Not thinking straight? A critical discourse analysis of the 2006 Irish High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan v. Revenue Commissioners and Attorney General

The recognition and protection of constitutional rights is a fundamental precept. In Ireland, the right to marry is provided for in the equality provisions of Article 40 of the Irish Constitution (1937). However, lesbians and gay men are denied the right to marry in Ireland. The ‘last word’ on this issue came into being in the High Court in 2006, when Katherine Zappone and Ann Louise Gilligan sought, but failed, to have their Canadian marriage recognised in Ireland. My thesis centres on this constitutional court ruling. So as to contextualise the pursuit of marriage equality in Ireland, I provide details of the Irish trajectory vis-à-vis relationship and family recognition for same-sex couples. In Chapter One, I discuss the methodological orientation of my research, which derives from a critical perspective. Chapter Two denotes my theorisation of the principle of equality and the concept of difference. In Chapter Three, I discuss the history of the institution of marriage in the West with its legislative underpinning. Marriage also has a constitutional underpinning in Ireland, which derives from Article 41 of our Constitution. In Chapter Four, I discuss ways in which marriage and family were conceptualised in Ireland, by looking at historical controversies surrounding the legalisation of contraception and divorce. Chapter Five denotes a Critical Discourse Analysis of the High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan. In Chapter Six, I critique text from three genres of discourse, i.e. ‘Letters to the Editor’ regarding same-sex marriage in Ireland, communication from legislators vis-à-vis the 2004 legislative impediment to same-sex marriage in Ireland, and parliamentary debates surrounding the 2010 enactment of civil partnership legislation in Ireland. I conclude my research by reflecting on my methodological and theoretical considerations with a view to answering my research questions. Author’s Update: Following the outcome of the 2015 constitutional referendum vis-à-vis Article 41, marriage equality has been realised in Ireland.

Constitutional Principles and Horizontal Effects: Kücükdeveci revisited

While German labour lawyers were still awaiting the German Constitutional Court’s final verdict on the principles established by the Mangold case, the Court of Justice of the European Union re-visited the question what exactly are the effects of Directive 2000/78 and the constitutional principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. This article analyses the constitutional relevance of this case in two respects. First, it argues that the Court has accepted neither direct horizontal effects of directives nor direct effects of constitutional principles, but rather - much more cautiously - reiterated the rule that directives on constitutional principles such as non-discrimination can exclude the application of national legislation in horizontal cases. The article also demonstrates that this cautious approach has succeeded in convincing the German Constitutional Court that the Mangold judgment was not ultra vires. Consequently, the claim challenging that judgment was dismissed and a constitutional crisis avoided.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

l bilanciamento tra le libertà economiche e i diritti sociali collettivi operato dalla Corte di Giustizia è un contemperamento tra diritti equiordinati?* = The balance between economic freedoms and collective social rights and actions; Court of Justice is a choice between rights equiordinati? Actions by the Court of Justice. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 98/2012

In the Viking and Laval judgments and more recently in the Comm. v. Germany ruling, the Court of Justice applied the proportionality test to collective rights, setting a series of restrictions to the exercise of the right to strike and the right to collective bargaining. The way the ECJ balances the economic freedoms and the social rights is indeed very different from that of the Italian Constitutional Court. Unlike the European Union Treaties, the Italian Constitution recognizes an important role to the right to take collective action which has to be connected with article 3, paragraph 2, consequently the right of strike is more protected than the exercise of economic freedoms.

"Viewers should not try this at home". Die Verfassungsgerichte Bosnien-Herzegowinas und Kosovos in deren Rolle als Schlichtungsinstanzen in ethnopolitischen Konflikten = The constitutional courts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in their role as arbitration bodies in ethno-political conflicts. EDAP 01/2014

The article analyzes the role of constitutional courts in Bosnia and Kosovo, both characterized by their partly internationalized membership, in the adjudication of cases that are highly controversial between the different ethno-political factions. The main focus is on the Constitutional Court of Bosnia, which presents one of the richest and most interesting examples of “lawfare” in divided societies. The concept of lawfare has been adapted to refer to the continuation of political battles by ethno-political actors through legal means, in this case, constitutional adjudication. In Kosovo, the Constitutional Court has been an important defender of diversity, albeit its primary focus and merit are to have contributed to the establishment of a concept of democracy close to the people of Kosovo. The article concludes that constitutional courts represent important institutions of internal conflict resolution in divided societies, which have been instrumental in shaping multiculturalism in these post-conflict societies divided by deep ethnic cleavages.

Did the German court do Europe a favor? Bruegel Working Paper 2014/09, July 2014

The European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme was a politically-pragmatic tool to diffuse the euro-area crisis. But it did not deal with the fundamental incompleteness of the European monetary union. As such, it blurred the boundary between monetary and fiscal policy. The fuzziness of this boundary helped in the short-term but pushed political and economic risks to the future. Unless a credible commitment to enforcing losses on private creditors is instituted, these conundrums will persist. The German Federal Constitutional Court has helped by insisting that such a dialogue be conducted in order to achieve a more durable political and economic solution. A study of the European Union Court of Justice’s Pringle decision (Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, Case C-370/12, ECJ, 27 November 2012) suggests that the ECJ will also not rubber-stamp the OMT – and, if it does, the legal victory will not resolve the fundamental dilemmas.

The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Re-writing the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht. IHS Political Science Series No. 136, February 2014

At a time of crisis – a true state of emergency – both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court have failed the rule of law in Europe. Worse still, in their evaluation of the ersatz crisis law, which has been developed in response to financial and sovereign debt crises, both courts have undermined constitutionality throughout Europe. Each jurisdiction has been implicated within the techocratisation of democratic process. Each Court has contributed to an incremental process of the undermining of the political subjectivity of European Citizens. The results are depressing for lawyers who are still attached to notions of constitutionality. Yet, we must also ask whether the Courts could have acted otherwise. Given the original flaws in the construction of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the politically pre-emptive constraints imposed by global financial markets, each Court might thus be argued to have been forced to suspend immediate legality in a longer term effort to secure the character of the legal jurisdiction as a whole. Crisis can and does defeat the law. Nevertheless, what continues to disturb is the failure of law in Europe to open up any perspective for a return to normal constitutionality post crisis, as well as its apparent inability to give proper and honest consideration to the hardship now being experienced by millions of Europeans within crisis. This contribution accordingly seeks to reimagine each Judgment in a language of legal honesty. Above all, this contribution seeks to suggest a new form of post-national constitutional language; a language which takes as its primary function, proper protection of democratic process against the ever encroaching powers of a post-national executive power. This contribution forms a part of an on-going effort to identify a new basis for the legitimacy of European Law, conducted jointly and severally with Christian Joerges, University of Bremen and Hertie School of Government, Berlin. Differences do remain in our theoretical positions; hence this individual essay. Nevertheless, the congruence between pluralist and conflict of law approaches to the topic are also readily apparent. See, for example, Everson & Joerges (2013).

The German Constitutional Court’s decision about the European Central Bank’s OMT [Outright Monetary Transactions] mechanism: A masterpiece of judicial arrogance. European Policy Briefs No. 30, April 2014

The German Constitutional Court (BVG) recently referred different questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. They concern the legality of the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transaction mechanism created in 2012. Simultaneously, the German Court has threatened to disrupt the implementation of OTM in Germany if its very restrictive analysis is not validated by the European Court of Justice. This raises fundamental questions about the future efficiency of the ECB’s monetary policy, the damage to the independence of the ECB, the balance of power between judges and political organs in charge of economic policy, in Germany and in Europe, and finally the relationship between the BVG and other national or European courts.

Financial and Criminal Responsibility for Public Funds – Protection of the Constitutional Fundamental Social Law of Health

Abstract: The implementation of Fundamental Constitutional Health and Social Rights is necessary, appropriate and proportionate, following the demands of the population. Accountability and self-responsibility play a very important role. This requires the development of constitutional principles that protect public funds against corruption and offer a constitutional right to health protection. Financial and criminal liability might provide an incentive to improve the management of public funds and reinforce fundamental constitutional principles, particularly regarding the right to health. Constitutional, administrative and criminal issues, as well as public management and administration and the science of good governance, should be articulated in a single strategy also in the health sector. In Portugal and Brazil, as examples, the Federal Court / Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court / High Court of Justice or the Court of Auditors should be considered together.

The Black Label: trade mark dilution, culture jamming, and the no logo movement

This article considers the ongoing debate over the appropriation of well-known and famous trade marks by the No Logo Movement for the purposes of political and social critique. It focuses upon one sensational piece of litigation in South Africa, Laugh It Off Promotions v. South African Breweries International (Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark International. In this case, a group called Laugh It Off Promotions subjected the trade marks of the manufacturers of Carling Beer were subjected to parody, social satire, and culture jamming. The beer slogan “Black Label” was turned into a T-Shirt entitled “Black Labour/ White Guilt”. In the ensuing litigation, the High Court of South Africa and the Supreme Court of Appeal were of the opinion that the appropriation of the mark was a case of hate speech. However, the Constitutional Court of South Africa disagreed, finding that the parodies of a well-known, famous trade mark did not constitute trade mark dilution. Moseneke J observed that there was a lack of evidence of economic or material harm; and Sachs J held that there is a need to provide latitude for parody, laughter, and freedom of expression. The decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa provides some important insights into the nature of trade mark dilution, the role of parody and satire, and the relevance of constitutional protections of freedom of speech and freedom of expression. Arguably, the ruling will be of help in the reformation of trade mark dilution law in other jurisdictions – such as the United States. The decision in Laugh It Off Promotions v. South African Breweries International demonstrates that trade mark law should not be immune from careful constitutional scrutiny.

A delimitação das cláusulas pétreas tributárias e financeiras na Constituição de 1988

O texto constitucional brasileiro de 1988 sofreu diversas alterações em matéria tributária e financeira. Praticamente todas as emendas constitucionais tiveram sua constitucionalidade questionada em razão de alegadas violações aos limites materiais do poder de reforma constitucional. O presente trabalho procura delinear alguns parâmetros para a construção de contornos mais precisos dos limites do poder de reforma constitucional em matéria tributária e financeira. A delimitação de tais parâmetros de reforma, além de contribuir para o exercício da jurisdição constitucional na análise da constitucionalidade das emendas constitucionais, permite que sejam mais bem delineadas quais as decisões fundamentais que a Constituição adotou na seara financeira e tributária, relacionadas ao federalismo, aos direitos fundamentais e à separação de poderes.

Da inconstitucionalidade por omissão ao Estado de coisas inconstitucional

A omissão inconstitucional é um tema desafiador. Este trabalho é dedicado a revisar os pressupostos de sua configuração, buscando explicar a possibilidade de a omissão implicar um estado de coisas inconstitucional. Presente violação massiva de direitos fundamentais decorrente de omissões caracterizadas como falhas estruturais, a Corte Constitucional colombiana declara a vigência de um estado de coisas inconstitucional. Ao assim decidir, a Corte passa a adotar remédios estruturais dirigidos a superar esse quadro negativo. Defendo aqui essa proposta como uma possibilidade para o Brasil e a atuação do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Trata-se, sem dúvida, de exemplo de ativismo judicial em sua dimensão estrutural. Todavia, esse comportamento judicial pode ser legítimo se presentes os pressupostos próprios do estado de coisas inconstitucional e o Tribunal formular decisões flexíveis, determinando a formulação e implementação de políticas públicas, mas deixando aos poderes políticos a tarefa de definir o conteúdo e os meios dessas políticas. O sistema carcerário brasileiro é exemplo de um estado de coisas inconstitucional que requer intervenção judicial da espécie.

The European Convention on Human Rights after Enlargement

The Council of Europe has dramatically enlarged its membership over the past decade, encompassing the vast majority of the formerly Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. With this dramatic enlargement, the Council has sought to secure its place in the complex institutional architecture of post-Cold War Europe, building on its traditional strengths in the promotion of democratic governance and human rights. Yet, both inside and outside the organisation, voices have been raised to suggest that the Council has lowered its admission standards in a manner which risks compromising the legitimacy of the European Convention on Human Rights. Against the background of these ongoing controversies, this article assesses the impact of enlargement on the European human rights system. Focusing on the composition of the European Court of Human Rights and the initial pattern of cases from the Central and East European member states, it is demonstrated that the short-term impact of enlargement has been quite limited. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court will face major new challenges over the coming years. In part, the Court will have to assume the role of an adjudicator of transition. More generally, there will also be mounting pressures for it to (re)cast itself more clearly as a European constitutional court.

Just a piece of cloth? German courts and employees with headscarves

On 10 October 2002, and on 24 September 2003, the German Federal Labour Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court each delivered a decision on the consequences of wearing a headscarf for employees. Both courts appeared to protect the individual rights of the woman in question. The Federal Labour Court invalidated the dismissal of a salesperson based on the wearing of a headscarf; the Federal Constitutional Court held that a school teacher must not be denied employment on grounds of wearing a headscarf. However, both courts also left some room for manoeuvre in favour of clothing policies or laicism principles which could be used to justify head-scarf bans. This note discussed the potential and drawback of these cases, especially as regards intersectional inequalities along the lines of gender, religion and ethnicity.