Variation in mortality rates in Australia: correlation with Indigenous status, remoteness and socio-economic deprivation

Background The aim of this study was to study ecological correlations between age-adjusted all-cause mortality rates in Australian statistical divisions and (1) the proportion of residents that self-identify as Indigenous, (2) remoteness, and (3) socio-economic deprivation. Methods All-cause mortality rates for 57 statistical divisions were calculated and directly standardized to the 1997 Australian population in 5-year age groups using Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data. The proportion of residents who self-identified as Indigenous was obtained from the 1996 Census. Remoteness was measured using ARIA (Accessibility and Remoteness Index for Australia) values. Socioeconomic deprivation was measured using SEIFA (Socio-Economic index for Australia) values from the ABS. Results Age-standardized all-cause mortality varies twofold from 5.7 to 11.3 per 1000 across Australian statistical divisions. Strongest correlation was between Indigenous status and mortality (r = 0.69, p < 0.001). correlation between remoteness and mortality was modest (r = 0.39, p = 0.002) as was correlation between socio-economic deprivation and mortality (r = -0.42, p = 0.001). Excluding the three divisions with the highest mortality, a multiple regression model using the logarithm of the adjusted mortality rate as the dependent variable showed that the partial correlation (and hence proportion of the variance explained) for Indigenous status was 0.03 (9 per cent; p = 0.03), for SEIFA score was -0.17 (3 per cent; p = 0.22); and for remoteness was -0.22 (5 per cent; p = 0.13). Collectively, the three variables studied explain 13 per cent of the variability in mortality. Conclusions Ecological correlation exists between all-cause mortality, Indigenous status, remoteness and disadvantage across Australia. The strongest correlation is with indigenous status, and correlation with all three characteristics is weak when the three statistical divisions with the highest mortality rates are excluded. intervention targeted at these three statistical divisions could reduce much of the variability in mortality in Australia.

Variation in cervical cancer screening by region, socio-economic, migrant and Indigenous status in women in New South Wales

The purpose of this study was to estimate the extent of association of cervical screening in NSW women with socio-economic status (SES), rurality, and proportions of non-English speaking background (NESB) and Indigenous status. Data on women who had at least one Pap test over two years (January 1998-December 1999) were obtained from the NSW Pap test Register. Each local government area (LGA) was allocated to categories of population proportions of NESB and Indigenous status, a rurality classification based on population density and remoteness, and to an SES quintile. The odds ratios (OR) of having a Pap test were estimated and confounding adjusted by multiple logistic regression analysis. Implied Pap test rates in urban NESB and in rural Indigenous women were estimated from the modelled estimates. The adjusted OR for a Pap test in large rural centres (1.14) was significantly higher than those for metropolitan or capital city residents (0.9 and 1.0 respectively). Adjusted OR for a Pap test in other rural centres (0.73) and other remote areas (0.64) were significantly lower than those for metropolitan or capital city residents. In urban populations the lowest OR were in areas with both low SES and high proportion of NESB. The lowest OR for Pap screening in rural populations occurred in the most remote areas with the highest proportion of Indigenous women. For urban NESB women the biennial Pap test rate was estimated as 50%, and for rural Indigenous women 29%, compared with the NSW average of 59%.

The game to play: expanding the co-opetition proposal through the strategic games matrix

Purpose - Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s 1995 co-opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments. Design/methodology/approach - The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled. Findings - The co-opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff`s model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative). Practical implications - This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision- and policy-makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies. Originality/value - A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they Could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.

Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games

Stability of matchings was proved to be a new cooperative equilibrium concept in Sotomayor (Dynamics and equilibrium: essays in honor to D. Gale, 1992). That paper introduces the innovation of treating as multi-dimensional the payoff of a player with a quota greater than one. This is done for the many-to-many matching model with additively separable utilities, for which the stability concept is defined. It is then proved, via linear programming, that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty and it may be strictly bigger than the set of dual solutions and strictly smaller than the core. The present paper defines a general concept of stability and shows that this concept is a natural solution concept, stronger than the core concept, for a much more general coalitional game than a matching game. Instead of mutual agreements inside partnerships, the players are allowed to make collective agreements inside coalitions of any size and to distribute his labor among them. A collective agreement determines the level of labor at which the coalition operates and the division, among its members, of the income generated by the coalition. An allocation specifies a set of collective agreements for each player.

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students` strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.

Binary games with many players

We examine a problem with n players each facing the same binary choice. One choice is superior to the other. The simple assumption of competition - that an individual's payoff falls with a rise in the number of players making the same choice, guarantees the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium (involving mixed strategies). As n increases, there are two opposing effects. First, events in the middle of the distribution - where a player finds itself having made the same choice as many others - become more likely, but the payoffs in these events fall. In opposition, events in the tails of the distribution - where a player finds itself having made the same choice as few others - become less likely, but the payoffs in these events remain high. We provide a sufficient condition (strong competition) under which an increase in the number of players leads to a reduction in the equilibrium probability that the superior choice is made.