Outlines of central government, including the judicial system of England.

Mode of access: Internet.

Outlines of central government, including the judicial system of England

Mode of access: Internet.

Exploring innovation in policy-making within central government:the case of the UK's Highways Agency

The first and main contribution of this article is its access to the decision-making processes which drive innovation in policy-making within central government. The article will present a detailed case history of how the innovation came about and conclude by highlighting analytic possibilities for future research. The policy in focus is the UK’s Traffic Management Act 2004, which passed responsibility for managing incidents on major roads from the police to the Highways Agency (HA), and has been interpreted as a world first in traffic management. The article tracks the Traffic Management Act 2004 from problem identification to a preliminary evaluation. It is then suggested that future research could explain organizational change more theoretically. By taking a longitudinal and multi-level approach, the research falls into a processual account of organizational change. The second contribution of the article is to highlight two novel ways in which this approach is being applied to policy-making, through an institutional processualist research programme on public management reform and empirical investigations using complex systems to explain policy change.

Reporting and managing risk:a look at current practice at Tesco, RBS, local and central government

These case studies from CIMA highlight the need to embed risk management within more easily understood behaviours, consistent with the overall organisational culture. In each case, some form of internal audit team provides either an oversight function or acts as an expert link in that feedback loop. Frontline staff, managers and specialists should be completely aligned on risk, in part just to ensure that there is a consistency of approach. They should understand instinctively that good performance includes good risk management. Tesco has continued to thrive during the recession and remains a robust and efficient group of businesses despite the emergence of potential threats around consumer spending and the supply chain. RBS, by contrast, has suffered catastrophic and very public failures of risk management despite a large in-house function and stiff regulation of risk controls. Birmingham City Council, like all local authorities, is adapting to more commercial modes of operation and is facing diverse threats and opportunities emerging as a result of social change. And DCMS, like many other public sector organisations, has to handle an incredibly complex network of delivery partners within the context of a relatively recent overhaul of central government risk management processes. Key Findings: •Risk management is no longer solely a financial discipline, nor is it simply a concern for the internal control function. •Where organisations retain a discrete risk management cadre – often specialists at monitoring and evaluating a range of risks – their success is dependent on embedding risk awareness in the wider culture of the enterprise. •Risk management is most successful when it is explicitly linked to operational performance. •Clear leadership, specific goals, excellent influencing skills and open-mindedness to potential threats and opportunities are essential for effective risk management. •Bureaucratic processes and systems can hamper good risk management – either as a result of a ‘box-ticking mentality’ or because managers and staff believe they do not need to consider risk themselves.

A Decentralized Iron Cage: Do Chinese Local Officials Comply with the Central Government?

This paper contributes to the literature in nancial aid and authoritarian institutions.

For a long time, scholars are debating whether nancial aid is able to facilitate

development and governance. Though abundant evidence is provided, the answer is

still inconclusive. On the other hand, scholars investigating China argue that the

leadership uses various institutions to ensure local ocials' compliance. In this paper,

we nd that the nancial aid does not bring a positive impact and the central

government in China does not have enough monitoring capacity to force local o-

cials to comply. We study a redevelopment program established by Chinese central

government after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. By adopting a geographic regression

discontinuity combining with a dierence-in-dierences design, we show that

the redevelopment program does not signicantly develop the disaster area. On the

contrary, the evidence implies that the economy in the disaster area is worse after

receiving the aid. The results imply that local ocials do not follow the central government's

regulations and misuse the aid money for other purposes. In the future, we

expect to further investigate through which mechanism do local ocials undermine

the existing institutions.

iii

A summary view of government cost recovery policies in Australia and New Zealand relating to the supply of public sector information

Researching administrative history is problematical. A trail of authoritative documents is often hard to find; and useful summaries can be difficult to organise, especially if source material is in paper formats in geographically dispersed locations. In the absence of documents, the reasons for particular decisions and the rationale underpinning particular policies can be confounded as key personnel advance in their professions and retire. The rationale for past decisions may be lost for practical purposes; and if an organisation’s memory of events is diminished, its learning through experience is also diminished. Publishing this document tries to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort by other researchers that need to venture into how policies of charging for public sector information have been justified. The author compiled this work within a somewhat limited time period and the work does not pretend to be a complete or comprehensive analysis of the issues.----- A significant part of the role of government is to provide a framework of legally-enforceable rights and obligations that can support individuals and non-government organisations in their lawful activities. Accordingly, claims that governments should be more ‘business-like’ need careful scrutiny. A significant supply of goods and services occurs as non-market activity where neither benefits nor costs are quantified within conventional accounting systems or in terms of money. Where a government decides to provide information as a service; and information from land registries is archetypical, the transactions occur as a political decision made under a direct or a clearly delegated authority of a parliament with the requisite constitutional powers. This is not a market transaction and the language of the market confuses attempts to describe a number of aspects of how governments allocate resources.----- Cost recovery can be construed as an aspect of taxation that is a sole prerogative of a parliament. The issues are fundamental to political constitutions; but they become more complicated where states cede some taxing powers to a central government as part of a federal system. Nor should the absence of markets be construed necessarily as ‘market failure’ or even ‘government failure’. The absence is often attributable to particular technical, economic and political constraints that preclude the operation of markets. Arguably, greater care is needed in distinguishing between the polity and markets in raising revenues and allocating resources; and that needs to start by removing unhelpful references to ‘business’ in the context of government decision-making.

The role of operations management in public sector policy and practice alignment: a local government analysis

In responding to the demand for change and improvement, local government has applied a plethora of operations management-based methods, tools and techniques. This article explores how these methods, specifically in the form of performance management models, are used to improve alignment between central government policy and local government practice, an area which has thus far been neglected in the literature. Using multiple case studies from Environmental Waste Management Services, this research reports that models derived in the private sector are often directly ‘implanted’ into the public sector. This has challenged the efficacy of all performance management models. However, those organisations which used models most effectively did so by embedding (contextualisation) and extending (reconceptualisation) them beyond their original scope. Moreover, success with these models created a cumulative effect whereby other operations management approaches were probed, adapted and used.

Efficiency in Central Public Sector Enterprises in Kerala

For the analysis of productivity, capacity utilisation and profitability the data relating to the manufacturing central public sector enterprises in Kerala have been collected from the published annual reports of the companies, public enterprises surveys of Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), Economic Review of State Planning Board (SPB) and statistical review of central government enterprises by Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). Primary data have been collected by conducting personal interview with the high and middle level executives.

Refashioning local government and inner-city regeneration: The Salford experience

This paper explores the role of local government in urban regeneration in England. The first part describes local-central government relations during recent decades. It concludes that 'actually occurring' regeneration fuses top-down and bottom-up priorities and preferences, as well as path dependencies created by past decisions and local relations. The second part illustrates this contention by examining the regeneration of inner-city Salford over a 25-year period. It describes Salford City Council's approach in achieving the redevelopment of the former Salford Docks and how this created the confidence for the council to embark on further regeneration projects. Yet the top-down decision-making model has failed to satisfy local expectations, creating apathy which threatens the Labour government's desire for active citizens in regeneration projects.

A decade of decentralisation? Assessing the role of the government offices for the English regions

The Government Offices for the English regions were established in 1994 to coordinate the regional activities of three central government departments. A decade on, regional government in England is greatly expanded, and two other institutions of regional governance, the Regional Development Agencies and the Regional Assemblies, have also been created. In 2002 the Labour government proposed that this 'triad' of regional governance should be further reformed and strengthened, in some places being brought to democratic account. In this paper, we argue that academic research on the English regions has generally focused on the Regional Development Agencies and to a lesser extent the Regional Assemblies, to the exclusion of the Government Offices. This focus has led some to overstate the extent to which regional government represents the real decentralisation of power. Focusing on the role of the Government Offices, we argue that central government retains a great deal of power over the 'triad' institutions, which in their current form may be unable to challenge the structure of power in the English state.

Organização administrativa brasileira: quadro atual e propostas acerca da estruturação de entidades vocacionais ao desenvolvimento de políticas de estado, não subordinadas ao poder público central

o objeto da presente pesquisa é evidenciar o padrão de Estado Regulador brasileiro, sua complexidade e o modelo adotado, em parte, na década de 90, para a sua implementação, notadamente com a criação de algumas autarquias especiais dotadas de autonomia funcional diferenciada em relação ao Poder Público central. Examinando os motivos e a forma adotada para a estruturação dessas entidades reguladoras, no bojo de uma tentativa de reformar a organização administrativa, sob a forma gerencial, pretende-se analisar se esse caminho deve ser trilhado, ainda que em parte, para outros setores. A análise envolve a possível redefinição da divisão de tarefas e competências entre "entidades de Governo" e entes públicos cuja missão requer continuidade ("órgãos de Estado"), especialmente, nos casos de alternância do poder. Pretende-se contribuir para a estruturação de entidades vocacionadas para o desenvolvimento de políticas de Estado.

The relations between different levels of government in Brazil

Includes bibliography

Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment: Government Finance in the Ottoman Empire

Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this paper we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. While the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth century Ottoman Empire supports the transaction cost explanation, suggesting that risk matters less because insurance can be obtained in a variety of ways.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

The missing ingredient:inter-municipal cooperation and central-local relations in the UK

The thrust of the argument presented in this chapter is that inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the United Kingdom reflects local government's constitutional position and its exposure to the exigencies of Westminster (elected central government) and Whitehall (centre of the professional civil service that services central government). For the most part councils are without general powers of competence and are restricted in what they can do by Parliament. This suggests that the capacity for locally driven IMC is restricted and operates principally within a framework constructed by central government's policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the governing political party. In practice, however, recent examples of IMC demonstrate that the practices are more complex than this initial analysis suggests. Central government may exert top-down pressures and impose hierarchical directives, but there are important countervailing forces. Constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales have shifted the locus of central- local relations away from Westminster and Whitehall. In England, the seeding of English government regional offices in 1994 has evolved into an important structural arrangement that encourages councils to work together. Within the local government community there is now widespread acknowledgement that to achieve the ambitious targets set by central government, councils are, by necessity, bound to cooperate and work with other agencies. In recent years, the fragmentation of public service delivery has affected the scope of IMC. Elected local government in the UK is now only one piece of a complex jigsaw of agencies that provides services to the public; whether it is with non-elected bodies, such as health authorities, public protection authorities (police and fire), voluntary nonprofit organisations or for-profit bodies, councils are expected to cooperate widely with agencies in their localities. Indeed, for projects such as regeneration and community renewal, councils may act as the coordinating agency but the success of such projects is measured by collaboration and partnership working (Davies 2002). To place these developments in context, IMC is an example of how, in spite of the fragmentation of traditional forms of government, councils work with other public service agencies and other councils through the medium of interagency partnerships, collaboration between organisations and a mixed economy of service providers. Such an analysis suggests that, following changes to the system of local government, contemporary forms of IMC are less dependent on vertical arrangements (top-down direction from central government) as they are replaced by horizontal modes (expansion of networks and partnership arrangements). Evidence suggests, however that central government continues to steer local authorities through the agency of inspectorates and regulatory bodies, and through policy initiatives, such as local strategic partnerships and local area agreements (Kelly 2006), thus questioning whether, in the case of UK local government, the shift from hierarchy to network and market solutions is less differentiated and transformation less complete than some literature suggests. Vertical or horizontal pressures may promote IMC, yet similar drivers may deter collaboration between local authorities. An example of negative vertical pressure was central government's change of the systems of local taxation during the 1980s. The new taxation regime replaced a tax on property with a tax on individual residency. Although the community charge lasted only a few years, it was a highpoint of the then Conservative government policy that encouraged councils to compete with each other on the basis of the level of local taxation. In practice, however, the complexity of local government funding in the UK rendered worthless any meaningful ambition of councils competing with each other, especially as central government granting to local authorities is predicated (however imperfectly) on at least notional equalisation between those areas with lower tax yields and the more prosperous locations. Horizontal pressures comprise factors such as planning decisions. Over the last quarter century, councils have competed on the granting of permission to out-of-town retail and leisure complexes, now recognised as detrimental to neighbouring authorities because economic forces prevail and local, independent shops are unable to compete with multiple companies. These examples illustrate tensions at the core of the UK polity of whether IMC is feasible when competition between local authorities heightened by local differences reduces opportunities for collaboration. An alternative perspective on IMC is to explore whether specific purposes or functions promote or restrict it. Whether in the principle areas of local government responsibilities relating to social welfare, development and maintenance of the local infrastructure or environmental matters, there are examples of IMC. But opportunities have diminished considerably as councils lost responsibility for services provision as a result of privatisation and transfer of powers to new government agencies or to central government. Over the last twenty years councils have lost their role in the provision of further-or higher-education, public transport and water/sewage. Councils have commissioning power but only a limited presence in providing housing needs, social care and waste management. In other words, as a result of central government policy, there are, in practice, currently far fewer opportunities for councils to cooperate. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted IMC through vertical drivers and the development; the operation of these policy initiatives is discussed following the framework of the editors. Current examples of IMC are notable for being driven by higher tiers of government, working with subordinate authorities in principal-agent relations. Collaboration between local authorities and intra-interand cross-sectoral partnerships are initiated by central government. In other words, IMC is shaped by hierarchical drivers from higher levels of government but, in practice, is locally varied and determined less by formula than by necessity and function. © 2007 Springer.