The Forward Premium Puzzle and The Euro

This paper evaluates the forward premium puzzle using the Euro exchange rate. Unlike previous studies, our analysis utilizes time-varying parameter methods and is based on two approaches for evaluation of the puzzle; the traditional approach analyzing the sensitivity of interest rate differentials to the forward premium, and the other looking into deviations from the covered interest rate parity (CIRP) condition. Then we provide evidence that the forward premium puzzle indeed became more prominent around the time of the recent crisis periods such as the Lehman Shock and the Euro crisis. This is also shown to be consistent with a deterioration in the CIRP.

spotlight europe 20120/05, August 2012: Confronting the crisis

The euro crisis has not gone away on holiday. In fact, it continues to generate a never-ending string of horrific headlines. Where is it all going to end? In this article we describe the proposed remedies that are currently being discussed, and what blue and red eurobonds, euro bills, FIRE and the debt redemption fund can actually achieve.

Intra-Euro rebalancing is inevitable, but insufficient. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/15, August 2012

Greece, Portugal and Spain face a serious risk of external solvency due to their close to minus 100 percent of GDP net negative international investment positions, which are largely composed of debt. The perceived inability of these countries to rebalance their external positions is a major root of the euro crisis. Intra-euro rebalancing through declines in unit labour costs (ULC) in southern Europe, and ULC increases in northern Europe should continue, but has limits because: The share of intra-euro trade has declined. Intra-euro trade balances have already adjusted to a great extent. The intra-euro real exchange rates of Greece, Portugal and Spain have also either already adjusted or do not indicate significant appreciations since 2000. There are only two main current account surplus countries, Germany and the Netherlands. A purely intra-euro adjustment strategy would require too-significant wage increases in northern countries and wage declines in southern countries, which do not seem to be feasible. Before the crisis, the euro was significantly overvalued despite the close-to balanced current account position. The euro has depreciated recently, but more is needed to support the extra-euro trade of southern euro-area members. A weaker euro would also boost exports, growth, inflation and wage increases in Germany, thereby helping further intra-euro adjustment and the survival of the euro.

The Crisis and Germany: The Trading State Unleashed

Based on interviews with the main German actors and on secondary sources, the article examines the recent development of the German political economy, and the German strategy vis-à-vis the Euro zone. Germany is a trading state whose economic growth is strongly export-led. Until the years 1990s, strong institutional rigidities, both in industrial relations and in the welfare state, contributed to reconcile export growth with household consumption, thus keeping the German “tiger” on a leash. From the early 1990s on, however, both industrial relations and social protections have been strongly liberalized, thus further stimulating external competitiveness and reducing the role of consumption in the German growth model. The unleashed trading state shapes the German response to the Euro crisis and the austerity policies that Germany imposes to Europe. These policies are strongly supported by political parties, social actors, and public opinion in Germany, and the likelihood that they change in the near future is minimal.

Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/06, 13 March 2013

Irrespective of the euro crisis, a European banking union makes sense, including for non-euro area countries, because of the extent of European Union financial integration. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first element of the banking union. From the point of view of non-euro countries, the draft SSM regulation as amended by the EU Council includes strong safeguards relating to decision-making, accountability, attention to financial stability in small countries and the applicability of national macro-prudential measures. Non-euro countries will also have the right to leave the SSM and thereby exempt themselves from a supervisory decision. The SSM by itself cannot bring the full benefits of the banking union, but would foster financial integration, improve the supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory practices, increase the quality of supervision,avoid competitive distortions and provide ample supervisory information. While the decision to join the SSM is made difficult by the uncertainty about other elements of the banking union, including the possible burden sharing, we conclude that non-euro EU members should stand ready to join the SSM and be prepared for the negotiations of the other elements of the banking union.

Banking Union with a Sovereign Virus. The self-serving regulatory treatment of sovereign debt in the euro area. CEPS Policy Brief No. 289, 27 March 2013

In many eurozone countries, domestic banks often hold more than 20% of domestic public debt, which is an unsatisfactory situation given that banks are highly leveraged and that sovereign debt is inherently subject to default risk within the euro area. This paper by Daniel Gros finds, however, that the relative concentration of public debt on bank balance sheets is not just a result of the euro crisis, for there are strong additional incentives for banks in some countries to increase their sovereign. His contribution discusses a number of these regulatory incentives – the most important of which is specific to the euro area – and explores ways in which euro area banks can be weaned from massive investments in government bonds.

The EMS Crisis of the 1990s: Parallels with the present crisis? CEPS Working Document No. 393, 28 March 2014

The EMS crisis of the 1990s illustrated the importance of a lack of confidence in price or exchange rate stability, whereas the present crisis illustrates the importance of a lack of confidence in fiscal sustainability. Theoretically the difference between the two should be minor since, in terms of the real return to an investor, the loss of purchasing power can be the same when inflation is unexpectedly high, or when the nominal value of government debt is cut in a formal default. Experience has shown, however, that expropriation via a formal default is much more disruptive than via inflation. The paper starts by providing a brief review of the EMS crisis, emphasising that the most interesting period might be the ‘post-EMS’ crisis of 1993-95. It then reviews in section 2 the crisis factors, comparing the EMS crisis to today’s euro crisis. Section 3 outlines the main analytical issue, namely the potential instability of high public debt within and outside a monetary union. Section 4 then compares the pressure on public finance coming from the crises for the case of Italy. Section 5 uses data on ‘foreign currency’ debt to disentangle expectations of devaluation/inflation from expectations of default. Section 6 concludes.

The Eurozone crisis and the erosion of democratic legitimacy: Lessons from the gold standard. ACES Cases No. 2013.3

This paper makes four propositions. First, it argues that the euro’s institutional design makes it function like the interwar gold exchange standard during periods of stress. Just like the gold exchange standard during the 1930s, the euro created a ‘core’ of surplus countries and a ‘periphery’ of deficit countries. The latter have to sacrifice their internal domestic economic equilibrium in order to restore their external equilibrium, and therefore have no choice but to respond to balance of payments crises by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. The paper’s second claim is that the euro’s institutional design and the EU’s response to its ‘sovereign debt crisis’ during 2010-13 deepened the recession in the Eurozone periphery, as EMU leaders focused almost exclusively on austerity measures and structural reforms and paid only lip service to the need to rebalance growth between North and South. As Barry Eichengreen argued in Golden Fetters, the rigidity of the gold standard contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression during the 1930s, but also underscored the incompatibility of the system with legitimate national democratic government in places like Italy, Germany, and Spain, which is the basis for the paper’s third proposition: the euro crisis instigated a crisis of democratic government in Southern Europe underlining that democratic legitimacy still mainly resides within the borders of nation states. By adopting the euro, EMU member states gave up their ability to control major economic policy decisions, thereby damaging their domestic political legitimacy, which in turn dogged attempts to enact structural reforms. Evidence of the erosion of national democracy in the Eurozone periphery can be seen in the rise of anti-establishment parties, and the inability of traditional center-left and center-right parties to form stable governments and implement reforms. The paper’s fourth proposition is that the euro’s original design and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis further widened the existing democratic deficit in the European Union, as manifested in rising anti-EU and anti-euro sentiment, as well as openly Eurosceptic political movements, not just in the euro periphery, but also increasingly in the euro core.

Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism?

Highlights - Irrespective of the euro crisis, a European banking union makes sense, including for non-euro area countries, because of the extent of European Union financial integration. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the first element of the banking union. - From the point of view of non-euro countries, the draft SSM regulation as amended by the EU Council includes strong safeguards relating to decision-making, accountability, attention to financial stability in small countries and the applicability of national macro-prudential measures. Non-euro countries will also have the right to leave the SSM and thereby exempt themselves from a supervisory decision. - The SSM by itself cannot bring the full benefits of the banking union, but would foster financial integration, improve the supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory practices, increase the quality of supervision, avoid competitive distortions and provide ample supervisory information. - While the decision to join the SSM is made difficult by the uncertainty about other elements of the banking union, including the possible burden sharing, we conclude that non-euro EU members should stand ready to join the SSM and be prepared for the negotiations of the other elements of the banking union.

Eurokriisi ja euroalueen rakenteelliset ongelmat

Maailmanlaajuinen finanssikriisi on vaikuttanut merkittävällä tavalla euroalueen toimintaan ja tuonut esiin ongelmia sen rakenteessa. Tutkielman tavoitteena oli tunnistaa eurokriisiin johtaneita tekijöitä ja euroalueen keskeisiä rakenteellisia ongelmia. Teoriakehys muodostui optimaalisen valuutta-alueen teoriasta, jota täydennettiin velkaantumiseen, pankkikriiseihin ja vaihtotaseiden epätasapainotiloihin liittyvällä teorialla. Tutkimuksessa hyödynnettiin laaja-alaisesti olemassa olevaa teoreettista ja empiiristä kirjallisuutta sekä eri tietokannoista saatavaa makrodataa. Tulokset kertovat rahoitusmarkkinoiden keskeisestä roolista epätasapainotilojen kehittymisessä sekä rahaunionin puutteellisista mukautumismekanismeista. Institutionaalisen rakenteen osalta euroalueen keskeisiä ongelmia ovat olleet tehokkaan pankkivalvonnan puute sekä viime hetken lainoittajan puuttuminen valtionvelkakirjamarkkinoilla.

La estructura a plazos del riesgo interbancario

Este documento propone un modelo para la estructura a plazos del riesgo interbancario a partir del spread entre los Interest Rate Swap (IRS) y los Overnight Indexed Swaps (OIS) en dólares durante la crisis financiera 2007-08 y la crisis del euro en 2010. Adicionalmente hace la descomposición del riesgo interbancario entre riesgo de default y no-default (liquidez). Los resultados sugieren que la crisis financiera tuvo importantes repercusiones en la estructura a plazos del riesgo interbancario y sus componentes: en los años previos a la crisis, el riesgo de no-default explicaba la mayor parte del riesgo interbancario; durante la crisis y posterior a ella, el riesgo de default conducía el comportamiento del riesgo interbancario. Adicionalmente, se encuentra que, a partir de la estructura a plazos de cada componente del riesgo interbancario, la crisis financiera se caracterizó por ser un problema más de corto que de largo plazo, en contraste con la crisis del euro de 2010. Estos resultados siguen lo propuesto por Filipovic & Trolle (2012) y dejan importantes implicaciones sobre el riesgo interbancario durante los periodos de stress financiero.

La estructura a plazos del riesgo interbancario

Este documento propone un modelo para la estructura a plazos del riesgo interbancario a partir del spread entre los Interest Rate Swap (IRS) y los Overnight Indexed Swaps (OIS) en dólares durante la crisis financiera 2007-08 y la crisis del euro en 2010. Adicionalmente hace la descomposición del riesgo interbancario entre riesgo de default y no-default (liquidez). Los resultados sugieren que la crisis financiera tuvo importantes repercusiones en la estructura a plazos del riesgo interbancario y sus componentes: en los años previos a la crisis, el riesgo de no-default explicaba la mayor parte del riesgo interbancario; durante la crisis y posterior a ella, el riesgo de default conducía el comportamiento del riesgo interbancario. Adicionalmente, se encuentra que, a partir de la estructura a plazos de cada componente del riesgo interbancario, la crisis financiera se caracterizó por ser un problema más de corto que de largo plazo, en contraste con la crisis del euro de 2010. Estos resultados siguen lo propuesto por Filipovic & Trolle (2012) y dejan importantes implicaciones sobre el riesgo interbancario durante los periodos de stress financiero.

The implications for the EU and national budgets of the use of EU instruments for macro-financial stability. CEPS Special Report, 4 September 2012

The euro crisis has forced member states and the EU institutions to create a series of new instruments to safeguard macro-financial stability of the Union. This study describes the status of existing instruments, the role of the European Parliament and how the use of the instruments impinges on the EU budget also through their effects on national budgets. In addition, it presents a survey of other possible instruments that have been proposed in recent years (e.g. E-bonds and eurobonds), in order to provide an assessment of how EU macro-financial stability assistance could evolve in the future and what could be its impact on EU public finances.

Germania: l’indomabile trading state

Basato su interviste con i principali attori tedeschi e su un’analisi della letteratura, l’articolo analizza lo sviluppo recente dell’economia tedesca e la strategia tedesca nell’affrontare la crisi dell’eurozona. La Germania è uno stato commerciale (trading state), la cui crescita è fortemente trainata dalle esportazioni. Fino agli anni novanta, rigidità istituzionali forti, nel sistema di relazioni industriali e nel sistema di protezione sociale, contribuivano a conciliare lo sviluppo delle esportazioni con una crescita armonica dei consumi interni, contribuendo cosi a ingabbiare la «tigre» tedesca. A partire dagli anni novanta, sia le relazioni industriali sia la protezione sociale sono state fortemente liberalizzate, stimolando ulteriormente la competitività estera e indebolendo i consumi interni. Il modello economico tedesco, cosi come è venuto profilandosi negli ultimi dieci anni, è alla base delle politiche di austerità che la Germania impone all’Europa. Tali politiche sono fortemente condivise dai partiti politici, dagli attori sociali e dall’opinione pubblica, e le probabilità che la strategia tedesca cambi sono minime.

The Europe barometer points to stormy weather. CEPS Commentary, 15 February 2013

Against the current background of a sharp decline in public support for the EU and an emerging reinforced centre to manage the euro crisis, this commentary finds that the only way Europe’s leaders can hope to keep the fragile equilibrium afloat is to summon up the courage to go forward with concrete proposals for political union.