Homeowners' Associations in Russia after the 2005 Housing Reform

The thesis examines homeowners associations as a part of the large-scale housing reform, implemented in Russia since 2005. The reform transferred housing management from the public sector to the private sector and to the citizens responsibility. The reform is a continuation to the privatisation of the housing stock that was started in Russia in the beginning of the 1990s, aiming to build a market-oriented housing sector in the country. The reform makes a fundamental change to the Soviet system, in which ownership along with management and maintenance of housing were monopolised by the state. Homeowners are now responsible for the management of the common areas in privatised houses, which is often realised by establishing a homeowners association. Homeowners associations are examined by using the so-called common-pool resource regime approach, with the main question being the ways in which taking care of common property collectively succeeds in practice. The study is based on interview data of St. Petersburg s homeowners associations. Using the common-pool resource theory the study demonstrates why implementation of the housing reform has not succeeded as expected. Certain elements that characterise a successful common-pool resource regime do not fulfill sufficiently in St. Petersburg s homeowners associations. Firstly, free-riding, that is, withdrawal from the association s joint decision-making and not making the housing payments is common, as effective sanctions to prevent it are missing in the legislation. That is, eviction or expelling a non-paying member from the association is not possible. Secondly, ownership of the land plot and common areas of the house, such as basements and attics, are often disputed between the associations and authorities. In the Soviet era, these common areas were public property along with the apartments, but in privatised houses they should, according to the legislation, belong to the associations property. Thirdly, solution of disputes between the associations and authorities and within the associations is difficult, as the court system tends to be bureaucratic and inefficient. In addition to the common-pool resource approach, the study also examines how social capital contributes to the associations effectiveness and democratic governance. The study finds that although homeowners associations have increased cooperation and tightened social relations between neighbours, social capital has not been able to prevent free-riding. The study shows that unlike it is often claimed, the so-called Soviet mentality , that is, residents passiveness and unwillingness to participate, is not the most important obstacle to the reform. Instead, the reform is impeded most of all by imperfect institutional arrangements and local authorities that prevent the associations from working as independent, self-governing associations.

Give-and-take based peer-to-peer content distribution networks

Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) are widely used to distribute data to large number of users. Traditionally, content is being replicated among a number of surrogate servers, leading to high operational costs. In this context, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) CDNs have emerged as a viable alternative. An issue of concern in P2P networks is that of free riders, i.e., selfish peers who download files and leave without uploading anything in return. Free riding must be discouraged. In this paper, we propose a criterion, the Give-and-Take (G&T) criterion, that disallows free riders. Incorporating the G&T criterion in our model, we study a problem that arises naturally when a new peer enters the system: viz., the problem of downloading a `universe' of segments, scattered among other peers, at low cost. We analyse this hard problem, and characterize the optimal download cost under the G&T criterion. We propose an optimal algorithm, and provide a sub-optimal algorithm that is nearly optimal, but runs much more quickly; this provides an attractive balance between running time and performance. Finally, we compare the performance of our algorithms with that of a few existing P2P downloading strategies in use. We also study the computation time for prescribing the strategy for initial segment and peer selection for the newly arrived peer for various existing and proposed algorithms, and quantify cost-computation time trade-offs.

An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution

We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach.

Análise de desempenho de redes p2p com protocolo push/pull para distribuição de vídeo na presença de nós não-cooperativos.

O uso de Internet para a distribuição de fluxos de vídeo tem se mostrado uma tendência atual e traz consigo grandes desafios. O alicerce sobre qual a Internet está fundamentada, comutação por pacotes e arquitetura cliente-servidor, não proporciona as melhores condições para este tipo de serviço. A arquitetura P2P (peer-to-peer) vem sendo considerada como infraestrutura para a distribuição de fluxos de vídeo na Internet. A idéia básica da distribuição de vídeo com o suporte de P2P é a de que os vários nós integrantes da rede sobreposta distribuem e encaminham pedaços de vídeo de forma cooperativa, dividindo as tarefas, e colocando à disposição da rede seus recursos locais. Dentro deste contexto, é importante investigar o que ocorre com a qualidade do serviço de distribuição de vídeo quando a infraestrutura provida pelas redes P2P é contaminada por nós que não estejam dispostos a cooperar, já que a base desta arquitetura é a cooperação. Neste trabalho, inicialmente é feito um estudo para verificar o quanto a presença de nós não-cooperativos pode afetar a qualidade da aplicação de distribuição de fluxo de vídeo em uma rede P2P. Com base nos resultados obtidos, é proposto um mecanismo de incentivo à cooperação para que seja garantida uma boa qualidade de vídeo aos nós cooperativos e alguma punição aos nós não-cooperativos. Os testes e avaliações foram realizados utilizando-se o simulador PeerSim.

Addressing the cognitive and social influence inhibitors during the ideation stages of technology roadmapping workshops

Technology roadmapping workshops are essentially a social mechanism for exploring, creating, shaping and implementing ideas. The front-end of a roadmapping session is based on brainstorming in order to tap into the group's diverse knowledge. The aim of this idea stimulation activity is to capture and share as many perspectives as possible across the full scope of the area of interest. The premise to such group brainstorming is that the sharing and exchange of ideas leads to cognitive stimulation resulting in a greater overall group idea generation performance in terms of the number, variety and originality of ideas. However, it must be recognized that the ideation stage in a roadmapping workshop is a complex psychosocial phenomenon with underlying cognitive and social processes. Thus, there are downsides to group interactions and these must be addressed in order to fully benefit from the power of a roadmapping workshop. This paper will highlight and discuss the key cognitive and social inhibitors involved. These include: production blocking, evaluation apprehension, free riding/social loafing, low norm setting/matching. Facilitation actions and process adjustments to counter such negative factors will be identified so as to provide a psychosocial basis for improving the running of roadmapping workshops. © 2009 PICMET.

Resolving questions about bias in real and hypothetical referenda

Despite 10 years of research on behavior in hypothetical referenda, conflict remains in the literature on whether or not the mechanism generates biased responses compared to real referenda, and the nature and source of any such bias. Almost all previous inquiry in respect of this issue has concentrated on bias at the aggregate level. This paper reports a series of three experiments which focuses on bias at the individual level and how this can translate to bias at the aggregate level. The authors argue that only an individual approach to hypothetical bias is consistent with the concept of incentive compatibility. The results of these experiments reflect these previous conflicting findings but go on to show that individual hypothetical bias is a robust result driven by the differing influence of pure self-interest and other-regarding preferences in real and hypothetical situations, rather than by a single behavioral theory such as free riding. In a hypothetical situation these preferences cause yea-saying and non-demand revealing voting. This suggests that investigation of individual respondents in other hypothetical one-shot binary choices may also provide us with insights into aggregate behavior in these situations.

Analyse en identification partielle de la décision d'émigrer des étudiants africains

La migration internationale d’étudiants est un investissement couteux pour les familles dans beaucoup de pays en voie de développement. Cependant, cet investissement est susceptible de générer des bénéfices financiers et sociaux relativement importants aux investisseurs, tout autant que des externalités pour d’autres membres de la famille. Cette thèse s’intéresse à deux aspects importants de la migration des étudiants internationaux : (i) Qui part? Quels sont les déterminants de la probabilité de migration? (ii) Qui paie? Comment la famille s’organise-t-elle pour couvrir les frais de la migration? (iii) Qui y gagne? Ce flux migratoire est-il au bénéfice du pays d’origine? Entreprendre une telle étude met le chercheur en face de défis importants, notamment, l’absence de données complètes et fiables; la dispersion géographique des étudiants migrants en étant la cause première. La première contribution importante de ce travail est le développement d’une méthode de sondage en « boule de neige » pour des populations difficiles à atteindre, ainsi que d’estimateurs corrigeant les possibles biais de sélection. A partir de cette méthodologie, j’ai collecté des données incluant simultanément des étudiants migrants et non-migrants du Cameroun en utilisant une plateforme internet. Un second défi relativement bien documenté est la présence d’endogénéité du choix d’éducation. Nous tirons avantage des récents développements théoriques dans le traitement des problèmes d’identification dans les modèles de choix discrets pour résoudre cette difficulté, tout en conservant la simplicité des hypothèses nécessaires. Ce travail constitue l’une des premières applications de cette méthodologie à des questions de développement. Le premier chapitre de la thèse étudie la décision prise par la famille d’investir dans la migration étudiante. Il propose un modèle structurel empirique de choix discret qui reflète à la fois le rendement brut de la migration et la contrainte budgétaire liée au problème de choix des agents. Nos résultats démontrent que le choix du niveau final d’éducation, les résultats académiques et l’aide de la famille sont des déterminants importants de la probabilité d’émigrer, au contraire du genre qui ne semble pas affecter très significativement la décision familiale. Le second chapitre s’efforce de comprendre comment les agents décident de leur participation à la décision de migration et comment la famille partage les profits et décourage le phénomène de « passagers clandestins ». D’autres résultats dans la littérature sur l’identification partielle nous permettent de considérer des comportements stratégiques au sein de l’unité familiale. Les premières estimations suggèrent que le modèle « unitaire », où un agent représentatif maximise l’utilité familiale ne convient qu’aux familles composées des parents et de l’enfant. Les aidants extérieurs subissent un cout strictement positif pour leur participation, ce qui décourage leur implication. Les obligations familiales et sociales semblent expliquer les cas de participation d’un aidant, mieux qu’un possible altruisme de ces derniers. Finalement, le troisième chapitre présente le cadre théorique plus général dans lequel s’imbriquent les modèles développés dans les précédents chapitres. Les méthodes d’identification et d’inférence présentées sont spécialisées aux jeux finis avec information complète. Avec mes co-auteurs, nous proposons notamment une procédure combinatoire pour une implémentation efficace du bootstrap aux fins d’inférences dans les modèles cités ci-dessus. Nous en faisons une application sur les déterminants du choix familial de soins à long terme pour des parents âgés.

A budget for Europe's Monetary Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/22, December 2012

In a monetary union, national fiscal deficits are of limited help to counteract deep recessions; union-wide support is needed. A common euro-area budget (1) should provide a temporary but significant transfer of resources in case of large regional shocks, (2) would be an instrument to counteract severe recessions in the area as a whole, and (3) would ensure financial stability. The four main options for stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are: unemployment insurance, payments related to deviations of output from potential, the narrowing of large spreads, and discretionary spending. The common resource would need to be well-designed to be distributionally neutral, avoid free-riding behaviour and foster structural change while be of sufficient size to have an impact. Linking budget support to large deviations of output from potential appears to be the best option. A borrowing capacity equipped with a structural balanced budget rule could address area-wide shocks. It could serve as the fiscal backstop to the bank resolution authority. Resources amounting to 2 percent of euro-area GDP would be needed for stabilisation policy and financial stability.

Should kids pay their own way?

Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised such that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers, despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that there is a debate, two main views can be identified. The Parents Pay view says that parents, responsible for the existence of the costs, must foot the bill. The Society Pays view says that a next generation is a benefit to all, and so to allow parents to foot the bill alone is the worst kind of free-riding. In this paper, I introduce a third potentially liable party currently missing from the debate: children themselves. On my backward-looking view, we are entitled to ask people to contribute to the raising of children on the basis that they have benefited from being raised themselves.

Evaluation of cumulative externality: environmental economics, oligopoly and the private provision of public goods

This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words).

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Common agency with informed principals

We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.

Spatial spillovers and political coordination in public health provision

We estimate the impact of the main unconditional federal grant (Fundo de Participaçãodos Municípios - FPM) to Brazilian municipalities as well as its spillover from the neighboring cities on local health outcomes. We consider data from 2002 to 2007 (Brollo et al, 2013) and explore the FPM distribution rule according to population brackets to apply a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) using cities near the thresholds. In elasticity terms, we nd a reduction on infant mortality rate (-0.18) and on morbidity rate (- 0.41), except in the largest cities of our sample. We also nd an increase on the access to the main program of visiting the vulnerable families, the Family Health Program (Programa Sa ude da Família - PSF). The e ects are stronger for the smallest cities of our sample and we nd increase: (i) On the percentage of residents enrolled in the program (0.36), (ii) On the per capita number of PSF visits (1.59), and (iii) On the per capita number of PSF visits with a doctor (1.8) and nurse (2). After we control for the FPM spillover using neighboring cities near diferent thresholds, our results show that the reduction in morbidity and mortality is largely due to the spillover e ect, but there are negative spillover on preventive actions, as PSF doctors visits and vaccination. Finally, the negative spillover e ect on health resources may be due free riding or political coordination problems, as in the case of the number of hospital beds, but also due to to competition for health professionals, as in the case of number of doctors (-0.35 and -0.87, respectively), specially general practitioners and surgeons (-1.84 and -2.45).

Does group size matter? Cheating and cooperation in Brazilian school children

Cooperation between individuals is an important requisite for the maintenance of social relationships. The purpose of this study was to investigate cooperation in children in the school environment, where individuals could cooperate or not with their classmates in a public goods game. We investigated which of the following variables influenced cooperation in children: sex, group size, and information on the number of sessions. Group size was the only factor to significantly affect cooperation, with small-group children cooperating significantly more than those in large groups. Both sex and information had no effect on cooperation. We suggest that these results reflect the fact that, in small groups, individuals were more efficient in controlling and retaliating theirs peers than in large groups. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Evolutionary methods for self-organizing cooperation in peer-to-peer networks

The Peer-to-Peer network paradigm is drawing the attention of both final users and researchers for its features. P2P networks shift from the classic client-server approach to a high level of decentralization where there is no central control and all the nodes should be able not only to require services, but to provide them to other peers as well. While on one hand such high level of decentralization might lead to interesting properties like scalability and fault tolerance, on the other hand it implies many new problems to deal with. A key feature of many P2P systems is openness, meaning that everybody is potentially able to join a network with no need for subscription or payment systems. The combination of openness and lack of central control makes it feasible for a user to free-ride, that is to increase its own benefit by using services without allocating resources to satisfy other peers’ requests. One of the main goals when designing a P2P system is therefore to achieve cooperation between users. Given the nature of P2P systems based on simple local interactions of many peers having partial knowledge of the whole system, an interesting way to achieve desired properties on a system scale might consist in obtaining them as emergent properties of the many interactions occurring at local node level. Two methods are typically used to face the problem of cooperation in P2P networks: 1) engineering emergent properties when designing the protocol; 2) study the system as a game and apply Game Theory techniques, especially to find Nash Equilibria in the game and to reach them making the system stable against possible deviant behaviors. In this work we present an evolutionary framework to enforce cooperative behaviour in P2P networks that is alternative to both the methods mentioned above. Our approach is based on an evolutionary algorithm inspired by computational sociology and evolutionary game theory, consisting in having each peer periodically trying to copy another peer which is performing better. The proposed algorithms, called SLAC and SLACER, draw inspiration from tag systems originated in computational sociology, the main idea behind the algorithm consists in having low performance nodes copying high performance ones. The algorithm is run locally by every node and leads to an evolution of the network both from the topology and from the nodes’ strategy point of view. Initial tests with a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma application show how SLAC is able to bring the network to a state of high cooperation independently from the initial network conditions. Interesting results are obtained when studying the effect of cheating nodes on SLAC algorithm. In fact in some cases selfish nodes rationally exploiting the system for their own benefit can actually improve system performance from the cooperation formation point of view. The final step is to apply our results to more realistic scenarios. We put our efforts in studying and improving the BitTorrent protocol. BitTorrent was chosen not only for its popularity but because it has many points in common with SLAC and SLACER algorithms, ranging from the game theoretical inspiration (tit-for-tat-like mechanism) to the swarms topology. We discovered fairness, meant as ratio between uploaded and downloaded data, to be a weakness of the original BitTorrent protocol and we drew inspiration from the knowledge of cooperation formation and maintenance mechanism derived from the development and analysis of SLAC and SLACER, to improve fairness and tackle freeriding and cheating in BitTorrent. We produced an extension of BitTorrent called BitFair that has been evaluated through simulation and has shown the abilities of enforcing fairness and tackling free-riding and cheating nodes.