Vertical Differentiation and Entry Deterrence: A Reconsideration

In this work we emphasize why market coverage should be considered endogenous for a correct analysis of entry deterrence in vertical differentiation models and discuss the implications of this endogeneity for that analysis. We consider contexts without quality costs and also contexts with convex fixed quality costs.

When deterrence works - and when it doesn't: a comparison of Sweden's prostitution law and UK's Dangerous Dogs Act

Many pieces of legislation have been implemented with the anticipation - or justification - that they will have a deterrent effect. Deterrence was clearly argued in the debate preceding the Swedish prostitution law prohibiting the purchase of sexual services, but less so regarding the Dangerous Dogs Act, which was a very rapid response to a particular moral panic. As it turned out, the Swedish law has had a deterrent effect on street prostitution in that 'respectable' buyers were deterred. It will be argued that it is this very 'respectability' that makes deterrence work in this case. Regarding the Dangerous Dogs Act, the owners of Pit Bulls and other banned breeds are not considered 'respectable' and the banning might have had the reversed effect - increasing the attraction of these dogs, rather than deterring the ownership. Apart from deterrence and its consequences, the rendering invisible of key actors - buyers and owners respectively - and the use of symbolic legislation to promote moral messages will also be considered. [From the Author]

How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.

The Deterrence Rational in the Criminalization of HIV/AIDS

Anne Merminod de l'Université McGill est récipiendaire du 2ème prix du concours de la bourse d'initiation à la recherche offerte par le Regroupement Droit et changements aux étudiants du baccalauréat en droit.

The impact of distance deterrence on the choice of field of study in vocational education in the Netherlands. 'El impacto de la disuasión por la distancia en la elección de un campo de estudios en la Formación Profesional en los Países Bajos'.

Resumen tomado de la publicación

The virtual world of exercises and deterrence

Miliary Exercises, Command Post Exercises and War Games serve to test procedures, but in some forms also serve to signal ability to defend against aggression, or to intimidate neighbours with the threat of aggression. Some indicators suggest that the solidarity of NATO and the EU is decreasing, and with it a plausible nuclear deterrence posture. This article discusses whether recent exercises and TV war games make matters better or worse.

Cartel deterrence and settlements: the Brazilian experience

Settlements are an important part of a program of cartel deterrence, particularly when the likelihood of conviction and the litigation costs are higher. This type of negotiated procedure to reach finality is in essence complementary to the fully adversarial procedures associated to the trial by the administrative or judicial courts, and to other investigative instruments, such as the leniency agreement. The Brazilian experience provides some insights about the different models of direct settlement in cartel cases and the complex interaction among settlements, leniency agreements, and trial outcome. First, there is leeway for the complementary models of settlements, the first oriented mainly to increasing the likelihood of detection, and the second oriented to saving social costs of litigation. Second, the concern with the preservation of the demand for leniency agreements led the competition authority to restrict the use of settlements, which are effectively designed for the defendants that are likely guilty and give higher value to finality. The recent experience illustrates that the current settlement policy has not caused any adverse effect on leniency agreements, while reducing litigation costs and granting finality in some cases.

Role of Methyl Salicylate on Oviposition Deterrence in Arabidopsis thaliana

Plants attacked by herbivores have evolved different strategies that fend off their enemies. Insect eggs deposited on leaves have been shown to inhibit further oviposition through visual or chemical cues. In some plant species, the volatile methyl salicylate (MeSA) repels gravid insects but whether it plays the same role in the model species Arabidopsis thaliana is currently unknown. Here we showed that Pieris brassicae butterflies laid fewer eggs on Arabidopsis plants that were next to a MeSA dispenser or on plants with constitutively high MeSA emission than on control plants. Surprisingly, the MeSA biosynthesis mutant bsmt1-1 treated with egg extract was still repellent to butterflies when compared to untreated bsmt1-1. Moreover, the expression of BSMT1 was not enhanced by egg extract treatment but was induced by herbivory. Altogether, these results provide evidence that the deterring activity of eggs on gravid butterflies is independent of MeSA emission in Arabidopsis, and that MeSA might rather serve as a deterrent in plants challenged by feeding larvae.

Deterrence and Incapacitation: Towards a Unified Theory of Criminal Punishment

Economic models of crime have focused primarily on the goal of deterrence; the goal of incapacitation has received much less attention. This paper adapts the standard deterrence model to incorporate incapacitation. When prison only is used, incapacitation can result in a longer or a shorter optimal prison term compared to the deterrence-only model. It is longer if there is underdeterrence, and shorter if there is overdeterrence. In contrast, when a fine is available and it is not constrained by the offender's wealth, the optimal prison term is zero. Since the fine achieves first-best deterrence, only efficient crimes are committed and hence, there is no gain from incapacitation.

Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Repeat Offenders

This paper develops an economic model of criminal enforcement that combines the goals of deterrence and incapacitation. Potential offenders commit an initial criminal act if the present value of net private gains is positive. A fraction of these offenders become habitual and commit further crimes immediately upon release from their initial prison term (if any). The optimal punishment scheme in this setting generally involves a finite prison term for first-time offenders (based on the goal of deterrence), and an infinite (life) sentence for repeat offenders (based on the goal of incapacitation).