Dispute Settlement Alternatives in Future EU BITS. IES WORKING PAPER 1/2012

Following the inclusion of the Common Commercial Policy in the exclusive competences of the European Union, a handful of policy adjustments have occurred. Among these adjustments, investment protection has been a remarkable one - given its new, exclusive framework and an already established, state-level practice. As the new policy stands, Bilateral Investment Treaties, which had been negotiated and executed by the EU Member States in the pre-Lisbon period, can now only be negotiated and executed by the EU. These prospective ‘EU BITs’, inter alia, aim for an even stronger mechanism for the protection of investors both in the EU and in third states. A strong protection mechanism inevitably calls for a strong Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and the establishment of a DSM may prove to be challenging. The EU currently faces several questions on its path to a tangible and reliable ‘EU BIT’, and arguably the most outstanding one is the question of the DSMs to be incorporated in these new agreements. What are the alternatives of a DSM for these new BITs? Which alternatives are currently utilizable and which ones are not? What are the current problems that the EU face, and how can those problems be tackled? Is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes an alternative, and if not, why? Following a thorough overview, this paper aims to analyse the DSM alternatives for the EU to be used in the new EU BITs and ultimately provide a solid DSM proposal.

Why Do Some International Institutions Contain Strong Dispute Settlement Provisions: New Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements

To understand why some international institutions have stronger dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) than others, we investigate the dispute settlement provisions of nearly 600 preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which possess several desirable case-selection features and are evoked more than is realized. We broaden the study of dispute settlement design beyond “legalization” and instead reorient theorizing around a multi-faceted conceptualization of the strength of DSMs. We posit that strong DSMs are first and foremost a rational response to features of agreements that require stronger dispute settlement, such as depth and large memberships. Multivariate empirical tests using a new data set on PTA design confirm these expectations and reveal that depth – the amount of policy change specified in an agreement – is the most powerful and consistent predictor of DSM strength, providing empirical support to a long-posited but controversial conjecture. Yet power also plays a sizeable role, since agreements among asymmetric members are more likely to have strong DSMs due to their mutual appeal, as are those involving the United States. Important regional differences also emerge, as PTAs across the Americas are designed with strong dispute settlement, as are Asian PTAs, which contradicts the conventional wisdom about Asian values and legalization. Our findings demonstrate that rationalism explains much of international institutional design, yet it can be enhanced by also incorporating power-based and regional explanations.

Problems and policies of dispute settlement and wage stabilization during World War II.

Mode of access: Internet.

Les tiers dans le contentieux arbitral des investissements internationaux : de l'intervention au recours direct

L’arbitrage public international est demeuré un domaine exclusif aux États souverains jusqu’à la fin des années 50, alors que sont apparus les traités bilatéraux relatifs aux investissements (TBI). La principale caractéristique de ces TBI est sans conteste le recours direct de l’investisseur étranger en arbitrage international contre des États récalcitrants, une alternative aux tribunaux locaux souvent inefficaces. Plus récemment, en 1998, l’organe d’appel de l’OMC est allé jusqu’à accepter l’opinion d’amicus curiae dans un différend opposant des États et aujourd’hui, l’admission de ce type d’opinion est expressément prévue dans plusieurs TBI de nouvelle génération. Mais si l’investisseur bénéficie d’un recours devant une instance arbitrale neutre, il en va tout autrement pour la population locale qui se trouve souvent lésée par la présence, sur son territoire, d’investisseurs étrangers. Le droit de présenter une opinion ne peut remplacer le droit de faire valoir une réclamation. Se pose donc la question : est-ce que, dans le contexte actuel du droit de l’investissement international, des tiers (par rapport aux parties signataires de TBI et par rapport aux parties au différend) peuvent prétendre à une voie de recours direct en arbitrage international? Nous sommes d’avis qu’une telle voie de recours est actuellement possible et que le contexte de l’arbitrage relatif à l’investissement constitue un terrain fertile pour la mise en place de ce droit, étant donné la place déjà faite aux investisseurs. Nous verrons que les principales objections à l’admission de tiers à l’arbitrage international peuvent être rejetées. L’objection de l’absence du consentement des parties intéressées tombe quand on constate les nombreux cas d’arbitrage international où la portée du consentement a été étendue pour inclure des non-parties ou encore pour soumettre à l’arbitrage des matières non envisagées au départ. Par ailleurs, l’absence de qualité pour agir en droit international est un problème théorique, car les investisseurs y ont déjà accès malgré l’absence de cette qualité. Reste donc à déterminer quelle pourrait être la base d’un recours en droit substantiel international pour qu’un tiers puisse faire valoir une réclamation. Nous verrons qu’il existe des instruments juridiques et des principes internationaux dont la contravention pourrait très bien engager la responsabilité de l’État ou de l’investisseur fautif, tout comme il est possible de bien circonscrire les critères d’admissibilité des tiers à la procédure d’arbitrage international.

Curbing agricultural exceptionalism: The EU's response to external challenge

From 1948 to 1994, the agricultural sector was afforded special treatment in the GATT. We analyse the extent to which this agricultural exceptionalism was curbed as a result of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, discuss why it was curbed and finally explore the implication of this for EU policy making. We argue that, in particular, two major changes in GATT institutions brought about restrictions on agricultural exceptionalism. First, the Uruguay Round was a 'single undertaking' in which progress on other dossiers was contingent upon an outcome on agriculture. The EU had keenly supported this new decision rule in the GATT. Within the EU this led to the MacSharry reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992, paving the way for a trade agreement on agriculture within the GATT. Second, under the new quasi-judicial dispute settlement procedure, countries are expected to bring their policies into conformity with WTO rules or face retaliatory trade sanctions. This has brought about a greater willingness on the part of the EU to submit its farm policy to WTO disciplines.

The mutual agreement procedure and arbitration of double taxation disputes

It is in the interest of most states to eliminate double taxation (i.e. the payment of the same tax in two jurisdictions) of transnational commercial enterprises. Because such disputes involve, on the one hand, the state imposition of taxes, a right universally asserted by all states, and private entities on the other, taxation disputes between such parties are not, on their face, easily susceptible to arbitration. This article analyzes two dispute settlement procedures-the OECD First Model Tax Convention and a similar EU Convention-with the exclusive focus on disputes relating to the imposition of double taxation. It will look at the ways in which state roles may vary under these procedures from assisting in the negotiation process to taking a part similar to, but with important differences from, diplomatic protection on behalf of an affected enterprise. The article will examine the situations under which the settlement procedure is required and/or available, how the procedures are triggered, the obligations and parts played by the parties, the means by which the disputes are resolved (from negotiations to tribunals) and the limitations of the procedures. Are they “taxpayer friendly”? As a result the reader may draw comparisons between the two procedures. Finally, the article will look at the proposed OECD Arbitration Clause which is intended to be incorporated into Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention as well as how these mechanisms relate and/or conflict with bilateral tax treaties and the GATS.

To ISDS or not to ISDS: A question of legitimacy in dispute resolution

Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) has gained prominence in recent years with an explosion in the number of investor claims against states. While the evolution of this type of arbitration was expected, its focus and context was not. Investors are currently bringing actions against developed states in unanticipated policy areas. Greece, facing actions from investors challenging its debt haircut and Spain, battling investor challenges to its revamped energy policy are examples of the use of arbitration as a political as well as a dispute resolution tool. It is for this reason why the proposal for the inclusion of ISDS in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has caused so much heated discussion. This paper examines the recent evolution and likely trajectory of investor state dispute settlement, reflecting on consequences for perceptions of arbitration and its links with politics and economics.

The tale of a Trojan horse or the quest for market access? China and the World Trade Organization

In 2001, China finally joined the WTO. The accession of China was looked forward to by many WTO members and China itself. However, observers had some fears that the Chinese accession would prove to be a Trojan horse, disrupting the working of the WTO. This paper looks into the Chinese accession and its involvement in the WTO Dispute Settlement and argues that these fears seem so far to be unfounded.

A liquidação do IRS: uma análise à actuação oficiosa

Mestrado em Fiscalidade