Poetics of Subjectivity : Existence and Expressivity in Simone de Beauvoir's Philosophy

In the last thirty years, primarily feminist scholars have drawn attention to and re-evaluated the philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir (1908 1986). Her philosophical practice has been described as non-systematic, and her literary writing has been viewed as part of her non-systematic mode of philosophising. This dissertation radically deepens the question concerning Beauvoir s philosophical motivations for turning to literature as a mode to express subjectivity. It explicates the central concepts of Beauvoir s philosophy of existence, which are subjectivity, ambiguity, paradox and temporality, and their background in the modern traditions of existential philosophy and phenomenology. It also clarifies Beauvoir s main reason to turn to literature in order to express subjectivity as both singular and universal: as a specific mode of communication, literature is able to make the universality of existence manifest in the concrete, singular and temporal texture of life. In addition, the thesis gives examples of how Beauvoir s literary works contribute to an understanding of the complexity of subjectivity. I use the expression poetics of subjectivity to refer to the systematic relation between Beauvoir s existential and phenomenological notion of subjectivity and her literary works, and to her articulations of a creative mode of using language, especially in the novel. The thesis is divided into five chapters, of which the first three investigate Beauvoir s philosophy of existence at the intersection of the modern traditions of thought that began with René Descartes and Søren Kierkegaard s intuitions about subjectivity. Chapter 1 interprets Beauvoir s notion of ambiguity, as compared to paradox, and argues that both determine her notion of existence. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the phenomenological side of Beauvoir s philosophy through a study of her response to early French interpretations of transcendental subjectivity, especially in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. My analysis shows that Edmund Husserl s distinction between different levels of subjective experience is central to Beauvoir s understanding of subjectivity and to the different ego concepts she uses. Chapter 4 is a study of Beauvoir s reflections on the expression of subjective thought, and, more specifically, her philosophical conceptions of the metaphysical novel and the autobiography as two modes of indirect communication. Chapter 5, finally, compares two modes of investigating concrete subjectivity; Beauvoir s conceptual study of femininity in Le deuxième sexe and her literary expression of subjectivity in the novel L Invitée. My analysis reveals and explicates Beauvoir s original contribution to a comprehensive understanding of the becoming and paradox of human existence: the fundamental insight that these phenomena are sexed, historically as well as imaginatively.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

La Teoría del Diseño Inteligente : un análisis desde el tomismo

Resumen: Michael Behe y William Dembski son dos de los líderes de la Teoría del Diseño Inteligente, una propuesta surgida como respuesta a los modelos evolucionistas y anti-finalistas prevalentes en ciertos ambientes académicos e intelectuales, especialmente del mundo anglosajón. Las especulaciones de Behe descansan en el concepto de “sistema de complejidad irreductible”, entendido como un conjunto ordenado de partes cuya funcionalidad depende estrictamente de su indemnidad estructural, y que su origen resulta, por tanto, refractario a explicaciones gradualistas. Estos sistemas, según Behe, están presentes en los vivientes, lo que permitiría inferir que ellos no son el producto de mecanismos ciegos y azarosos, sino el resultado de un diseño. Dembski, por su parte, ha abordado el problema desde una perspectiva más cuantitativa, desarrollando un algoritmo probabilístico conocido como “filtro explicatorio”, que permitiría, según el autor, inferir científicamente la presencia de un diseño, tanto en entidades artificiales como naturales. Trascendiendo las descalificaciones del neodarwinismo, examinamos la propuesta de estos autores desde los fundamentos filosóficos de la escuela tomista. A nuestro parecer, hay en el trabajo de estos autores algunas intuiciones valiosas, las que sin embargo suelen pasar desapercibidas por la escasa formalidad en que vienen presentadas, y por la aproximación eminentemente mecanicista y artefactual con que ambos enfrentan la cuestión. Es precisamente a la explicitación de tales intuiciones a las que se dirige el artículo.

La integración del saber en la obra de Jacques Maritain

Resumen: La cuestión sobre la integración del saber es un tema particularmente relevante en el panorama de la epistemología actual. Nuestra época promueve un clima favorable al diálogo, pero con resultados de valor desparejo. Uno de los grandes intelectuales cristianos del siglo XX, Jacques Maritain, dedicó una parte importante de su obra a reflexionar sobre estas cuestiones. Siguiendo su lema distinguir para unir este trabajo se despliega en dos partes: la primera referida al momento de distinción entre las disciplinas, y la segunda al momento de su (relativa) unificación. En esta entrega se avanza a partir de las intuiciones primordiales de la sabiduría metafísica y las grandes categorías del conocimiento: el saber en sentido analógico, la filosofía, la ciencia y la teología. Maritain introduce el criterio de división a partir de lo especulativo y lo práctico. Luego, en el orden especulativo, recurre a la doctrina tradicional sobre la abstracción y sus formas, esforzándose por adaptar los principios que la inspiran a la compleja temática de la ciencia actual. Se cierra con una consideración acerca de las modalidades del saber práctico. Este movimiento de distinción será completado en la segunda parte del trabajo a partir de las exigencias de complementación de las disciplinas involucradas.

O resgate da sensorialidade na transferência

Face às transformações sócio-culturais ocorridas ao longo do século XX, que favoreceram a predominância de configurações psicopatológicas distintas das neuroses, a metapsicologia freudiana passou por críticas e revisões, que visavam tanto compreender quanto tratar essas patologias que desde então ficaram em evidência. O narcisismo se mostrou um conceito central nessa reformulação teórica, que permitiu a construção de uma segunda teoria tópica do aparelho psíquico, quando o inconsciente deixou de ser entendido como subproduto da consciência. Neste novo modelo, embora o conflito edipiano ainda mantenha um lugar de destaque na cena psíquica, sua importância no desvelamento dos processos de instauração das psicopatologias passou a um plano secundário. A aquisição de um sentido vital e o desenvolvimento de estilos subjetivos como tributários das marcações sensoriais estabelecidas nos primórdios da relação materno-infantil passaram, radativamente, a ocupar um lugar de destaque na teorização psicanalítica e, consequentemente, os processos infralingüísticos adquiriram relevo como moduladores da eficácia da cura pela palavra. Neste trabalho discuto aspectos de algumas das intuições freudianas acerca da forma como se constitui um psiquismo em sua teorização, e apresento a relevância de contribuições à sua teoria, realizadas por psicanalistas como Ferenczi, Winnicott, Anzieu e Haag, entre outros. A contribuição desses autores para a o entendimento das condições e obstáculos para o estabelecimento de um Eu capaz de agir de forma criativa na interação com seu meio, permite que se pense no fenômeno humano em uma perspectiva que rompe com os dualismos - aos quais Freud se manteve aderido - e compreende a subjetivação como um processo complexo e interminável. A categoria sensorialidade desempenha um papel significativo e precisa ser considerada na compreensão dos fenômenos que emergem no campo transferencial. Apresento um caso clínico como fio condutor e como ilustração da importância de seu resgate na prática da terapia psicanalítica contemporânea, visto que pretendo reafirmar a soberania da clínica para interpelar a teoria e enriquecê-la.

Esportes e lazer como instrumentos políticos da Era Vargas e governo Lula: aproximações e particularidades

Esta Tese de Doutorado foi elaborada com a pretensão de contribuir para as reflexões políticas acerca do lazer e dos esportes. A compreensão que há confusões conceituais entre eles e a convicção de que suas características favorecem o uso ideológico dessas práticas foram determinantes para o aprofundamento destes estudos. Nosso entendimento é que essas atividades se legitimam como direitos sociais e, como tal, deveriam ser contempladas no conjunto das Políticas Públicas sejam em nível federal, estadual ou municipal. Entretanto, aqui se revelam as contradições que subsidiam as análises centrais dessa Tese. É fato que o lazer e os esportes estiveram presentes nos programas das políticas sociais de diferentes governos brasileiros em distintas épocas, entretanto, o protagonismo atribuído a eles está marcado pela ideologização de suas propostas de ação. Essa hipótese pôde ser comprovada na recuperação histórica que fizemos neste trabalho. O objetivo principal da pesquisa era a análise das Políticas Públicas de Esportes e Lazer implementadas pela Era Vargas e Governo Lula para estabelecer comparações entre eles e, por esse motivo nos dedicamos a esses dois períodos históricos, emblemáticos e permeados de contradições políticas e sociais. Inquietava-nos a percepção de que, dois governos ideologicamente distintos fizessem uso dos mesmos instrumentos no diálogo com a classe trabalhadora. A contextualização dos governos dos dois líderes demarcou a analogia entre eles na utilização dos preceitos desenvolvimentistas, nacionalistas e populistas. Ainda que essas aproximações em níveis mais gerais tenham apontado coincidências relevantes, a principal constatação de nossa Tese foi a similaridade no uso ideológico do lazer e dos esportes, o que comprovou nossas intuições iniciais. Enquanto Getúlio Vargas associou as concessões de direitos trabalhistas aos programas de Recreação Operária e ao estímulo do ufanismo nacional articulado com a seleção brasileira de futebol, Lula adotou o assistencialismo explícito, incentivou a espetacularização dos esportes de rendimento e proporcionou a realização histórica dos Megaeventos Esportivos em série, no Brasil. Na Era Vargas foi possível constatar o lazer contribuindo para a domesticação dos corpos, os esportes para estabelecer uma relação harmoniosa entre dominantes e dominados e o futebol para a divulgação do regime interna e externamente. Já no Governo Lula, percebemos a retração das políticas sociais nas questões do lazer; os programas de esportes, predominantemente voltados para a descoberta de talentos e a priorização do espetáculo esportivo. A análise que fizemos não deixa dúvidas que os princípios liberais de fortalecimento do capital e aumento dos lucros, norteadores da política econômica mundial e balizadores da política macro do Governo Lula, se refletiram na definição de suas Políticas Públicas de Esportes e Lazer, que em nosso entendimento se resumiram na realização dos Megaeventos Esportivos.

Motivated Action Theory: A Formal Theory of Causal Reasoning

When we reason about change over time, causation provides an implicit preference: we prefer sequences of situations in which one situation leads causally to the next, rather than sequences in which one situation follows another at random and without causal connections. In this paper, we explore the problem of temporal reasoning --- reasoning about change over time --- and the crucial role that causation plays in our intuitions. We examine previous approaches to temporal reasoning, and their shortcomings, in light of this analysis. We propose a new system for causal reasoning, motivated action theory, which builds upon causation as a crucial preference creterion. Motivated action theory solves the traditional problems of both forward and backward reasoning, and additionally provides a basis for a new theory of explanation.

An Algorithm for Parsing Flow Graphs

This report describes research about flow graphs - labeled, directed, acyclic graphs which abstract representations used in a variety of Artificial Intelligence applications. Flow graphs may be derived from flow grammars much as strings may be derived from string grammars; this derivation process forms a useful model for the stepwise refinement processes used in programming and other engineering domains. The central result of this report is a parsing algorithm for flow graphs. Given a flow grammar and a flow graph, the algorithm determines whether the grammar generates the graph and, if so, finds all possible derivations for it. The author has implemented the algorithm in LISP. The intent of this report is to make flow-graph parsing available as an analytic tool for researchers in Artificial Intelligence. The report explores the intuitions behind the parsing algorithm, contains numerous, extensive examples of its behavior, and provides some guidance for those who wish to customize the algorithm to their own uses.

Qualitative Analysis of MOS Circuits

With the push towards sub-micron technology, transistor models have become increasingly complex. The number of components in integrated circuits has forced designer's efforts and skills towards higher levels of design. This has created a gap between design expertise and the performance demands increasingly imposed by the technology. To alleviate this problem, software tools must be developed that provide the designer with expert advice on circuit performance and design. This requires a theory that links the intuitions of an expert circuit analyst with the corresponding principles of formal theory (i.e. algebra, calculus, feedback analysis, network theory, and electrodynamics), and that makes each underlying assumption explicit.

Getting Constitutional Theory into Proportion: A Matter of Interpretation?

Gibbs, N., Getting Constitutional Theory into Proportion: A Matter of Interpretation?, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 27 (1), 175-191. RAE2008

Filozofia antyczna wobec problemu interpretacji. Rozwój alegorezy od przedsokratyków do Arystotelesa

The present work examines the beginnings of ancient hermeneutics. More specifically, it discusses the connection between the rise of the practice of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the emergence of the first theory of figurative language, on the other. Thus, this book investigates the specific historical and cultural circumstances that enabled the ancient Greeks not only to discover the possibility of allegorical interpretation, but also to treat figurative language as a philosophical problem. By posing difficulties in understanding the enigmatic sense of various esoteric doctrines, poems, oracles and riddles, figurative language created the context for theoretical reflection on the meaning of these “messages”. Hence, ancient interpreters began to ponder over the nature and functions of figurative (“enigmatic”) language as well as over the techniques of its proper use and interpretation. Although the practice of allegorical interpretation was closely linked to the development of the whole of ancient philosophy, the present work covers only the period from the 6th to the 4th century B.C. It concentrates, then, on the philosophical and cultural consequences of allegoresis in the classical age. The main thesis advocated here has it that the ancient Greeks were in-clined to regard allegory as a cognitive problem rather than merely as a stylistic or a literary one. When searching for the hidden meanings of various esoteric doc-trines, poems, oracles and riddles, ancient interpreters of these “messages” assumed allegory to be the only tool suitable for articulating certain matters. In other words, it was their belief that the use of figurative language resulted from the necessity of expressing things that were otherwise inexpressible. The present work has been organized in the following manner. The first part contains historical and philological discussions that provide the point of departure for more philosophical considerations. This part consists of two introductory chapters. Chapter one situates the practice of allegorical interpretation at the borderline of two different traditions: the rhetorical-grammatical and the hermeneutical. In order to clearly differentiate between the two, chapter one distinguishes between allegory and allegoresis, on the one hand, and allegoresis and exegesis, on the other. While pointing to the conventionality (and even arbitrariness) of such distinctions, the chapter argues, nevertheless, for their heuristic usefulness. The remaining part of chapter one focuses on a historical and philological reconstruction of the most important conceptual tools of ancient hermeneutics. Discussing the semantics of such terms as allēgoría, hypónoia, ainigma and symbolon proves important for at least two crucial reasons. Firstly, it reveals the mutual affinity between allegoresis and divination, i.e., practices that are inherently connected with the need to discover the latent meaning of the “message” in question (whether poem or oracle). Secondly, these philological analyses bring to light the specificity of the ancient understanding of such concepts as allegory or symbol. It goes without saying that antiquity employed these terms in a manner quite disparate from modernity. Chapter one concludes with a discussion of ancient views on the cognitive value of figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Chapter two focuses on the role that allegoresis played in the process of transforming mythos into logos. It is suggested here that it was the practice of allegorical interpretation that made it possible to preserve the traditional myths as an important point of reference for the whole of ancient philosophy. Thus, chapter two argues that the existence of a clear opposition between mythos into logos in Preplatonic philosophy is highly questionable in light of the indisputable fact that the Presocratics, Sophists and Cynics were profoundly convinced about the cognitive value of mythos (this conviction was also shared by Plato and Aristotle, but their attitude towards myth was more complex). Consequently, chapter two argues that in Preplatonic philosophy, myth played a function analogous to the concepts discussed in chapter one (i.e., hidden meanings, enigmas and symbols), for in all these cases, ancient interpreters found tools for conveying issues that were otherwise difficult to convey. Chapter two concludes with a classification of various types of allegoresis. Whilst chapters one and two serve as a historical and philological introduction, the second part of this book concentrates on the close relationship between the development of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the flowering of philosophy, on the other. Thus, chapter three discusses the crucial role that allegorical interpretation came to play in Preplatonic philosophy, chapter four deals with Plato’s highly complex and ambivalent attitude to allegoresis, and chapter five has been devoted to Aristotle’s original approach to the practice of allegorical interpretation. It is evident that allegoresis was of paramount importance for the ancient thinkers, irrespective of whether they would value it positively (Preplatonic philosophers and Aristotle) or negatively (Plato). Beginning with the 6th century B.C., the ancient practice of allegorical interpretation is motivated by two distinct interests. On the one hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects the more or less “conservative” attachment to the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus). The purpose of this apologetic allegoresis is to exonerate poetry from the charges leveled at it by the first philosophers and, though to a lesser degree, historians. Generally, these allegorists seek to save the traditional paideia that builds on the works of the poets. On the other hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects also the more or less “progressive” desire to make original use of the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus) so as to promote a given philosophical doctrine. The objective of this instrumental allegoresis is to exculpate philosophy from the accusations brought against it by the more conservative circles. Needless to say, these allegorists significantly contribute to the process of the gradual replacing of the mythical view of the world with its more philosophical explanation. The present book suggests that it is the philosophy of Aristotle that should be regarded as a sort of acme in the development of ancient hermeneutics. The reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand, the Stagirite positively values the practice of allegoresis, rehabilitating, thus, the tradition of Preplatonic philosophy against Plato. And, on the other hand, Aristotle initiates the theoretical reflection on figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Hence, in Aristotle we encounter not only the practice of allegoresis, but also the theory of allegory (although the philosopher does not use the term allēgoría). With the situation being as it is, the significance of Aristotle’s work cannot be overestimated. First of all, the Stagirite introduces the concept of metaphor into the then philosophical considerations. From that moment onwards, the phenomenon of figurative language becomes an important philosophical issue. After Aristo-tle, the preponderance of thinkers would feel obliged to specify the rules for the appropriate use of figurative language and the techniques of its correct interpretation. Furthermore, Aristotle ascribes to metaphor (and to various other “excellent” sayings) the function of increasing and enhancing our knowledge. Thus, according to the Stagirite, figurative language is not only an ornamental device, but it can also have a significant explanatory power. Finally, Aristotle observes that figurative expressions cause words to become ambiguous. In this context, the philosopher notices that ambiguity can enrich the language of a poet, but it can also hinder a dialectical discussion. Accordingly, Aristotle is inclined to value polysemy either positively or negatively. Importantly, however, the Stagirite is perfectly aware of the fact that in natural languages ambiguity is unavoidable. This is why Aristotle initiates a syste-matic reflection on the phenomenon of ambiguity and distinguishes its various kinds. In Aristotle, ambiguity is, then, both a problem that needs to be identified and a tool that can help in elucidating intricate philosophical issues. This unique approach to ambiguity and figurative (“enigmatic”) language enabled Aristotle to formulate invaluable intuitions that still await appropriate recognition.

Matching Well-Being to Merit:The Example of Punishment

In this paper, I explore our common-sense thinking about the relation between moral value, moral merit, and well-being. Starting from Ross’s observation that welfarist axiologies ignore our intuitions about desert, I focus on axiologies that take moral merit and well-being to be independent determinants of value. I distinguish three ways in which these axiologies can be formulated, and I then consider their application to the issue of punishment. The objection that they recommend penalties in circumstances in which intuitively we would judge them to be unjustified is examined, and I suggest that it can be met by incorporating temporal information into the way in which value, well-being and moral merit are linked.

The effects and side-effects of statistics education: Psychology students’ (mis-)conceptions of probability

In three studies we looked at two typical misconceptions of probability: the representativeness heuristic, and the equiprobability bias. The literature on statistics education predicts that some typical errors and biases (e.g., the equiprobability bias) increase with education, whereas others decrease. This is in contrast with reasoning theorists’ prediction who propose that education reduces misconceptions in general. They also predict that students with higher cognitive ability and higher need for cognition are less susceptible to biases. In Experiments 1 and 2 we found that the equiprobability bias increased with statistics education, and it was negatively correlated with students’ cognitive abilities. The representativeness heuristic was mostly unaffected by education, and it was also unrelated to cognitive abilities. In Experiment 3 we demonstrated through an instruction manipulation (by asking participants to think logically vs. rely on their intuitions) that the reason for these differences was that these biases originated in different cognitive processes.

Discriminating Taxonomic Categories and Domains in Mental Simulations of Concepts of Varying Concreteness

Most studies of conceptual knowledge in the brain focus on a narrow range of concrete conceptual categories, rely on the researchers' intuitions about which object belongs to these categories, and assume a broadly taxonomic organization of knowledge. In this fMRI study, we focus on concepts with a variety of concreteness levels; we use a state of the art lexical resource (WordNet 3.1) as the source for a relatively large number of category distinctions and compare a taxonomic style of organization with a domain-based model (associating concepts with scenarios). Participants mentally simulated situations associated with concepts when cued by text stimuli. Using multivariate pattern analysis, we find evidence that all Taxonomic categories and Domains can be distinguished from fMRI data and also observe a clear concreteness effect: Tools and Locations can be reliably predicted for unseen participants, but less concrete categories (e.g., Attributes, Communications, Events, Social Roles) can only be reliably discriminated within participants. A second concreteness effect relates to the interaction of Domain and Taxonomic category membership: Domain (e.g., relation to Law vs. Music) can be better predicted for less concrete categories. We repeated the analysis within anatomical regions, observing discrimination between all/most categories in the left middle occipital and temporal gyri, and more specialized discrimination for concrete categories Tool and Location in the left precentral and fusiform gyri, respectively. Highly concrete/abstract Taxonomic categories and Domain were segregated in frontal regions. We conclude that both Taxonomic and Domain class distinctions are relevant for interpreting neural structuring of concrete and abstract concepts.

Développement durable : Quelques points litigieux

Le développement durable a pour objectif de concilier des exigences diverses,sinon antagoniques :l’économique, le social,l’environnemental.On peut donc se demander s’il répond vraiment aux intuitions qui sont au point de départ de la conscience écologique. Nous en dégageons trois, dans trois domaines : l’exigence de protection de la nature, la conviction que la solution à la crise environnementale ne peut pas être purement technique, et l’insistance sur la dimension sociale, et pas seulement naturelle, de la crise environnementale. Chacune de ces exigences donne lieu à des débats conflictuels : préservation contre conservation,souci éthique contre optimisme technologique,exigence sociale et politique contre traitement scientiste des questions environnementales. De l’examen de ces litiges,il ressort que l’avenir du développement durable passe par une reformulation du concept de nature.