulation of internment (ie preventive, security detention), as it is here that the current law is particularly unclear. On the one hand, the treaty provisions applicable in non-international armed conflicts contain no rules on the procedural regulation of internment, in comparison with the law of international armed conflict. On the other hand, the relevant rules under international human rights law (IHRL) appear derogable in such situations. This article demonstrates that the approach taken to this issue in the Copenhagen Principles is one which essentially draws on the procedural rules applicable to civilian internment in the international armed conflicts. These rules adopt standards that are lower than those under IHRL. Reference is then made to other recent practice, which illustrates that the Copenhagen Principles do not apply in a legal vacuum. In particular, two recent judicial developments highlight the continued relevance of human rights law and domestic law, respectively, in regulating detention operations in the context of international military operations. Compliance with the Copenhagen Principles may not, therefore, be sufficient for detention to be lawful.