Productive consequences of fasting neonatal chicks of different genetic constitutions for growing

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Fiscal Constitutions: An Empirical Approach

The overarching question of this dissertation is: “why does the public debt grow, and why are fiscal (debt) crises repetitive and so widespread?” A special focus in answering this question is given to a fiscal constitution, which contains a country-specific set of laws, rules and regulations, and guides decision making in the area of fiscal policy. By shaping incentives and limiting arbitrariness, the fiscal constitution determines the course of fiscal policy and fiscal outcomes in the long term. This dissertation does not give, however, an exhaustive response to the overarching question. Instead it asks much narrower questions, which are selected after reviewing and identifying the main weaknesses and gaps in the modern literature on fiscal constitutions.

Legal Translation and the Bilingual Publication of Roman Imperial Constitutions

The present paper aims at investigating translation techniques and publication methods of Roman imperial constitutions published in Greek in the eastern provinces of the empire, where the official Latin was not well-established. Language, being a tool for normative communication must be comprehensible to the addressees of the norm, therefore publication of a normative text in a multilingual society brings along difficulties related in particular to the translatability of legal terminology. Language problems appear, however, not only in the level of communication, but also in those of implementation and interpretation of norms. Linguistic diversity, which currently afflicts legislators in the EU, has already been a challenge for the legislators in the Roman Empire. Major difficulty was the necessity of expressing Roman legal concepts in Greek language. Centralized translation system and consequent use of terminology helped to adapt Greek for the purposes of Roman legislator creating new technical vocabulary.

Kundmachung: Da das auf den 16., 17. und 18. d. M. angekündigte Constitutions-Fest im Prater nur eine Privat-Speculation ...

Welsch (Projektbearbeiter): Verbot des für den 16., 17. und 18. Juli 1848 angekündigten Konstitutionsfestes im Prater

Constitutions-Buch der gerechten und vollkommenen deutschen Loge freier und angenommener Maurer, zur gekrönten Schlange in Görlitz : Sanctionirt den 24. Junius im Jahre des Lichts 5808

Lt. der in den Johannislogen verwendeten Zeitrechnung (plus 4000) ca. 1808 erschienen

Constitutions around the world : A View from Latin America

This paper gives a global summary of the number of constitutions and the number of　articles in each constitution for many representative countries around the world. Several　works have already been written comparing different legal systems and different　constitutional traditions around the world; the purpose of this paper is just to compare the　numbers of constitutions and articles in the diverse regions of the world, namely: North　America, Latin America, Europe, Oceania, Middle East, Asia and Africa. Around the world, on average, Latin America has had the most convoluted constitutional history. The Dominican Republic has had a total of 32 constitutions, the largest number of constitutions of any country, since its independence in 1844. Three other countries have also had 20 or more constitutions throughout their history, all of them in Latin America: Venezuela (26), Haiti (24) and Ecuador (20). On the other hand, there are economies and societies that do not even have codified constitutions, like the United Kingdom in Europe, Hong Kong in Asia and New Zealand in Oceania. The United States has had only one constitution, even if it has been amended several times. There are also the special cases of Israel and Saudi Arabia, both in the Middle East, that do not have official written constitutions for historical and religious reasons. Comparative constitutional numbers and history help explain several things about the stability of political systems, but not necessarily about their quality.