Gender stereotyping and decision processes: extending and reversing the gender bias in fame judgements

M. R. Banaji and A. G. Greenwald (1995) demonstrated a gender bias in fame judgments—that is, an increase in judged fame due to prior processing that was larger for male than for female names. They suggested that participants shift criteria between judging men and women, using the more liberal criterion for judging men. This "criterion-shift" account appeared problematic for a number of reasons. In this article, 3 experiments are reported that were designed to evaluate the criterion-shift account of the gender bias in the false-fame effect against a distribution-shift account. The results were consistent with the criterion-shift account, and they helped to define more precisely the situations in which people may be ready to shift their response criterion on an item-by-item basis. In addition, the results were incompatible with an interpretation of the criterion shift as an artifact of the experimental situation in the experiments reported by M. R. Banaji and A. G. Greenwald. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)

Training conditional and cumulative risk judgements: the role of frequencies, problem-structure and Einstellung

Two experiments implement and evaluate a training scheme for learning to apply frequency formats to probability judgements couched in terms of percentages. Results indicate that both conditional and cumulative probability judgements can be improved in this manner, however the scheme is insufficient to promote any deeper understanding of the problem structure. In both experiments, training on one problem type only (either conditional or cumulative risk judgements) resulted in an inappropriate transfer of a learned method at test. The obstacles facing a frequency-based training programme for teaching appropriate use of probability data are discussed. Copyright (c) 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The benefits of providing benefit information: examining the effectiveness of provision of simple benefit statements on people's judgements about a medicine

Three experiments examined the effects of adding information about medication benefits to a short written explanation about a medicine. Participants were presented with a fictitious scenario about visiting the doctor, being prescribed an antibiotic and being given information about the medicine. They were asked to make various judgements relating to the information, the medicine and their intention to take it. Experiment 1 found that information about benefits enhanced the judgements, but did not influence the intention to comply. Experiment 2 compared the relative effectiveness of two different forms of the benefit statement, and found that both were effective in improving judgements, but had no effect on intention to comply. Experiment 3 compared the effectiveness of the two forms of benefit information but participants were told that the medicine was associated with four named side effects. Both types of statement improved ratings of the intention to comply, as well as ratings on the other measures. The experiments provide fairly consistent support for the inclusion of benefit information in medicine information leaflets, particularly to balance concerns about side effects.

Analysing lexical richness in French learner language: what frequency lists and teacher judgements can tell us about basic and advanced words

We show how teacher judgements can be used to assess the quality of vocabulary used by L2 learners of French.

Do normative judgements aim to represent the World?

Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world.

Dissociation between the impact of evidence on eye movement target choice and confidence judgements

It has been suggested that the evidence used to support a decision to move our eyes and the confidence we have in that decision are derived from a common source. Alternatively, confidence may be based on further post-decisional processes. In three experiments we examined this. In Experiment 1, participants chose between two targets on the basis of varying levels of evidence (i.e., the direction of motion coherence in a Random-Dot-Kinematogram). They indicated this choice by making a saccade to one of two targets and then indicated their confidence. Saccade trajectory deviation was taken as a measure of the inhibition of the non-selected target. We found that as evidence increased so did confidence and deviations of saccade trajectory away from the non-selected target. However, a correlational analysis suggested they were not related. In Experiment 2 an option to opt-out of the choice was offered on some trials if choice proved too difficult. In this way we isolated trials on which confidence in target selection was high (i.e., when the option to opt-out was available but not taken). Again saccade trajectory deviations were found not to differ in relation to confidence. In Experiment 3 we directly manipulated confidence, such that participants had high or low task confidence. They showed no differences in saccade trajectory deviations. These results support post-decisional accounts of confidence: evidence supporting the decision to move the eyes is reflected in saccade control, but the confidence that we have in that choice is subject to further post-decisional processes.

Ordinal judgements of depth in monocularly- and binocularly-viewed photographs of complex natural scenes

This study investigated the contribution of stereoscopic depth cues to the reliability of ordinal depth judgments in complex natural scenes. Participants viewed photographs of cluttered natural scenes, either monocularly or stereoscopically. On each trial, they judged which of two indicated points in the scene was closer in depth. We assessed the reliability of these judgments over repeated trials, and how well they correlated with the actual disparities of the points between the left and right eyes' views. The reliability of judgments increased as their depth separation increased, was higher when the points were on separate objects, and deteriorated for point pairs that were more widely separated in the image plane. Stereoscopic viewing improved sensitivity to depth for points on the same surface, but not for points on separate objects. Stereoscopic viewing thus provides depth information that is complementary to that available from monocular occlusion cues.

The consistency of welfare judgements with a representative consumer

This paper is about economies with a representative consumer. In general a representative consumer need not exist, although there are several well known sets of sufficient conditions under which Qne will. It is common practice, however, to use the representative consumer hypothesis without specifically assuming any of these. We show, firstly, that it is possible for the utility of the representative consumer to increase when every actual consumer is made worse off. This shows a serious shortcoming of welfare judgements based on the representatíve consumer. Secondly, in economies where this does not occur, there exists a social welfare function, which we construct, which is consistent with welfare judgements based on the utility of the representative consumer. Finally we provide a converse to Samuelson' s 1956 representative consumer result, which relates it to Scitovsky's community indifference curves.

Interpreting Judgements using Knowledge Representation Methods and Computational Models of Argument

The goal of the present research is to define a Semantic Web framework for precedent modelling, by using knowledge extracted from text, metadata, and rules, while maintaining a strong text-to-knowledge morphism between legal text and legal concepts, in order to fill the gap between legal document and its semantics. The framework is composed of four different models that make use of standard languages from the Semantic Web stack of technologies: a document metadata structure, modelling the main parts of a judgement, and creating a bridge between a text and its semantic annotations of legal concepts; a legal core ontology, modelling abstract legal concepts and institutions contained in a rule of law; a legal domain ontology, modelling the main legal concepts in a specific domain concerned by case-law; an argumentation system, modelling the structure of argumentation. The input to the framework includes metadata associated with judicial concepts, and an ontology library representing the structure of case-law. The research relies on the previous efforts of the community in the field of legal knowledge representation and rule interchange for applications in the legal domain, in order to apply the theory to a set of real legal documents, stressing the OWL axioms definitions as much as possible in order to enable them to provide a semantically powerful representation of the legal document and a solid ground for an argumentation system using a defeasible subset of predicate logics. It appears that some new features of OWL2 unlock useful reasoning features for legal knowledge, especially if combined with defeasible rules and argumentation schemes. The main task is thus to formalize legal concepts and argumentation patterns contained in a judgement, with the following requirement: to check, validate and reuse the discourse of a judge - and the argumentation he produces - as expressed by the judicial text.