Insurance with frequent trading: A dynamic analysis of efficient insurance markets

This paper extends existing insurance results on the type of insurance contracts needed for insurance market efficiency toa dynamic setting. It introduces continuosly open markets that allow for more efficient asset allocation. It alsoeliminates the role of preferences and endowments in the classification of risks, which is done primarily in terms of the actuarial properties of the underlying riskprocess. The paper further extends insurability to include correlated and catstrophic events. Under these very general conditions the paper defines a condition that determines whether a small number of standard insurance contracts (together with aggregate assets) suffice to complete markets or one needs to introduce such assets as mutual insurance.

Insurance with frequent trading

This paper looks at the dynamic management of risk in an economy with discrete time consumption and endowments and continuous trading. I study how agents in such an economy deal with all the risk in the economy and attain their Pareto optimal allocations by trading in a few natural securities: private insurance contracts and a common set of derivatives on the aggregate endowment. The parsimonious nature ofthe implied securities needed for Pareto optimality suggests that insuch contexts complete markets is a very reasonable assumption.

The aggregate claims distribution of a life insurance portfolio with a pairwise positive dependence structure

The individual life model has always been considered as the one closest to the real situation of the total claims of a life insurance portfolio. It only makes the ¿nearly inevitable assumption¿ of independence of the lifelenghts of insured persons in the portfolio. Many clinical studies, however, have demonstrated positive dependence of paired lives such as husband and wife. In our opinion, it won¿t be unrealistic expecting a considerable number of married couples in any life insurance portfolio (e.g. life insurance contracts formalized at the time of signing a mortatge) and these dependences materially increase the values for the stop-loss premiums associated to the aggregate claims of the portfolio. Since the stop-loss order is the order followed by any risk averse decison maker, the simplifying hypothesis of independence constitute a real financial danger for the company, in the sense that most of their decisions are based on the aggregated claims distribution. In this paper, we will determine approximations for the distribution of the aggregate claims of a life insurance portfolio with some married couples and we will describe how to make safe decisions when we don¿t know exactly the dependence structure between the risks in each couple. Results in this paper are partly based on results in Dhaene and Goovaerts (1997)

The aggregate claims distribution of a life insurance portfolio with a pairwise positive dependence structure

The individual life model has always been considered as the one closest to the real situation of the total claims of a life insurance portfolio. It only makes the ¿nearly inevitable assumption¿ of independence of the lifelenghts of insured persons in the portfolio. Many clinical studies, however, have demonstrated positive dependence of paired lives such as husband and wife. In our opinion, it won¿t be unrealistic expecting a considerable number of married couples in any life insurance portfolio (e.g. life insurance contracts formalized at the time of signing a mortatge) and these dependences materially increase the values for the stop-loss premiums associated to the aggregate claims of the portfolio. Since the stop-loss order is the order followed by any risk averse decison maker, the simplifying hypothesis of independence constitute a real financial danger for the company, in the sense that most of their decisions are based on the aggregated claims distribution. In this paper, we will determine approximations for the distribution of the aggregate claims of a life insurance portfolio with some married couples and we will describe how to make safe decisions when we don¿t know exactly the dependence structure between the risks in each couple. Results in this paper are partly based on results in Dhaene and Goovaerts (1997)

Unemployment insurance an analysis of optimal mechanisms under aggregate shocks

The purpose of this work is to provide a brief overview of the literature on the optimal design of unemployment insurance systems by analyzing some of the most influential articles published over the last three decades on the subject and extend the main results to a multiple aggregate shocks environment. The properties of optimal contracts are discussed in light of the key assumptions commonly made in theoretical publications on the area. Moreover, the implications of relaxing each of these hypothesis is reckoned as well. The analysis of models of only one unemployment spell starts from the seminal work of Shavell and Weiss (1979). In a simple and common setting, unemployment benefits policies, wage taxes and search effort assignments are covered. Further, the idea that the UI distortion of the relative price of leisure and consumption is the only explanation for the marginal incentives to search for a job is discussed, putting into question the reduction in labor supply caused by social insurance, usually interpreted as solely an evidence of a dynamic moral hazard caused by a substitution effect. In addition, the paper presents one characterization of optimal unemployment insurance contracts in environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. Finally, an extension to multiple aggregate shocks environment is considered. The paper ends with a numerical analysis of the implications of i.i.d. shocks to the optimal unemployment insurance mechanism.

Monopolistic insurance and competitive financial markets

This dissertation studies the interaction between insurance and financial markets. Individuals who differ only in risk can save through a competitive market. They also have access to insurance contracts offered by a monopolist firm. We show that an equilibrium exists in that economy. Fundamentally, we identify an externality imposed on the insurer's decision by the endogeneity of prices in the financial market.We argue that, because of such externality and in contrast to the pure contract theory case, equilibrium may exhibit pooling.

Market failure in long-term private health insurance markets: a proposed solution

Recently, private health insurance rates have declined in many countries. In places requiring community rating in their health insurance premiums, a major cause is age-based adverse selection. However, even in countries without community rating, a de facto type of partial community rating tends to occur. In this note, a modified version of Pauly et al.'s guaranteed renewability model, which addresses the problem of age-based adverse selection (Pauly et al., 1995) is presented. Their model is extended from three to 35 periods. Also, probabilities are allowed to increase by age for low-risk types using actual age-based probabilities. This extension of their work shows that private health insurance contracts available stray far from optimal contracts that deal with age-based adverse selection. This suggests that government actions to affect private insurance options are warranted.

Solvency risk minimizing guaranteed returns in life insurance

Return guarantee constitutes a key ingredient of classical life insurance premium calculation. In the current low interest rate environment insurers face increasingly strong financial incentives to reduce guaranteed returns embedded in life insurance contracts. However, return guarantee lowering efforts are restrained by associated demand effects, since a higher guaranteed return makes the net price of the insurance cover lower. This tradeoff between possibly higher future insurance obligations and the possibility of a larger demand for life insurance products can theoretically also be considered when determining optimal guaranteed returns. In this paper, optimality of return guarantee levels is analyzed from a solvency point of view. Availability and some other properties of optimal solutions for guaranteed returns are explored and compared in a simple model for two measures of solvency risk (company-level and contract-level VaR). The paper concludes that a solvency risk minimizing optimal guaranteed return may theoretically exist, although its practical availability can be impeded by economic and regulatory constraints.

What Transaction Costs are Acceptable in Life Insurance Products from the Policyholders' Viewpoint?

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to analyze what transaction costs are acceptable for customers in different investments. In this study, two life insurance contracts, a mutual fund and a risk-free investment, as alternative investment forms are considered. The first two products under scrutiny are a life insurance investment with a point-to-point capital guarantee and a participating contract with an annual interest rate guarantee and participation in the insurer's surplus. The policyholder assesses the various investment opportunities using different utility measures. For selected types of risk profiles, the utility position and the investor's preference for the various investments are assessed. Based on this analysis, the authors study which cost levels can make all of the products equally rewarding for the investor. Design/methodology/approach - The paper notes the risk-neutral valuation calibration using empirical data utility and performance measurement dynamics underlying: geometric Brownian motion numerical examples via Monte Carlo simulation. Findings - In the first step, the financial performance of the various saving opportunities under different assumptions of the investor's utility measurement is studied. In the second step, the authors calculate the level of transaction costs that are allowed in the various products to make all of the investment opportunities equally rewarding from the investor's point of view. A comparison of these results with transaction costs that are common in the market shows that insurance companies must be careful with respect to the level of transaction costs that they pass on to their customers to provide attractive payoff distributions. Originality/value - To the best of the authors' knowledge, their research question - i.e. which transaction costs for life insurance products would be acceptable from the customer's point of view - has not been studied in the above described context so far.

Consequências da mora do segurador e o princípio neminem laedere no âmbito contratual

Relatório de atividade profissional de mestrado em Direito dos Contratos e da Empresa

A celebração do contrato de seguro à distância

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito dos Contratos e da Empresa

Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously

Although Insurers Face Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard When They Set Insurance Contracts, These Two Types of Asymmetrical Information Have Been Given Separate Treatments Sofar in the Economic Literature. This Paper Is a First Attempt to Integrate Both Problems Into a Single Model. We Show How It Is Possible to Use Time in Order to Achieve a First-Best Allocation of Risks When Both Problems Are Present Simultaneously.

Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment

Managed caIe capitation contracts provide monetary incentives for doctoIs to save medical costs while standard health insurance contracts do noto The papeI proposes an alternative model for insurance markets which is used to analyze managed caIe contracts. In our model, households would like to buy insurance for the possible need of a service. The distinctive aspect of our model is that providers of service have privileged information on the most appropriate procedure to be followed. In the managed care application of the model, doctors are the providers of the service and through a diagnosis have better information of the patient's health condition. Equilibrium in our model is always constrained eflicient. A partial capitation contract arises when both the cost and net benefits of treatment are high enough. We show that a capitation contract provides incentives for doctors: i) to care about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (altruistic behamor); and ii) to save medical costs (managed care behamor). Doctors, in this case, choose less medically eflicient treatments as they would choose under a standard health insurance contract. Besides this, household' welfare is increased in comparison to the standard contract. This increased welfare translates into a revealed preference for the capitation contract.