All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Parallel characterizations of a generalized shapley value and a generalized banzhaf value for cooperative games with level structure of cooperation

We present parallel characterizations of two different values in the framework of restricted cooperation games. The restrictions are introduced as a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one, hence forming a structure of different levels of a priori unions. On the one hand, we consider a value first introduced in Ref. [18], which extends the Shapley value to games with different levels of a priori unions. On the other hand, we introduce another solution for the same type of games, which extends the Banzhaf value in the same manner. We characterize these two values using logically comparable properties.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

A characterization of cooperative TU-games with large monotonic core

[cat] El concepte de joc cooperatiu amb large core és introduït per Sharkey (1982) i el de Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme és definit per Sprumont (1990). Inspirat en aquests conceptes, Moulin (1990) introdueix la noció de large monotonic core donant una caracterització per a jocs de tres jugadors. En aquest document provem que tots els jocs amb large monotonic core són convexes. A més, donem un criteri efectiu per determinar si un joc té large monotonic core o no, i daquí obtenim una caracterització pel cas de quatre jugadors.

Some Notes and Comments on the Efficient use of Information in Repeated Games with Poisson Signals

In the present paper we characterize the optimal use of Poisson signals to establish incentives in the "bad" and "good" news models of Abreu et al. [1]. In the former, for small time intervals the signals' quality is high and we observe a "selective" use of information; otherwise there is a "mass" use. In the latter, for small time intervals the signals' quality is low and we observe a "fine" use of information; otherwise there is a "non-selective" use. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Infor- mation Characteristics.

Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

Existence of nash equilibrium in competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection

We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.

The effects of auditory stimulation with music on heart rate variability in healthy women

OBJECTIVES: There are no data in the literature with regard to the acute effects of different styles of music on the geometric indices of heart rate variability. In this study, we evaluated the acute effects of relaxant baroque and excitatory heavy metal music on the geometric indices of heart rate variability in women. METHODS: We conducted this study in 21 healthy women ranging in age from 18 to 35 years. We excluded persons with previous experience with musical instruments and persons who had an affinity for the song styles. We evaluated two groups: Group 1 (n = 21), who were exposed to relaxant classical baroque musical and excitatory heavy metal auditory stimulation; and Group 2 (n = 19), who were exposed to both styles of music and white noise auditory stimulation. Using earphones, the volunteers were exposed to baroque or heavy metal music for five minutes. After the first music exposure to baroque or heavy metal music, they remained at rest for five minutes; subsequently, they were re-exposed to the opposite music (70-80 dB). A different group of women were exposed to the same music styles plus white noise auditory stimulation (90 dB). The sequence of the songs was randomized for each individual. We analyzed the following indices: triangular index, triangular interpolation of RR intervals and Poincaré plot (standard deviation of instantaneous beat-by-beat variability, standard deviation of the long-term RR interval, standard deviation of instantaneous beat-by-beat variability and standard deviation of the long-term RR interval ratio), low frequency, high frequency, low frequency/high frequency ratio, standard deviation of all the normal RR intervals, root-mean square of differences between the adjacent normal RR intervals and the percentage of adjacent RR intervals with a difference of duration greater than 50 ms. Heart rate variability was recorded at rest for 10 minutes. RESULTS: The triangular index and the standard deviation of the long-term RR interval indices were reduced during exposure to both music styles in the first group and tended to decrease in the second group whereas the white noise exposure decreased the high frequency index. We observed no changes regarding the triangular interpolation of RR intervals, standard deviation of instantaneous beat-by-beat variability and standard deviation of instantaneous beat-by-beat variability/standard deviation in the long-term RR interval ratio. CONCLUSION: We suggest that relaxant baroque and excitatory heavy metal music slightly decrease global heart rate variability because of the equivalent sound level.

Auditory stimulation with music influences the geometric indices of heart rate variability in response to the postural change maneuver

It is poor in the literature the behavior of the geometric indices of heart rate variability (HRV) during the musical auditory stimulation. The objective is to investigate the acute effects of classic musical auditory stimulation on the geometric indexes of HRV in women in response to the postural change maneuver (PCM). We evaluated 11 healthy women between 18 and 25 years old. We analyzed the following indices: Triangular index, Triangular interpolation of RR intervals and Poincar plot (standard deviation of the instantaneous variability of the beat-to beat heart rate [SD1], standard deviation of long-term continuous RR interval variability and Ratio between the short - and long-term variations of RR intervals [SD1/SD2] ratio). HRV was recorded at seated rest for 10 min. The women quickly stood up from a seated position in up to 3 s and remained standing still for 15 min. HRV was recorded at the following periods: Rest, 0-5 min, 5-10 min and 10-15 min during standing. In the second protocol, the subject was exposed to auditory musical stimulation (Pachelbel-Canon in D) for 10 min at seated position before standing position. Shapiro-Wilk to verify normality of data and ANOVA for repeated measures followed by the Bonferroni test for parametric variables and Friedmans followed by the Dunns posttest for non-parametric distributions. In the first protocol, all indices were reduced at 10-15 min after the volunteers stood up. In the protocol musical auditory stimulation, the SD1 index was reduced at 5-10 min after the volunteers stood up compared with the music period. The SD1/SD2 ratio was decreased at control and music period compared with 5-10 min after the volunteers stood up. Musical auditory stimulation attenuates the cardiac autonomic responses to the PCM.