A Defesa Judicial do Estado Brasileiro nas Varas Federais

There is no information whatsoever of a society in which there are no demands among private people and companies, among individuals and institutions, varying only the tenor and the intensity of the issues. It would be ideal if conflicts could be solved in common aggreement. The selfcomposition, yet, does not often occurr; leaving the remaining issues for a third part, i.e., the State. Up to the English and French Revolutions, political power was exercised by limitless governors and the State did not submit to the law. After those revolutions, rules are agregated to curb Absolutism and organize the State, which starts to acccomplish its duties under the law, i.e., a Law State. As a result, today, the individual can sue the State to make the State perform or not any undesirable action. In this dissertation, one traces back from the very beginning the role of the institutions in charge of defending the State in courts of law. The judicial defense of the Brazilian State in a court of law, since 1608 to the 1988 Constitution, was a role of the Public Ministry, along with other institutional functions, including prosecution. As a consequence of this ambivalence, the results of the State defense came even to be contradictory. The promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution adjusted this historical dualism. The 1988 Constituent embodied significant change to the concept and operationalization of a State Advocacy, confering to a new institution , which was called 'Advocacia Geral da União' or 'General Advocacy of the Union' (article 131), the judicial and extrajudicial representation of the Union. The final object of the reflections of this study is centred on the analysis of the activities of the 'General Advocacy of the Union', in its first years of functioning, in other words, from 1993 to 1999

Crimes financeiros e política criminal : estudo de acórdãos do TRF da 3ª Região sobre os crimes de gestão fraudulenta e gestão temerária no período de 2001 a 2010

Este trabalho visa produzir conhecimento sobre como o Tribunal Regional Federal da 3ª Região tem decidido sobre dois dos principais crimes afetos à administração das instituições financeiras: gestão fraudulenta e gestão temerária. Trata-se de delitos criticados pela doutrina em razão das falhas de definição dos tipos, desde a edição da Lei 7.492, em 1986. Além disso, a sua previsão legislativa possui características que os aproximam do paradigma do direito penal do risco, ou seja: são crimes de perigo abstrato, que tutelam bem jurídico supra-individual, praticados por administradores detentores do dever de probidade na condução das instituições frente aos riscos inerentes à dinâmica do sistema financeiro. A adoção desse paradigma é controversa na doutrina penal por implicar a flexibilização de garantias do Estado Democrático de Direito sob a perspectiva do paradigma do direito penal tradicional. Diante disso, adota-se a metodologia de análise de conteúdo de decisões para se responder a dois problemas de pesquisa: (1) Quais os critérios adotados pelo Tribunal para a configuração dos crimes? (2) As decisões aproximam-se de algum paradigma de direito penal? As hipóteses objeto de teste são: (1) que o Tribunal considera principalmente a prática da conduta sem analisar a sua potencialidade lesiva sob uma perspectiva ex ante; e, (2) que esse discurso de imputação de responsabilidade aproxima as decisões do paradigma do direito penal do risco, considerados, em contexto, outros elementos presentes nas decisões. Na primeira parte, é feita uma introdução metodológica; na segunda, estabelece-se o referencial teórico; na terceira e na quarta, realizam-se as análises dos resultados quantitativos e qualitativos obtidos com a sua discussão; por fim, procede-se à conclusão, levantando-se novo problema a ser investigado.

What kind of judiciary do we want?: the access to justice in Brazil

The goal of this paper is to discuss a key issue in the Democratic Rule of Law State: what are the role and main functions of the Judiciary in Brazil? Is the Judiciary mainly a public service provider, adjudicating disputes and guaranteeing individual rights? Or also as a state power, it should mainly control and guide the moral values of the society, changing the status quo and reducing social conflicts? In this sense, what are the conflicts that must be examined by the Judiciary? We will seek to answer these questions based on a discussion subsidized by courts official statistics and the results of surveys conducted with the Brazilian general population. The surveys measured how do citizens feel about their judicial system and what are the circumstances and the facts that determine the judicialization of conflicts. We work with the perceptions and attitudes of citizens relating to the Judiciary as it is today and discuss the Judiciary they want. Then, we compare how attitudes and perceptions relate to actual behavior and use of courts.

A questão do petróleo em terras indígenas: uma análise constitucional à luz do desenvolvimento sustentável

Recognizing the need to preserve a national ethnic minority, the Constitution, inspired by the pluralistic values of the Constitutional Law State, stipulated a series of rights and guarantees for the conservation of indigenous cultural singularity, disciplining in article 231 the Indians right to maintain their social organization, customs, languages, beliefs and traditions, as well as safeguarding the rights to the lands they traditionally occupy, and the exclusive use of the wealth existing in them, premise of ensuring their physical and cultural continuity, breaking decisively with the paradigm the assimilation of the Indian national civilization. However, despite the Indian policy of ethnic and cultural preservation, the Constitution allowed the exploitation of minerals in aboriginal territory, incorporated herein hydrocarbons, provided they meet certain predetermined requirements, leaving it to the legislature the discipline of ordinary matter. However, this law has not yet been published, with some projects in the National Congress, leaving thus precluding the indigenous subsurface oil exploration until the enactment of enabling legislation. Meanwhile, this paper carries out an integrated analysis of the constitutional protection of ethnic and cultural uniqueness of indigenous peoples, Convention Nº 169 of the International Labour Organization and the bill presented by Deputy Eduardo Valverde, in an attempt to consolidate sustainable development practices in the sector, through developing a system of social and environmental responsible oil exploration, aligning with national energy needs to maintain a balanced environment and preservation of socio-cultural organization of a minority so weakened and beaten over five centuries of domination

O princípio (instituidor) da intervenção mínima: a proteção do bem jurídico e a (des)criminalização no direito eleitoral

No presente trabalho, questiona-se a necessidade da intervenção do direito penal no direito eleitoral para proteger os bens jurídicos. Constata-se que, no caso do Brasil, essa intervenção penal no direito eleitoral é significativa e ocorre por intermédio de diversas leis, das quais a principal é o Código Eleitoral (CE) em vigor. O ponto de partida desta pesquisa é a teoria do bem jurídico-penal, com destaque para a sua função crítica. É feita uma aproximação dessa teoria crítica do bem jurídico-penal com o Estado Democrático de Direito e a formulação teórica de Ronald Dworkin e Lenio Streck a respeito dos princípios do direito, com ênfase no princípio (instituidor) da intervenção mínima, no âmbito do direito penal, e seus componentes de garantia, entre os quais a proteção exclusiva de bens jurídicos, a fragmentariedade e a subsidiariedade. A partir daí, é estabelecida a relação entre a proteção não penal de bens jurídicos (relevantes) no direito eleitoral e a (des)criminalização no direito eleitoral, contrapondo-se as teses do expansionismo e do minimalismo penal. A questão fundamental da pesquisa é relacionar esses conceitos para indagar sobre a (des)necessidade dos tipos penais eleitorais e buscar, para o modelo brasileiro, uma proposta não penal de proteção de bens jurídicos no âmbito eleitoral.

Razor Thin Win: The 1972 Constitution Ballot, Campaign, Ratification & the Courts -- Mae Nan (Robinson) Ellingson & Mick McKeon “In the Crucible of Change”

Beyond the challenge of crafting a new state Constitution that empowered the people and modernized and opened up state and local government in Montana, the Constitutional Convention delegates, as they signed the final document, looked forward to the arduous task of getting it ratified by the electorate in a short ten week period between the end of the convention on March 24 and the ratification election of June 6, 1972. While all 100 delegates signed the draft Constitution, not all supported its adoption. But the planning about how to get it adopted went back to the actions of the Convention itself, which carefully crafted a ballot that kept “hot political issues” from potentially killing the entire document at the polls. As a result, three side issues were presented to the electorate on the ballot. People could vote for or against those side issues and still vote to ratify the entire document. Thus, the questions of legalizing gambling, having a unicameral legislature and retaining the death penalty were placed separately on the ballot (gambling passed, as did the retention of the death penalty, but the concept of a one-house legislature was defeated). Once the ballot structure was set, delegates who supported the new Constitution organized a grassroots, locally focused effort to secure ratification – thought hampered by a MT Supreme Court decision on April 28 that they could not expend $45,000 in public monies that they had set aside for voter education. They cobbled together about $10,000 of private money and did battle with the established political forces, led by the MT Farm Bureau, MT Stockgrowers’ Assn. and MT Contractors Assn., on the question of passage. Narrow passage of the main document led to an issue over certification and a Montana Supreme Court case challenging the ratification vote. After a 3-2 State Supreme Court victory, supporters of the Constitution then had to defend the election results again before the federal courts, also a successful effort. Montana finally had a new progressive State Constitution that empowered the people, but the path to it was not clear and simple and the win was razor thin. The story of that razor thin win is discussed in this chapter by the two youngest delegates to the 1972 Constitutional Convention, Mae Nan Ellingson of Missoula and Mick McKeon, then of Anaconda. Both recognized “Super Lawyers in their later professional practices were also significant players in the Constitutional Convention itself and actively participated in its campaign for ratification. As such, their recollections of the effort provide an insider’s perspective of the struggle to change Montana for the better through the creation and adoption of a new progressive state Constitution “In the Crucible of Change.” Mae Nan (Robinson) Ellingson was born Mae Nan Windham in Mineral Wells, TX and graduated from Mineral Wells High School in 1965 and Weatherford College in Weatherford, TX in 1967. Mae Nan was the youngest delegate at the 1972 Convention from Missoula. She moved to Missoula in 1967 and received her BA in Political Science with Honors from the University of MT in 1970. She was a young widow known by her late husband’s surname of Robinson while attending UM graduate school under the tutelage of noted Professor Ellis Waldron when he persuaded her to run for the Constitutional Convention. Coming in a surprising second in the delegate competition in Missoula County she was named one of the Convention’s “Ten Outstanding Constitutional Convention Delegates,” an impressive feat at such a young age. She was 24 at the time, the youngest person to serve at the ConCon, and one of 19 women out of 100 delegates. In the decade before the Convention, there were never more than three women Legislators in any session, usually one or two. She was a member of the American Association of University Women, a Pi Sigma Alpha political science honorary, and a Phi Alpha Theta historical honorary. At the Convention, she led proposals for the state's bill of rights, particularly related to equal rights for women. For years, Ellingson kept a copy of the preamble to the Constitution hanging in her office; while all the delegates had a chance to vote on the wording, she and delegate Bob Campbell are credited with the language in the preamble. During the convention, she had an opportunity that opened the door to her later career as an attorney. A convention delegate suggested to her that she should go to law school. Several offered to help, but at the time she couldn't go to school. Her mom had died in Texas, and she ended up with a younger brother and sister to raise in Missoula. She got a job teaching, but about a year later, intrigued with the idea of pursuing the law as a career, she called the man back to ask about the offer. Eventually another delegate, Dave Drum of Billings, sponsored her tuition at the UM School of Law. After receiving her JD with Honors (including the Law Review and Moot Court) from the UM Law School Ellingson worked for the Missoula city attorney's office for six years (1977-83), and she took on landmark projects. During her tenure, Missoula became the first city to issue open space bonds, a project that introduced her to Dorsey & Whitney. The city secured its first easement on Mount Sentinel, and it created the trail along the riverfront with a mix of playing fields and natural vegetation. She also helped develop a sign ordinance for the city of Missoula. She ended up working as bond counsel for Dorsey & Whitney, and she opened up the firm's full-fledged Missoula office after commuting a couple of years to its Great Falls office. She was a partner at Dorsey Whitney, working there from 1983 until her retirement in 2012. The area of law she practiced there is a narrow specialty - it requires knowledge of constitutional law, state and local government law, and a slice of federal tax law - but for Ellingson it meant working on great public projects – schools, sewer systems, libraries, swimming pools, ire trucks. At the state level, she helped form the Montana Municipal Insurance Authority, a pooled insurance group for cities. She's shaped MT’s tax increment law, and she was a fixture in the MT Legislature when they were debating equal rights. As a bond lawyer, though, Ellingson considers her most important work for the state to be setting up the Intercap Program that allowed local governments to borrow money from the state at a low interest rate. She has been a frequent speaker at the League of Cities and Towns, the Montana Association of Counties, and the Rural Water Users Association workshops on topics related to municipal finance, as well as workshops sponsored by the DNRC, the Water and Sewer Agencies Coordination Team, and the Montana State University Local Government Center. In 2002, she received an outstanding service award from the Montana Rural Water Users Association. In addition to being considered an expert on Montana state and constitutional law, local government law and local government finance, she is a frequent teacher at the National Association of Bond Lawyers (NABL) Fundamentals of Municipal Bond Law Seminar and the NABL Bond Attorney’s Workshop. For over 30 years Mae Nan has participated in the drafting of legislation in Montana for state and local finance matters. She has served on the Board of Directors of NABL, as Chairman of its Education Committee, was elected as an initial fellow in 1995 to the American College of Bond Counsel, and was recognized as a Super Lawyer in the Rocky Mountain West. Mae Nan was admitted to practice before the MT and US Supreme Courts, was named one of “America’s Leading Business Lawyers” by Chambers USA (Rank 1), a Mountain States Super Lawyer in 2007 and is listed in Best Lawyers in America; she is a member and former Board Member of NABL, a Fellow of the American College of Bond Counsel and a member of the Board of Visitors of the UM Law School. Mae Nan is also a philanthropist who serves on boards and applies her intelligence to many organizations, such as the Missoula Art Museum. [Much of this biography was drawn from a retirement story in the Missoulian and the Dorsey Whitney web site.] Mick McKeon, born in Anaconda in 1946, is a 4th generation Montanan whose family roots in this state go back to the 1870’s. In 1968 he graduated from Notre Dame with a BA in Communications and received a Juris Doctorate degree from the University of Montana Law School in 1971. Right after graduating from law school, Mick was persuaded by his father, longtime State Senator Luke McKeon, and his uncle, Phillips County Attorney Willis McKeon, to run for delegate to Montana’s Constitutional Convention and was elected to represent Deer Lodge, Philipsburg, Powell, and part of Missoula Counties. Along with a coalition of delegates from Butte and Anaconda, he fought through the new Constitution to eliminate the legal strangle hold, often called “the copper collar,” that corporate interests -- the Anaconda Company and its business & political allies -- had over state government for nearly 100 years. The New York Times called Montana’s Constitutional Convention a “prairie revolution.” After helping secure the ratification of the new Constitution, Mick began his practice of law in Anaconda where he engaged in general practice for nearly 20 years. Moving to Butte in 1991, Mick focused has practice in personal injury law, representing victims of negligence and corporate wrongdoing in both Montana district courts and federal court. As such, he participated in some of the largest cases in the history of the state. In 1992 he and his then law partner Rick Anderson obtained a federal court verdict of $11.5 million -- the largest verdict in MT for many years. Mick’s efforts on behalf of injured victims have been recognized by many legal organizations and societies. Recently, Mick was invited to become a member of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers - 600 of the top lawyers in the world. Rated as an American Super Lawyer, he has continuously been named one of the Best Lawyers in America, and an International Assn. of Trial Lawyers top 100 Trial Lawyer. In 2005, he was placed as one of Montana’s top 4 Plaintiff’s lawyers by Law Dragon. Mick is certified as a civil trial specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy and has the highest rating possible from Martindale-Hubble. Mick was awarded the Montana Trial Lawyers Public Service Award and provided pro bono assistance to needy clients for his entire career. Mick’s law practice, which he now shares with his son Michael, is limited to representing individuals who have been injured in accidents, concentrating on cases against insurance companies, corporations, medical providers and hospitals. Mick resides in Butte with his wife Carol, a Butte native. Mick, Carol, Michael and another son, Matthew, who graduated from Dartmouth College and was recently admitted to the Montana bar, enjoy as much of their time together in Butte and at their place on Flathead Lake.

Estado, Justicia y Sociedad : la Administración de Justicia en la provincia de Buenos Aires, 1853-1881

Esta ponencia es la presentación del proyecto de tesis, que tiene por objetivo estudiar el proceso de constitución y consolidación del poder judicial, responsable de la administración de justicia, como integrante del Estado provincial, legitimador de su accionar político y mediador con la sociedad civil. La investigación se ubica en la provincia de Buenos Aires, entre 1853 y 1881, que sancionó su propia Constitución en 1854, en la que declaraba en su artículo 118 que el poder judicial sería independiente de todo otro en el ejercicio de sus funciones. Es decir que en esta provincia la consagración de la teoría de los poderes del Estado y la ley como definidora de lo que era justo, requirieron de la organización del poder judicial. El sistema judicial de la provincia de Buenos Aires comenzó su formación como poder del Estado a partir de la reforma rivadaviana y el proceso alcanzó su madurez entre 1853 y 1881, como parte fundamental del proyecto liberal, asentado sobre la autoridad de la ley. El poder judicial garantizaba la legitimidad del sistema político republicano de matriz liberal, pero la dependencia con el poder ejecutivo se mantuvo en parte, representada en el presupuesto, los nombramientos y los jurys. La organización judicial en formación incluyó al ámbito rural con una fisonomía institucional que tendía a consolidar la relación entre Estado y sociedad civil; ésta manifestaba sus necesidades a través de la opinión pública y el poder las interpretaba con el fin de legitimar su acción política. En este proceso de legitimación, el poder judicial era funcional al Estado, lo que se consolidó con el tiempo. La Constitución de 1873, a pesar de ser ideal en algunas de sus propuestas, dio protagonismo y efectividad a las instituciones judiciales que se formaron y pusieron en funcionamiento con una nueva concepción de justicia, que sin dejar de lado el derecho natural se consolidaba en una función más positiva, atenta a los derechos individuales y de propiedad. Para comprender el rol que jugó el sistema de justicia en la formación del Estado es necesario desenmarañar la compleja trama de relaciones entre el poder político y los magistrados, y a su vez entre ellos y la sociedad. Pero esto no se puede realizar sin conocer y comprender que entendían por justicia, y definir de qué forma organizaron su administración. En la realización de esta investigación atenderé a las soluciones que el ordenamiento jurídico debía brindar a una determinada sociedad, las instituciones que lo formaron y las ideas de quienes lo gestaron. El uso de la fuente judicial será fundamental para observar si la letra de la ley fue cumplida en la administración de justicia y de qué manera. Pero esa fuente judicial confirmará o no la aplicación de las leyes dictadas por el poder legislativo y los decretos emanados del ejecutivo, por ello será necesario reconstruir los organigramas del Poder Judicial a partir del estudio de los Registros Oficiales y los debates legislativos de la provincia.

Estado, Justicia y Sociedad : la Administración de Justicia en la provincia de Buenos Aires, 1853-1881

Esta ponencia es la presentación del proyecto de tesis, que tiene por objetivo estudiar el proceso de constitución y consolidación del poder judicial, responsable de la administración de justicia, como integrante del Estado provincial, legitimador de su accionar político y mediador con la sociedad civil. La investigación se ubica en la provincia de Buenos Aires, entre 1853 y 1881, que sancionó su propia Constitución en 1854, en la que declaraba en su artículo 118 que el poder judicial sería independiente de todo otro en el ejercicio de sus funciones. Es decir que en esta provincia la consagración de la teoría de los poderes del Estado y la ley como definidora de lo que era justo, requirieron de la organización del poder judicial. El sistema judicial de la provincia de Buenos Aires comenzó su formación como poder del Estado a partir de la reforma rivadaviana y el proceso alcanzó su madurez entre 1853 y 1881, como parte fundamental del proyecto liberal, asentado sobre la autoridad de la ley. El poder judicial garantizaba la legitimidad del sistema político republicano de matriz liberal, pero la dependencia con el poder ejecutivo se mantuvo en parte, representada en el presupuesto, los nombramientos y los jurys. La organización judicial en formación incluyó al ámbito rural con una fisonomía institucional que tendía a consolidar la relación entre Estado y sociedad civil; ésta manifestaba sus necesidades a través de la opinión pública y el poder las interpretaba con el fin de legitimar su acción política. En este proceso de legitimación, el poder judicial era funcional al Estado, lo que se consolidó con el tiempo. La Constitución de 1873, a pesar de ser ideal en algunas de sus propuestas, dio protagonismo y efectividad a las instituciones judiciales que se formaron y pusieron en funcionamiento con una nueva concepción de justicia, que sin dejar de lado el derecho natural se consolidaba en una función más positiva, atenta a los derechos individuales y de propiedad. Para comprender el rol que jugó el sistema de justicia en la formación del Estado es necesario desenmarañar la compleja trama de relaciones entre el poder político y los magistrados, y a su vez entre ellos y la sociedad. Pero esto no se puede realizar sin conocer y comprender que entendían por justicia, y definir de qué forma organizaron su administración. En la realización de esta investigación atenderé a las soluciones que el ordenamiento jurídico debía brindar a una determinada sociedad, las instituciones que lo formaron y las ideas de quienes lo gestaron. El uso de la fuente judicial será fundamental para observar si la letra de la ley fue cumplida en la administración de justicia y de qué manera. Pero esa fuente judicial confirmará o no la aplicación de las leyes dictadas por el poder legislativo y los decretos emanados del ejecutivo, por ello será necesario reconstruir los organigramas del Poder Judicial a partir del estudio de los Registros Oficiales y los debates legislativos de la provincia.

Estado, Justicia y Sociedad : la Administración de Justicia en la provincia de Buenos Aires, 1853-1881

Esta ponencia es la presentación del proyecto de tesis, que tiene por objetivo estudiar el proceso de constitución y consolidación del poder judicial, responsable de la administración de justicia, como integrante del Estado provincial, legitimador de su accionar político y mediador con la sociedad civil. La investigación se ubica en la provincia de Buenos Aires, entre 1853 y 1881, que sancionó su propia Constitución en 1854, en la que declaraba en su artículo 118 que el poder judicial sería independiente de todo otro en el ejercicio de sus funciones. Es decir que en esta provincia la consagración de la teoría de los poderes del Estado y la ley como definidora de lo que era justo, requirieron de la organización del poder judicial. El sistema judicial de la provincia de Buenos Aires comenzó su formación como poder del Estado a partir de la reforma rivadaviana y el proceso alcanzó su madurez entre 1853 y 1881, como parte fundamental del proyecto liberal, asentado sobre la autoridad de la ley. El poder judicial garantizaba la legitimidad del sistema político republicano de matriz liberal, pero la dependencia con el poder ejecutivo se mantuvo en parte, representada en el presupuesto, los nombramientos y los jurys. La organización judicial en formación incluyó al ámbito rural con una fisonomía institucional que tendía a consolidar la relación entre Estado y sociedad civil; ésta manifestaba sus necesidades a través de la opinión pública y el poder las interpretaba con el fin de legitimar su acción política. En este proceso de legitimación, el poder judicial era funcional al Estado, lo que se consolidó con el tiempo. La Constitución de 1873, a pesar de ser ideal en algunas de sus propuestas, dio protagonismo y efectividad a las instituciones judiciales que se formaron y pusieron en funcionamiento con una nueva concepción de justicia, que sin dejar de lado el derecho natural se consolidaba en una función más positiva, atenta a los derechos individuales y de propiedad. Para comprender el rol que jugó el sistema de justicia en la formación del Estado es necesario desenmarañar la compleja trama de relaciones entre el poder político y los magistrados, y a su vez entre ellos y la sociedad. Pero esto no se puede realizar sin conocer y comprender que entendían por justicia, y definir de qué forma organizaron su administración. En la realización de esta investigación atenderé a las soluciones que el ordenamiento jurídico debía brindar a una determinada sociedad, las instituciones que lo formaron y las ideas de quienes lo gestaron. El uso de la fuente judicial será fundamental para observar si la letra de la ley fue cumplida en la administración de justicia y de qué manera. Pero esa fuente judicial confirmará o no la aplicación de las leyes dictadas por el poder legislativo y los decretos emanados del ejecutivo, por ello será necesario reconstruir los organigramas del Poder Judicial a partir del estudio de los Registros Oficiales y los debates legislativos de la provincia.

Critical connections : Islamic politics and political economy in Indonesia and Malaysia

This article explores Islamic politics in two Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia, by linking their trajectories, from late colonial emergence to recent upsurge, to broad concerns of political economy, including changing social bases, capitalist transformation, state policies, and economic crises. The Indonesian and Malaysian trajectories of Islamic politics are tracked in a comparative exercise that goes beyond the case studies to suggest that much of contemporary Islamic politics cannot be explained by reference to Islam alone, but to how Islamic identities and agendas are forged in contexts of modern and profane social contestation.

O princípio da ofensividade como complemento necessário à regra da legalidade penal no Estado Democrático de Direito

As ideias políticas e filosóficas que influenciaram a criação da regra da legalidade penal e do princípio da ofensividade têm origem no Iluminismo. Principalmente durante a Idade Média e o Antigo Regime, confundia-se crime com pecado e as pessoas podiam ser punidas por mero capricho do soberano, sem que existisse lei. As arbitrariedades eram gritantes. A finalidade de ambas as teorias surgidas no período da Ilustração, portanto ao pregarem que era necessária a existência de lei prévia para que alguém fosse punido (regra da legalidade) e que o crime pressupunha uma lesão a direito ou bem jurídico de terceiro (princípio da ofensividade) , era a mesma: limitar o poder punitivo. No entanto, a regra da legalidade penal foi muito mais absorvida pelo discurso dogmático-jurídico do que o princípio da ofensividade, sendo oportuno, pois, analisar as razões pelas quais isso ocorreu. Algumas delas serão analisadas neste estudo como, por exemplo, a ausência de previsão explícita desse princípio nas Constituições, a suposta incompatibilidade desse princípio com a separação de poderes e com a própria regra da legalidade penal e a insegurança jurídica que a aplicação de princípios poderia gerar. Além disso, há um fator político de destaque: a consolidação da burguesia exigia a imposição de limites formais ao poder estatal, mas não limites materiais. Outro fator importante foi o advento do positivismo criminológico, no final do século XIX, que, ao confundir crime com doença, retornou ao paradigma do direito penal do autor que havia vigorado na Idade Média. Finalmente, para demonstrar o que impediu a consolidação do princípio da ofensividade especificamente no Brasil, será analisada a influência da doutrina europeia na dogmática nacional.

Fracking/Takings

As the use of fracking has spread during the recent oil and gas boom, inevitable conflicts have arisen between industry and its neighbors, particularly as fracking has moved into densely populated urban and suburban areas. Concerned over the impacts of fracking – such as risks to health and safely, diminished property values, air and water pollution, as well as noise, traffic, and other annoyances – many people have demanded a government response. Government regulation of fracking has struggled to catch up, although in recent years many state and local governments have taken steps to reduce the impacts of fracking in their communities. This article focuses on government restrictions in New York and Colorado, two of the key battlegrounds in the fight over fracking. New York recently prohibited fracking across the entire state, after several towns had enacted their own bans. In Colorado, the people have used the ballot initiative process to enact restrictions on fracking directly. The industry has responded not only with public relations spending to improve the fracking’s damaged reputation, but also legal challenges to these efforts to rein in oil and gas development. In addition to suing local governments, often arguing they do not have authority to regulate fracking, industry threatens to bring costly takings claims for compensation due to alleged economic harms. This Article examines the numerous legal and factual issues that should make it difficult for industry to succeed on fracking/takings claims. First, regulation of fracking, even including outright bans, can almost always be defended as necessary to prevent a nuisance or other background principle of law that justifies government regulation. Even if a nuisance defense could be overcome, industry would have difficulty proving that regulation has destroyed all economic value in their property, unless courts take a narrow view of property that would highlight the arbitrary nature of the “denominator problem.” When fracking/takings claims are considered under the default balancing of the Penn Central case, takings are unlikely to be found except in rare outlier cases. Finally, because requiring governments to pay compensation in fracking/takings cases would likely create a windfall for industry, particularly if the oil and gas eventually is extracted in the future, courts should resist the temptation to rule against government restrictions to protect public health, safety, and the environment.

Governance and Uncertainty

Government actors create law against a backdrop of uncertainty. Limited information, unpredictable events, and lack of understanding interfere with accurately predicting a legal regime’s costs, benefits, and effects on other legal and social programs and institutions. Does the availability of no-fault divorce increase the number of terminated marriages? Will bulk-collection of telecommunications information about American citizens reveal terrorist plots? Can a sensitive species breed in the presence of oil and gas wells? The answers to these questions are far from clear, but lawmakers must act nonetheless. The problems posed by uncertainty cut across legal fields. Scholars and regulators in a variety of contexts recognize the importance of uncertainty, but no systematic, generally-applicable framework exists for determining how law should account for gaps in information. This Article suggests such a framework and develops a novel typology of strategies for accounting for uncertainty in governance. This typology includes “static law,” as well as three varieties of “dynamic law.” “Static law” is a legal rule initially intended to last in perpetuity. “Dynamic law” is intended to change, and includes: (1) durational regulation, or fixed legal rules with periodic opportunities for amendment or repeal; (2) adaptive regulation, or malleable legal rules with procedural mechanisms allowing rules to change; and (3) contingent regulation, or malleable legal rules with triggering mechanisms to substantively change to the rules. Each of these strategies, alone or in combination, may best address the uncertainty inherent in a particular lawmaking effort. This Article provides a diagnostic framework that lawmakers can use to identify optimal strategies. Ultimately, this approach to uncertainty yields immediate practical benefits by enabling lawmakers to better structure governance.

Intra pomoerium und extra pomoerium : ein Beitrag zum römischen Staatsrecht /

Includes bibliographical references.

Judicial settlement of controversies between states of the American union : an analysis of cases decided in the Supreme Court of the United States /

Includes bibliographical references and index.