Globalization and loss of autonomy by the fiscal, banking and monetary authorities

Includes bibliography

O uso da ren??ncia fiscal na ??rea de museus

O objetivo desse artigo ?? investigar como a ren??ncia fiscal ?? utilizada na ??rea de museus. A fundamenta????o te??rica faz breve apresenta????o da literatura sobre implementa????o e descreve o uso da ren??ncia fiscal na ??rea de museus mediante an??lise de seis vari??veis: incentivos, autonomia, informa????o, apoio institucional, apoio social e etapas e tempo. A metodologia utilizada foi a an??lise documental e entrevistas. A an??lise foi feita com ajuda do programa NVIVO9. As principais conclus??es s??o que embora haja incentivos e autonomia em graus suficientes para permitir boa implementa????o via ren??ncia fiscal, h?? quest??es informacionais e referentes ??s etapas e tempo que dificultam sua implementa????o. Al??m disso, a ren??ncia fiscal ?? concentradora, desigual e apresenta baixa participa????o de empresas do setor privado. Esses problemas parecem diminuir a capacidade de a implementa????o de museus mediante o uso da ren??ncia fiscal alcan??ar os efeitos almejados.

Auxílios de Estado sob a forma fiscal: O caso Açores - Proc. C-88/03

Mestrado em Fiscalidade

Fiscal decentralization in Spain: An asymmetric transition to democracy

Asymmetric fiscal decentralization, by which we mean different fiscal arrangements between the central government and different groups of, or individual, lower-level governments, may be justified from an economic efficiency perspective. As argued by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and others, a decentralized system of regional and local governments is better able to accommodate differences in tastes for public goods and services. This efficiency argument calls for decentralization of fiscal authority to regional and local governments, but not necessarily asymmetric decentralization. However, when the differences in tastes for public goods and services arise out of differences in history, culture and language across regions of a country, asymmetric treatment may be justified. History, culture and language may influence how a group of people (a region) views autonomy, independence and fiscal authority. Some regions may have had experience with autonomous government in the past, they may have a culture that is strongly reliant upon (or leery of) the central government, or they may be fearful of losing their separate languages if they do not have special arrangements. To accommodate differences in taste for independence, autonomy, and fiscal authority, it may be necessary to have different fiscal arrangements between the central government and the different regions comprising the country.

Why do differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization endure?

A notable difference between the U.S. and many countries in Europe is in the degree of fiscal decentralization. Regional (and local) governments in the U.S. have significant autonomy in setting their own taxes and determining how to spend their revenues. This is not true of their counterparts in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and many other European countries. In recent years, many countries formerly subject to dictatorshipsor communism have been considering decentralizing fiscal responsibility to sub-national governments as part of the process of democratization (see Bird and Ebel, forthcoming). Yet, much of Europe remains immune to adopting effective decentralization in which sub-national units have true taxing authority.

A politica fiscal no Brasil : limites e contradições : o caso do Estado do Espirito Santo

o estudo pretende contribuir para a análise da realidade brasileira, através do caso do Estado do Espírito Santo, no período compreendido entre 1946 a 1980, tentando demonstrar a dependência financeira dos governos estaduais refletida na perda de receitas próprias e da necessária autonomia para a sua utilização. Numa visão retrospect.iva observa-se uma excessiva tendência à centralização manifestada pelo federalismo brasileiro, principalmente, depois da Reforma Tribut.ária de 1967, que estabeleceu um rigoroso controle da União sobre as receitas tributárias e sobre a ação dos Estados- membros, reduzindo sua autonomia em matéria de legislação tributária. A centralização financeira e política fez com que os go- . , . vernos estaduais perdessem 8S prerrogativasanteriorrnente adquiridas e tivessem limitada sua autonomia em;matéria de politica fiscal. Tentou-se compensar a acentuada redução das receitas tributárias estaduais lnstituindo- se o mecanismo das transferências que, a despeito de suas funç5es redIstributi vas, impõe uma série de exig§ncias e determinações para a sua aplicação. A partir dessa constataç50 passa-se a analisar a política fiscal no Estado do Espírito Santo observando-se as administrações estaduais nesse período. Cheg~-se à conclusão de que as sucessivas crises financeiras ocorridas limitaram a formulação de uma política fiscal estadual. Com isso, constat3-se que os estados passaram a ser rneros agentes administrativos reproduzindo as decis5es maiores formuladas pelo governo federal. Em linhas gerais, tentou-se comprovar a dependência fi--

Renúncia fiscal heterônoma de ICMS na exportação no estado do Pará

O presente trabalho faz análise, sob a égide do federalismo, da renúncia fiscal heterônoma do Imposto de Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços (ICMS) para exportação introduzida pela Lei Federal Complementar n.º 87 de 13 de Setembro de 1996, Lei Kandir, posteriormente posta pela Emenda à Constituição de n.º 42/2003. Aborda aspectos da autonomia federativa dos Estados Membros, detentores da competência tributária de ICMS, e procura esclarecer os conceitos de imunidade e isenção tributária, competência e autonomia para verificar a possibilidade de violação à autonomia dos Estado mediante usurpação de competência tributária, bem como verificar as perdas fiscais decorrentes da referida renúncia fiscal no Estado do Pará.

The Dynamics of Decentralization in Italy: Towards a Federal Solution? European Diversity and Autonomy Papers, EDAP/04 2013

This paper analyses the recent process of state decentralisation in Italy from the perspectives of political science and constitutional law. It considers the conflicting pressures and partisan opportunism of the decentralising process, and how these have adversely affected the consistency and completeness of the new constitutional framework. The paper evaluates the major institutional reforms affecting state decentralisation, including the 2001 constitutional reform and the more recent legislation on fiscal federalism. It argues that while the legal framework for decentralisation remains unclear and contradictory in parts, the Constitutional Court has performed a key role in interpreting the provisions and giving life to the decentralised system, in which regional governments now perform a much more prominent role. This new system of more decentralised multi-level government must nevertheless contend with a political culture and party system that remains highly centralised, while the administrative apparatus has undergone no comparable shift to take account of state decentralisation, leading to the duplication of bureaucracy at all territorial levels and continuing conflicts over policy jurisdiction. Unlike in federal systems these conflicts cannot be resolved in Italy through mechanisms of “shared rule”, since formal inter-governmental coordination structure are weak and entirely consultative.

Interaction Between Fiscal And Monetary Policy In A Dynamic Nonlinear Model.

The objective of this study is to verify the dynamics between fiscal policy, measured by public debt, and monetary policy, measured by a reaction function of a central bank. Changes in monetary policies due to deviations from their targets always generate fiscal impacts. We examine two policy reaction functions: the first related to inflation targets and the second related to economic growth targets. We find that the condition for stable equilibrium is more restrictive in the first case than in the second. We then apply our simulation model to Brazil and United Kingdom and find that the equilibrium is unstable in the Brazilian case but stable in the UK case.

The Conditional Autonomy of Tafuri's Historian / De Provisorische Autonomie van de Historicus bij Tafuri

This article considers the conditions placed on the autonomous architectural history discipline often understood at stake in Manfredo Tafuri's 1968 book Teorie e storia dell'architettura.

An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars

I examine a situation where a firm chooses to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions. The value of the factory may differ among jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdictions compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infrastructure, commitments to spend on infrastructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that the expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements is the same. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism that is, the mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense - can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation.

Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities

This paper uses a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the influence of public expenditures on the probability of mayors` reelection. We examine Brazilian municipal elections from 1988 to 2000 using a logit fixed-effects model. The results suggest that mayors who spend more during their terms of office increase the probability of their own reelection or of a successor of the same political party. In particular, higher capital spending over the years preceding elections and current expenditures in election years are beneficial to Brazilian incumbent mayors.