Central Bank Independence & Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany & Europe. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.4, 1994

This paper explores the fashionable proposition that with a more independent central bank, a country can secure lower levels of inflation without higher unemployment. Hall shows that the operation of the central bank depends on the character of wage bargaining. He illustrates this point with some cross-national data and an analysis of how coordinated wage bargaining is secured in Germany. He concludes by exploring the implications of this analysis for European Monetary Union.

Modeling the monetary policy reaction function of the colombian central bank

This paper proposes a simple Ordered Probit model to analyse the monetary policy reaction function of the Colombian Central Bank. There is evidence that the reaction function is asymmetric, in the sense that the Bank increases the Bank rate when the gap between observed inflation and the inflation target (lagged once) is positive, but it does not reduce the Bank rate when the gap is negative. This behaviour suggests that the Bank is more interested in fulfilling the announced inflation target rather than in reducing inflation excessively. The forecasting performance of the model, both within and beyond the estimation period, appears to be particularly good.

Central bank cooperation during the great recession. Bruegel Policy Contribution. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/08, 20 June 2013

During the Great Recession, central banks went well beyond their normal operations and provided liquidity in unlimited amounts, in foreign currency and to foreign banks. Central bank cooperation took the form of a swap network, and amounted to an episode of global monetary policy. However, though bank cooperation will continue to contribute to global governance, the swap network should not be made permanent and given an institutional basis to provide international lending of last resort. Swaps are a monetary policy tool and should continue to be decided on by central banks like all other monetary policy tools,to avoid impinging on their independence, which a difficult historical process has shown to be the best basis for price stability.

The channels of monetary policy triggered by central bank actions and statements in the Australian equity market

Owing to the discrete disclosure practices of the Reserve Bank of Australia, this paper provides new evidence on the channels of monetary policy triggered by central bank actions (monetary policy announcements) and statements (explanatory minutes releases), in the Australian equity market. Both monetary policy announcements and explanatory minutes releases are shown to have a significant and comparable impact on the returns and volatility of the Australian equity market. Further, distinct from US and European studies that find strong evidence of the interest rate, bank loan and balance sheet channels and no evidence of the exchange rate channel following central bank actions, this paper finds that monetary policy impacts the Australian equity market via the exchange rate, interest rate and bank loan channels of monetary policy, with only weak evidence of the balance sheet channel of monetary policy. These channels are found to be operating irrespective of the trigger (monetary policy announcements or explanatory minutes releases), though results are somewhat weaker when examining the explanatory minutes releases. These results have important implications for central bank officials and financial market participants alike: by confirming a comparable avenue to affect monetary policy; and providing an explication of its impact on the Australian equity market.

Monetary policy rules and estimated reaction functions for the European Central Bank

This thesis studies the interest-rate policy of the ECB by estimating monetary policy rules using real-time data and central bank forecasts. The aim of the estimations is to try to characterize a decade of common monetary policy and to look at how different models perform at this task.The estimated rules include: contemporary Taylor rules, forward-looking Taylor rules, nonlinearrules and forecast-based rules. The nonlinear models allow for the possibility of zone-like preferences and an asymmetric response to key variables. The models therefore encompass the most popular sub-group of simple models used for policy analysis as well as the more unusual non-linear approach. In addition to the empirical work, this thesis also contains a more general discussion of monetary policy rules mostly from a New Keynesian perspective. This discussion includes an overview of some notable related studies, optimal policy, policy gradualism and several other related subjects. The regression estimations are performed with either least squares or the generalized method of moments depending on the requirements of the estimations. The estimations use data from both the Euro Area Real-Time Database and the central bank forecasts published in ECB Monthly Bulletins. These data sources represent some of the best data that is available for this kind of analysis. The main results of this thesis are that forward-looking behavior appears highly prevalent, but that standard forward-looking Taylor rules offer only ambivalent results with regard to inflation. Nonlinear models are shown to work, but on the other hand do not have a strong rationale over a simpler linear formulation. However, the forecasts appear to be highly useful in characterizing policy and may offer the most accurate depiction of a predominantly forward-looking central bank. In particular the inflation response appears much stronger while the output response becomes highly forward-looking as well.

The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets, the Natural Rate of Unemployment

This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.

Media bias and central bank response. Evidence from the nominal exchange rate behavior in Colombia

Since 1991 Colombia has had a market-determined Peso - US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rate (NER), after more than 20 years of controlled and multiple exchange rates. The behavior (revaluation / devaluation) of the NER is constantly reported in news, editorials and op-eds of major newspapers of the nation with particular attention to revaluation. The uneven reporting of revaluation episodes can be explained by the existence of an interest group particulary affected by revaluation, looking to increase awareness and sympathy for help from public institutions. Using the number of news and op-eds from a major Colombian newspaper, it is shown that there is an over-reporting of revaluation episodes in contrast to devaluation ones. Secondly, using text analysis upon the content of the news, it is also shown that the words devaluation and revaluation are far apart in the distribution of words within the news; and revaluation is highly correlated with words related to: public institutions, exporters and the need of assistance. Finally it is also shown that the probability of the central bank buying US dollars to lessen revaluation effects increases with the number of news; even though the central bank allegedly intervenes in the exchange rate market only to tame volatility or accumulate international reserves.

What happens after the central bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

I start presenting an explicit solution to Taylorís (2001) model, in order to illustrate the link between the target interest rate and the overnight interest rate prevailing in the economy. Next, I use Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interest rate by 1%. Point estimates show a four-year accumulated output loss ranging from 0:04% (whole sample, 1980 : 1-2004 : 2; quarterly data) to 0:25% (Post-Real data only) with a Örst-year peak output response between 0:04% and 1:0%; respectively. Prices decline between 2% and 4% in a 4-year horizon. The accumulated output response is found to be between 3:5 and 6 times higher after the Real Plan than when the whole sample is considered. The 95% confidence bands obtained using bias-corrected bootstrap always include the null output response when the whole sample is used, but not when the data is restricted to the Post-Real period. Innovations to interest rates explain between 4:9% (whole sample) and 9:2% (post-Real sample) of the forecast error of GDP.

Central bank balance sheet concerns and credible optimal escape from the Liquidity trap

I show that when a central bank is financially independent from the treasury and has balance sheet concerns, an increase in the size or a change in the composition of the central bank's balance sheet (quantitative easing) can serve as a commitment device in a liquidity trap scenario. In particular, when the short-term interest rate is up against the zero lower bound, an open market operation by the central bank that involves purchases of long-term bonds can help mitigate the deation and a large negative output gap under a discretionary equilibrium. This is because such an open market operation provides an incentive to the central bank to keep interest rates low in future in order to avoid losses in its balance sheet.

What happens after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

In this paper I use Taylor's (2001) model and Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of some key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil, through the COPOM, increases the target interest rate by 1%. From a quantitative perspective, the best estimate from the empírical analysis, obtained with a 1994 : 2 - 2004 : 2 subsample of the data, is that GDP goes through an accumulated decline, over the next four years, around 0.08%. Innovations to interest rates explain around 9.2% of the forecast erro r of GDP.