Legislation Blocking Antitrust Investigations and the September 2012 Russian Executive Order

This article offers a typology of so-called blocking legislation and analyses its development, functions and legality under international law. It also presents and discusses the new Russian blocking Order, issued in September 2012, focusing on its possible effects on the European Commission's investigation of Gazprom's business practices (in light of EU competition law) as well as, more broadly, on foreign operations of Russian strategic enterprises.

Análisis de la Política Exterior Rusa en materia energética, comercial y militar hacia la República de Moldavia (Período 2000-2010)

Rusia sufrió grandes cambios tras la desintegración de la URSS en 1991. No obstante, con la llegada de Vladimir Putin al poder, los intereses geoestratégicos de Rusia sobre el espacio postsoviético revivieron con nuevo ímpetu debido a una mayor cantidad de recursos a disposición del Estado. La República de Moldavia es un claro ejemplo del resurgir de la política exterior rusa hacia el espacio postsoviético, siendo incluso, una región clave en la lucha de la Federación Rusa por recuperar su zona de influencia.

Uso del gas como recurso estratégico en la política exterior rusa. Análisis de caso Ucrania periodo 2000-2010

Estudio de caso que busca evaluar el uso del gas natural dentro de la política exterior rusa como recurso estratégico en las relaciones con Ucrania. Se describe y analiza cómo la importancia geoestratégica de Ucrania genera una percepción de seguridad y relevancia económica en Rusia, por esta razón la Federación utiliza el gas natural como mecanismo de presión frente al Estado ucraniano para satisfacer sus intereses nacionales en función de los elementos mencionados anteriormente.Todo lo anterior a través de la Teoría del Heartland desarrollada por Halford Mackinder y El Concepto de Área Pivote de Zbigniew Brzezinski para determinar cómo se genera la importancia del Estado ucraniano frente a Rusia

Implicaciones comerciales de la Diplomacia Petrolera China en el Amazonas ecuatoriano. 2007 - 2013

El presente Estudio de Caso tiene como objetivo analizar en qué medida las dinámicas comerciales de la Diplomacia Petrolera China han convertido a Ecuador en un socio estratégico para la RPCh. El petróleo como fuente de energía es primordial para llevar a cabo los procesos de industrialización y mantener el crecimiento económico del león Asiático. Por eso su búsqueda se ha convertido en un tema principal dentro de la agenda de política exterior. Ecuador, el tercer país de Suramérica con más reservas de petróleo, después de Venezuela y Brasil, se ha convertido en zona de influencia de la RPCh y a través de las empresas petroleras estatales se han firmado contratos por la venta de petróleo. A pesar de que las relaciones bilaterales son asimétricas, se buscar establecer si Ecuador es un socio estratégico en la región.

Política exterior rusa en el Ártico, un juego de intereses nacionales en torno a su reivindicación geopolítica. Periodo 2007 – 2013

El objetivo de esta monografía es analizar de qué manera el interés nacional ruso determina su reivindicación geopolítica en el Ártico. Adicionalmente, se profundizará sobre la posición geográficamente privilegiada en esta región y su importancia para los países miembros del Consejo Ártico a partir del deshielo del 2007. Por otra parte, se analizará la reivindicación geopolítica rusa en el Ártico a través de la aplicación del Derecho Internacional y el desplazamiento de sus fuerzas militares en esta zona. Para resolver la investigación, es pertinente explicar el interés nacional ruso bajo la Teoría de Realismo Político de Hans Morgenthau, lo que ayudará a clasificar el modelo de política exterior que Rusia aplicó en la región Ártica durante el periodo 2007 – 2013.

La construcción de la política exterior de Rusia hacia Serbia: entre el pragmatismo y el Eurasianismo (2007-2015)

Esta monografía defenderá que la Rusia contemporánea cuenta con una ideología formada a partir de los elementos imperiales y religiosos previos a la Unión Soviética además de elementos políticos propios de la URSS como la colectividad y la oposición a occidente. La Rusia de Putin ha recobrado sus capacidades para defender sus intereses en el mundo frente a la injerencia de occidente, y en el caso de Serbia esto se hará evidente a través de la importancia de los lazos culturales e históricos reforzados por los vínculos económicos y estratégicos que representa la presencia de Rusia en Serbia. Los principales autores sobre los que se trabajará son Alexander Dugin y Alexander Panarin.

Análisis de la política exterior norteamericana hacia Turquía, en materia de seguridad, y su influencia en el Kurdistán. Periodo 2003-2009

Este estudio tiene como objetivo analizar los elementos que articulan la Política Exterior de los Estados Unidos hacia Turquía, en materia de seguridad, y su influencia en el Kurdistán, ya que en el periodo 2003-2009 se presentaron acontecimientos que marcaron la vida política, económica, militar y social de la región del Medio Oriente, caracterizado por la presencia de los Estados Unidos. Esta investigación se desarrollara de acuerdo con el modelo de monografía, para dar un análisis teórico sobre el tema delimitado anteriormente. Se espera que el presente estudio sirva para que el lector comprenda las diferentes actuaciones de los Estados Unidos en el escenario internacional, para la consecución de sus intereses y que tenga un acercamiento en las diferentes relaciones entre los Estados para entender mejor los acontecimientos que se presentaron en el periodo a analizar.

Nord Stream on the liberalising EU gas market. OSW Point of View, March 2010

Nord Stream increases Gazprom’s flexibility as far its export routes are concerned; it enables them to be changed with regard to the market or political situation. Nevertheless, this expensive pipeline may contribute to a further drop in the price competitiveness of Russian gas. Accordingly, increasing the attractiveness of Russian fuel and ensuring profitable sales is steadily becoming the main challenge for Gazprom in the EU against a backdrop of increasing competitiveness on the market.

Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? OSW Report, October 2009. Second edition, revised

Introduction. The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition,see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated. Over the course of last year, two new factors strongly affected Gazprom’s capability to operate on the EU market. One was the ongoing global economic crisis, which has depressed demand for gas both in Russia and in Europe. Gazprom has cut both its own production and the quantities of gas it purchases from the Central Asian states, and the decrease in export revenues has forced the company to modify some of its current investment plans. Less demand for gas and the need to reduce production are also having a positive impact – the Russian company is likely to avoid the difficulties in meeting all of its export commitments which, only a year or so ago, it was expected to experience. The other factor affecting Gazprom’s expansion in Europe is the observed radicalisation of the rhetoric and actions of both the company itself and of the Russian authorities with regard to the gas sector as broadly understood. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009, which resulted in a two-week interruption of gas supplies from Russia to Europe via Ukraine, was the most prominent example of this radicalisation. The hardening of rhetoric in the ongoing energy talks with the EU and other actors, and increased political and business activities designed to promote Russian gas interests in Europe, in particular the lobbying for the Nord Stream and South Stream projects, are further signs of this shift in tone. These issues raise the question of whether, and to what extent, the current condition of Gazprom’s finance will permit the company to implement the infrastructural projects it has been endorsing and its other investment plans in Europe. Another important question is whether the currently observed changes in how Gazprom operates will take on a more permanent character, and what consequences this will have for the European Union. The first part of this report discusses Gazprom’s production and export potential. The second comprehensively presents the scope and nature of Gazprom’s economic presence in the EU member states. Finally, the third part presents the Russian company’s methods of operation on foreign markets. The data presented in the report come mainly from the statistics of the International Energy Agency, the European Commission and Gazprom, as well as the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Statistical Office. The figures presented here also include proprietary calculations by the OSW based on figures disclosed by energy companies and reports by professional press and news agencies.

At any price: Russia is embarking on the construction of South Stream. OSW Commentary No. 98, 2012-12-07

Gazprom is determined to continue its efforts to build the South Stream gas pipeline regardless of the slump on the European gas market and the fact that there is sufficient capacity already in the existing transport infrastructure. The official inauguration of the maritime section of South Stream was held on 7 December this year, but the construction itself will commence in 2014. The agreements concluded so far, both intergovernmental and between corporations, are necessary for the launch of the construction of the new pipeline, but still do not guarantee that the project will be completed on time. First of all, some legal problems have yet to be resolved, such as the evaluation of the compliance of the planned actions with the ‘third energy package’ or the fact that ecological surveys required under European law need to be carried out. Secondly, given the present situation on the European gas market and medium-term forecasts, the high cost of implementation of this project and the maintenance expenses of existing pipelines – which are not being used to full capacity – the new project seems to be unfeasible. However, Gazprom’s determination in its efforts to build the pipeline proves that Russia is ready to take a high economic risk to maintain its dominant position on the European gas supply market; it will restrict the possibilities of alternative infrastructural projects being implemented (above all, the EU’s Southern Corridor) and use the construction of new pipelines as an instrument of political pressure on the present transit countries (especially Ukraine).

Rebalancing the EU-Russia-Ukraine gas relationship. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2014/15, DECEMBER 2014

The October 2014 agreement on gas supplies between Russia, Ukraine and the European Union did not resolve the Ukraine-Russia conflict over gas. The differences between parties in terms of objectives, growing mistrust and legacy issues make it unlikely that a long-term stable arrangement will be achieved without further escalation. Without EU pressure and support, Ukraine is likely to enter a new unfavourable gas arrangement with Russia, which could have repercussions beyond the energy sector. Key highlights: To reduce prices and increase the security of imports, the EU as a bloc should redefine its gas relationship with Russia and Ukraine and overcome the diverging interests of EU member states on second-order issues. Implementation of a joint strategy rests on enforcement of EU competition and gas market rules, a strengthened role for the Energy Community and the establishment of a market-based instrument for supply security. For Ukraine, the EU should serve as an anchor for comprehensive gas sector reform. Contingent on Ukraine’s reform efforts, EU financial and technical assistance, the enabling of reverse flows from the EU to Ukraine and pressure on Gazprom, should eventually enable Ukraine to obtain a sustainable gas-supply contract with Russia. This should make a sustainable and mutually beneficial Russia-Ukraine-EU gas relationship possible. However, during the transition, the EU should be prepared for possible frictions.

The EU internal market - a stake or a tool in European-Russian gas relations. OSW Commentary No. 54, 2011-06-24

Since 2010 we have observed a new quality in EU energy policy. It is related to the European Commission’s more or less direct engagement in the bilateral gas relations of a part of the new member states – Poland, Bulgaria and Lithuania – with Russia. Although the long term outcome of this activity of the EC is as yet unclear it seems to be important for several reasons. Firstly it might increase the possibilities of the enforcement of the EU’s directives liberalising the internal gas market and specifically their implementation in individual gas agreements with suppliers from third countries (Gazprom). The consistency and determination of the EC in this field may be decisive for the future direction and depth of the liberalisation of the EU gas market. Furthermore, present developments may lead to an increase in EU and specifically EC competence in the field of energy policy, especially its external dimension. So what lessons can we draw from recent Commission activities on the following issues: – Implementing EU gas market 2nd and 3rd liberalisation packages and their main provisions – EU energy policy and its external dimension – recent developments and the EU’s role – EU-Russia gas relations – where Russian and EU interests diverge.

Forerunners or scaremongers? Germany to abandon nuclear power. OSW Commentary No. 58, 2011-07-21

The German government’s final decision to abandon nuclear power as of 2022 has been expected for months. However, instead of calming the waters, providing solutions and answering the question ‘What next?’, it has only fanned the flames. Even the adoption of legal amendments enforcing the government’s decision by the German parliament (both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) in late June and early July has not calmed the situation. It is more than apparent that these decisions have been made under emotional pressure: there was not enough time for accurate calculations to be made and consideration to be given to the consequences of Germany abandoning nuclear power. Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far been unable to fully convince the public that the ‘energy shift is a huge opportunity’ and that this process will be carried out on condition that ‘the supplies remain secure, the climate protected and the whole process economically efficient’1. German economic associations have warned against a politically motivated, ill-judged and irreversible abandonment of nuclear energy. They are anxious about an increase in electricity prices, the instability of supplies and environmental damage. The government believes, however, that green technologies will become a new driving force for the German economy and its main export commodity. Before that happens the industry will have to increase its use of electricity produced from fossil fuels, mainly natural gas imported from Russia. This may be exploited by Gazprom which will try to strengthen its position on the German market, and thus in the entire EU.

German companies strengthen their cooperation with Russian gas suppliers. OSW Commentary No. 64, 2011-10-24

Germany’s decision to give up the use of nuclear energy will force it to find a conventional low-carbon energy source as a replacement; in the short term, in addition to coal, this is likely to be gas. Due to their continued high debt and the losses associated with the end of atomic power, German companies will not be able to spend large funds on investing in conventional energy. First of all, they will aim to raise capital and repay their debts. The money for this will come from selling off their less profitable assets; this will include sales on the gas market. This will create opportunities for natural gas exporters and extraction companies such as Gazprom to buy back some of the German companies’ assets (electricity companies, for example). The German companies will probably continue to seek to recover the costs incurred in the investment projects already underway, such as Nord Stream, the importance of which will grow after Russian gas imports increase. At the same time, because of their debts, the German companies will seek to minimise their investment costs by selling some shares on the conventional energy market, to Russian corporations among others; the latter would thus be able to increase their stake in the gas market in both Western (Germany, Great Britain, the Benelux countries) and Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic). It is possible that while establishing the details of cooperation between the Russian and German companies, Russia will try to put pressure on Germany to give up competing projects such as Nabucco. However, a well-diversified German energy market should be able to defend itself against attempts to increase German dependence on Russian gas supplies and the dictates of high prices.

Russia's best ally: The situation of the Russian oil sector and forecast for its future. OSW Study 39/2012

Oil is a strategic raw material for Russia and one of fundamental significance for the functioning of the state and its future. Taxes on oil production and exports are the most important source of state budget revenues which guarantee Russia maintains its political and economic stability. Russia is building its international position on the basis of its vast raw material and energy potential. While a great number of various publications have been devoted to Russian gas and Gazprom, surprisingly little research has been done into the present condition and possible future developments of the Russian oil sector, despite the fact that oil has and will have a much greater impact than gas on the functioning and the future of Russia. The main objective of this text is to describe the present situation of the Russian oil sector, its problems and the challenges it is posing, as well as the government’s policy towards this key branch of the Russian economy. This will be an introduction to an attempt to answer to the questions about the possible future production and the export levels of Russian oil, also broken down into the European and Asian directions.