Dois ensaios em economia da saúde

We test for asymmetric information in health insurance by means of a special survey conducted in 1998 in Brazil. The distinct features of the database are twofold. First, it displays information on individual morbidity-an issue still unexplored in the empiricalliterature on insurance. Second, unlike other countries studied in the literature, the coverage leveI offered by the Brazilian free public health service is much lower than its private counterpart-making informational problems more likely. We find evidence of information asymmetries associated with some diseases (e.g., hypertension and heart disease) but not with others (e.g., cancer and chronic renal disease).

Problemas de agência no setor público: o papel dos intermediadores da relação entre poder central e unidades executoras

Este estudo teve como objetivo central identificar de que forma a alocação de indivíduos como intermediadores das relações de agência impacta os conflitos inerentes à relação principal-agente no âmbito da administração pública. Para tanto, foi considerado o contexto do arranjo contratual existente entre o Escritório de Gerenciamento de Projetos da Secretaria Municipal da Casa Civil (CVL/EGP-Rio), representante do poder central da Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro, e os órgãos e entidades executoras dos projetos e metas estratégicos definidos por esse poder central. A revisão bibliográfica apontou a existência de quatro problemas de agência principais, os quais dizem respeito às diferenças de motivações e objetivos, às assimetrias de informação, às distintas propensões ao risco e aos diferentes horizontes de planejamento. Foram realizadas dez entrevistas semi-estruturadas com ocupantes do cargo de Analista de Gerenciamento de Projetos e Metas (AGPM), que atuam como intermediadores da relação de agência entre CVL/EGP-Rio e unidades executoras. Os resultados do estudo indicam que o intermediador da relação de agência analisada é capaz de provocar redução naqueles conflitos de agência relacionados com as diferenças de motivações e objetivos e com as assimetrias de informação. Quanto aos problemas de agência que dizem respeito às distintas propensões ao risco e aos diferentes horizontes de planejamento, a pesquisa demonstra que o intermediador não promove qualquer impacto, seja no sentido de acentuá-los ou atenuá-los.

The State, the markets and development financing

Includes bibliography

As decisões de investimento e a instabilidade financeira

Initially, the text handles the theories of ancient classical and changes with the emerging of the debates of the schools of economic of Keynes and Kalecki. Over the years, from 1930 onwards, investment theories were debated and modified by various schools of economic thought. One of the debates that stands out in this work are the theories of Minsky that will bring new reformulations to Keynesian theory and a greater focus on psychological factors as determinants of investment decisions. Through financial instability hypothesis Minsky explains how the decisions to invest and the access to credit cause instability to financial system. Finally the work will show how access to credit is material when companies decide to invest and how these investments are often handled due to information asymmetries in the market. The financial institutions seek to maximize their profits while dribbling moral hazard and adverse selection, and thus the government needs to intervene once in a while as a regulator to maintain the solvency of the system

Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending

We analyze the role of intermediaries in electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform. In such an electronic credit market, lenders bid to supply a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. We find that these market participants act as financial intermediaries and significantly improve borrowers' credit conditions by reducing information asymmetries, predominantly for borrowers with less attractive risk characteristics. Our findings may be surprising given the replacement of a bank by an electronic marketplace.

Labor participation in corporate policy-making decisions: West Germany's experience with codetermination

If workers are wealth maximizers, codetermination should lead to less risky investments, smaller dividends, reduced firm leverage, higher and more stable salaries, and more capital-intensive production processes. Unless codetermination also increases productivity by raising wokers' morale and satisfaction or reduces information asymmetries within the firm, shareholder wealth and firm value will decline. An analysis of West Germany's case, however, indicates that codetermination has little, if any, effect on corporate operations and performance.

Swiss Air Traffic Policy: Noise Between Berne and Berlin

This article looks at the negotiations between Switzerland and Germany on air traffic regulation with the help of negotiation analysis tools. A number of factors pre-eminent in the literature on negotiation processes and outcomes are presented and critically assessed. In particular arguments of “power”, which are often insufficiently explored in analysing interstate cooperation, are brought back into the picture. The article argues that structural power best explains the negotiation results while domestic politics and information asymmetries both account for non-ratification of the treaty. Institutionalist arguments on the constraining effects of international norms and institutions as well as explanations focusing on negotiation skills are of minor importance. Moreover, the nature of the Swiss intra-governmental setting at the federal level did not encourage the Swiss negotiators to exploit all means during the different stages of the bargaining process. The article concludes by illuminating a number of policy observations in the broader context of Swiss foreign relations and indicating avenues for further research

Informational Barriers to Energy Efficiency - Theory and European Policies. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 15/2009

This BEER addresses informational barriers to energy efficiency. It is a widely acknowledged result that an energy efficiency gap exists implying that the level of energy efficiency is at an inefficiently low level. Several barriers to energy efficiency create this gap and the presence of asymmetric information is likely to be one such barrier. In this article a theoretical framework is presented addressing the issues of moral hazard and adverse selection related to energy efficiency. Based on the theoretical framework, European policies on energy efficiency are evaluated. The article is divided into two main parts. The first part presents the theory on information asymmetries and its consequences on energy efficiency focusing on the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Having established a theoretical framework to understand the agency barriers to energy efficiency, the second part evaluates the policies of the European Union on energy efficiency. The BEER finds that problems of moral hazard and adverse selection indeed can help explain the seemingly low levels of energy. In both presented models the cost to the principal from implementing high energy efficiency outcome is increased with the informational asymmetries. The theory reveals two implications to policies on energy efficiency. First, the development of measures to enable contractual parties to base remuneration on energy performance must be enhanced, and second, the information on technologies and the education of consumers and installers on energy efficiency must be increased. This could be complemented with certification of installers and energy efficiency advisors to enable consumers to select good agents. Finally, it is found that the preferred EU policy instrument on energy efficiency, so far, seems to be the use of minimum requirements. Less used in EU legislation is the use of measuring and verification as well as the use of certifications. Therefore, it is concluded that the EU should consider an increased use of these instruments, and in particular focus on a further development of standards on measurability and verification as well as an increased focus on education of consumers as well as installers and advisors on energy efficiency.

Informationsasymmetrien zwischen Übergeber und Nachfolger: Herausforderungen und Lösungsmöglichkeiten am Beispiel des Management Buy Ins in Familienunternehmen

Trotz der steigenden Bedeutung von familienexternen Nachfolgeregelungen wie MBO und MBI bestehen hinsichtlich dieser Nachfolgeoptionen noch große Forschungslücken. Obwohl die Informationsökonomie einen viel versprechenden Ansatz darstellt, um ein fundierteres Verständnis zu erlangen, ist sie in diesem Kontext noch zu wenig angewandt worden. Dies wäre jedoch vor allem in Bezug auf einen MBI sinnvoll, da dort die deutlichsten Informationsasymmetrien zwischen Übergeber und Nachfolger auftreten können. In diesem Beitrag bedienen wir uns daher der Informationsökonomie und analysieren die verschiedenen Informationsasymmetrien bei einem MBI im Detail. Außerdem zeigen wir verschiedene Möglichkeiten auf, wie die entsprechenden Asymmetrien überwunden werden können. Damit leisten wir einen wertvollen Beitrag zu Wissenschaft und Praxis.

Harnessing Natural Resources for Development: New Legal Regimes for Localized Benefit Sharing in the Mining Sector

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Impact of the length of relationships upon the use of research institutes by SMEs

Recent studies of US industrial modernisation programmes argue that difficulties of establishing long-term relationships with users prevent them from facilitating development of innovation capabilities. The paper supports this argument through a survey of Japanese research institutes the US programmes were modelled on. In view of information asymmetries in their use, it tests the hypothesis that small and medium-sized firms start using the research institutes with ‘low information gap’ services and gradually move on to ‘high information gap’ services that often require more absorptive capacity. This is demonstrated both under one-to-one relationships and between groups of firms and a research institute.

Methods and trends of performance benchmarking in UK utility regulation

Regulation is subject to information asymmetries that can lead to allocative and productive inefficiencies. One solution, suggested by Shleifer in 1985 and now adopted by many regulatory bodies round the world, is 'benchmarking', which is sometimes called 'yardstick competition'. In this paper we consider Shleifer's original approach to benchmarking and contrast this with the actual use of benchmarking by UK regulatory bodies in telecommunications, water and the energy sector since the privatizations of the 1980s and early 1990s. We find that benchmarking plays only one part and sometimes a small part in the setting of regulatory price caps in the UK. We also find that in practice benchmarking has been subject to a number of difficulties, which mean that it is never likely to be more than one tool in the regulator's armoury. The UK's experience provides lessons for regulation internationally. © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Speciális kockázatok és kockázatkezelés a kockázatitőke-finanszírozásban (The special risks and risk management of venture capital)

A tanulmányban a szerzők arra a kérdésre keresik a választ, hogy az aszimmetrikus információk hatására a vállalkozók és a befektetők között kialakuló megbízó-ügynök viszonynak melyek a speciális vetületei a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás vonatkozásában. A szerzők arra a következtetésre jutottak, hogy a hiányos információk, a megbízó-ügynök viszony, illetve az ügyletek speciális jellege miatt fokozottan jelentkező ügynökprobléma kezelésére a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás szereplői speciális kockázatkezelési technikákat alkalmaznak. Ilyenek a magas elvárt hozamok, a szigorú kiválasztási kritériumok, a speciális befektetési vagy szindikátusi szerződések, a befektetést követő monitoring tevékenység, a több lépcsőben történő finanszírozás és a portfólióvállalatok hálózatba szervezése. A speciális kockázati megközelítés következtében a befektetéseket opciós szemlélet is áthatja. _____ This paper focuses on the special aspects of imperfect information in case of venture capital financing including principal-agent relationship between entrepreneurs and investors as well as adverse selection that evolves as a result of information asymmetries. The authors’ finding is that venture capital is able to manage the problems caused by imperfect information via applying divers risk management techniques such as high profit expectations, scrutiny of portfolio-companies, the use of special contracting stipulations and syndicate agreements, the monitoring of investments, multi-staged financing of companies and the integration of portfolio-companies into networks. In addition to the risk management techniques the authors also give the interpretation of the unique attitude of venture capital toward uncertainty and its special real option-like risk valuation approach that makes venture capitalists capable of handling high uncertainty under imperfect information.

Theory of foreign portfolio investment

This dissertation examines one category of international capital flows, private portfolio investments (private refers to the source of capital). There is an overall lack of a coherent and consistent definition of foreign portfolio investment. We clarify these definitional issues.^ Two main questions that pertain to private foreign portfolio investments (FPI) are explored. The first problem is the phenomenon of home preference, often referred to as home bias. Related to this are the observed cross-investment flows between countries that seem to contradict the textbook rendition of private FPI. A description of the theories purporting to resolve the home preference puzzle (and the cross-investment one) are summarized and evaluated. Most of this literature considers investors from major developed countries. I consider--as well--whether investors in less developed countries have home preference.^ The dissertation shows that home preference is indeed pervasive and profound across countries, in both developed and emerging markets. For the U.S., I examine home bias in both equity and bond holdings as well. I find that home bias is greater when we look at equity and bond holdings than equity holdings solely.^ In this dissertation a model is developed to explain home bias. This model is original and fills a gap in the literature as there have been no satisfactory models that handle at the same time both home preference and cross-border holdings in the context of information asymmetries. This model reflects what we see in the data and permits us to reach certain results by the use of comparative statics methods. The model suggests, counter-intuitively, that as the rate of return in a country relative to the world rate of return increases, home preference decreases. In the context of our relatively simple model we ascribe this result to the higher variance of the now higher return for home assets. We also find, this time as intended, that as risk aversion increases, investors diversify further so that home preference decreases.^ The second question that the dissertation deals with is the volatility of private foreign portfolio investment. Countries that are recipients of these flows have been wary of such flows because of their perceived volatility. Often the contrast is made with the perceived absence of volatility in foreign direct investment flows. I analyze the validity of these concerns using first net flow data and then gross flow data. The results show that FPI is not, in relative terms, more volatile than other flows in our sample of eight countries (half were developed countries and the rest were emerging markets).^ The implication therefore is that restricting FPI flows may be harmful in the sense that private capital may not be allocated efficiently worldwide to the detriment of capital poor economies. More to the point, any such restrictions would in fact be misguided. ^

Essays on market design and regulation in electricity systems

This thesis discusses market design and regulation in electricity systems, focusing on the information exchange of the regulated grid firm and the generation firms as well as the regulation of the grid firm. In the first chapter, an economic framework is developed to consistently analyze different market designs and the information exchange between the grid firm and the generation firms. Perfect competition between the generation firms and perfect regulation of the grid firm is assumed. A numerical algorithm is developed and its feasibility demonstrated on a large-scale problem. The effects of different market designs for the Central Western European (CWE) region until 2030 are analyzed. In the second chapter, the consequences of restricted grid expansion within the current market design in the CWE region until 2030 are analyzed. In the third chapter the assumption of efficient markets is modified. The focus of the analysis is then, whether and how inefficiencies in information availability and processing affect different market designs. For different parameter settings, nodal and zonal pricing are compared regarding their welfare in the spot and forward market. In the fourth chapter, information asymmetries between the regulator and the regulated firm are analyzed. The optimal regulatory strategy for a firm, providing one output with two substitutable inputs, is defined. Thereby, one input and the absolute quantity of inputs is not observable for the regulator. The result is then compared to current regulatory approaches.