Limites formais e materiais ao controle de constitucionalidade pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal

This document approaches the formal and material limits of the constitucionalidade control for the Supreme Federal Court, iniating with the study of the Constitution, detaching its evolution, nature and meanings, passing for its historical evolution, offering still a unconstitutionality concept. Is work the principles as material Constitution, making the distinction entere principles and rules, detaching the characteristics of the principles constitutional, and the basic principle of the Constituition. It analyzes metodologics the historical parameters and of the brazilian system of constitutionality control and detaches the paper of the Supreme Federal Court as positive legislator. It observes the beddings of the constitutionality control and the legitimacy of the Supreme Federal Court. Is examines the performance of the Supreme Federal Court in face of the principle of the legal security. Is offers a vision on the experience of the control of constitutionality in other constries. It still approaches the control of constitutionality in Brazil, detaching the critical points of its formal and material limits. Is verifies the application of the principles constitutional for the Supreme Federal Court in the diffuse control and the intent control of constitutionality, as well as the performance of the Supreme Federal Court ahead of the unconstitutional omissions. It brings to the debate the new perspectives how much to the formal and material limits of the control of constitutionality for the Supreme Federal Court. Objective to elaborate considerations concerning the limits of the constitutional jurisdiction from the model of Constituition, the character politican of the difficulties with respect to the definition of its formal and material limits from the performance of the Supreme Federal Court

Fiscalização difusa da constitucionalidade e o incidente de argüição de inconstitucionalidade

The present work consists of studying to diffuse control of constitutionality in Brazil, with emphasis in a procedural alternative to the evolution of that model: the incident to challenge of unconstitutionality. Starting from the discussion about the new role of constitutional jurisdiction in peripheral countries and in the globalized society, without forgetting to face inevitable doubts about its legitimacy before other powers of the State, the Brazilian control of constitutionality is revealed, under a diffuse, non-dichotomical view, through a number of inconsistencies and misunderstandings, that compromise social peace, the credibility of democratic institutions and the supremacy of juridical security. In order to achieve the goal, the study in course discussed the main difficulties of the Brazilian mixed model of constitutionality control, as well as, directing its view to the incident of challenge of unconstitutionality, which the most adequate forms to assure its appropriateness, legitimacy, processing and decisory effects are. Is was essential, in this point of view, to establish the difference between the incident of challenge of unconstitutionality conceived in article of the Brazilian Federal Constitution and the incident of challenge of unconstitutionality such as it is known in the European models. The insertion of the incident of challenge of unconstitutionality based on European models in the Brazilian control system, without jeopardizing the North-American essence the Brazilian constitutional history presents since 1981, is the hypothesis that is presented as an improvement of constitutional protection

A objetivação do controle concreto de constitucionalidade nas decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal

The independence of the United States and the revolutions that emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century led to the birth of the written constitution, with a mission to limit the power of the State and to ensure fundamental rights to citizens. Thus, the Constitution has become the norm and ultimate founding of the State. Because of this superiority felt the need to protect her, emerging from that constitutional jurisdiction, taking control of constitutionality of provisions his main instrument. In Brazil, the constitutionality control began with the Constitution of 1891, when "imported" the American model, which is named after incidental diffuse model of judicial review. Indeed, allowed that any judge or court could declare the unconstitutionality of the law or normative act in a concrete case. However, the Brazilian Constituent did not bring the U.S. Institute of stare decisis, by which the precedents of higher courts eventually link the below. Because of this lack, each tribunal Brazilian freely decide about the constitutionality of a rule, so that the decision took effect only between the parties to the dispute. This prompted the emergence of conflicting decisions between judicantes organs, which ultimately undermine legal certainty and the image of the judiciary. As a solution to the problem, was incorporated from the 1934 Constitution to rule that the Senate would suspend the law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. With the introduction of abstract control of constitutionality, since 1965, the Supreme Court went on to also have the power to declare the invalidity of the provision unconstitutional, effectively against all without the need for the participation of the Senate. However, it remained the view that in case the Supreme Court declared the unconstitutionality of the fuzzy control law by the Senate would continue with the competence to suspend the law unconstitutional, thus the decision of the Praetorium Exalted restricted parties. The 1988 Constitution strengthened the abstract control expanding legitimized the Declaratory Action of Unconstitutionality and creating new mechanisms of abstract control. Adding to this, the Constitutional Amendment. No. 45/2004 brought the requirement of general repercussion and created the Office of Binding Precedent, both to be applied by the Supreme Court judgments in individual cases, thus causing an approximation between the control abstract and concrete constitutional. Saw themselves so that the Supreme Court, to be the guardian of the Constitution, its action should be directed to the trial of issues of public interest. In this new reality, it becomes more necessary the participation of the Senate to the law declared unconstitutional in fuzzy control by the Supreme Court can reach everyone, because such an interpretation has become obsolete. So, to adapt it to this reality, such a rule must be read in the sense that the Senate give publicity to the law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, since mutated constitutional

Estado, direito e politícas públicas: um estudo sobre a incidência normativa na educação superior a partir da Constituição Federal de 1988

O presente estudo teve como objeto central analisar as políticas públicas exaradas pelo Estado brasileiro, via espécies normativas para a educação superior. Tendo como categorias de análise a autonomia da universidade, e o financiamento da educação superior. A pesquisa parte da premissa de que as políticas públicas têm sido materializadas a partir de normas jurídicas. Assim, investigamos o Estado brasileiro, as políticas públicas por ele emanadas por meio de espécies normativas e suas implicações na educação superior. O estudo foi realizado por meio de pesquisa bibliográfica que consistiu num levantamento minucioso do ordenamento jurídico elaborado pelo Estado brasileiro para a educação superior a partir da Constituição Federal de 1988 até o ano de 2006. Detectamos que após a CF/88, no que concerne à autonomia da universidade e ao financiamento da educação superior, foram aprovadas quarenta e quatro normas jurídicas, sendo duas Emendas Constitucionais, onze Leis, três medidas provisórias, nove Decretos, dentre outras espécies normativas, que contribuíram para alterar de forma profunda o texto constitucional. No desenvolvimento do estudo iniciamos com a discussão sobre o Estado com vistas a estabelecer relações com o direito e as políticas públicas. Em seguida, traçamos uma contextualização histórica de todas as Constituições brasileiras, mas com ênfase no processo de redemocratização iniciado em 1974 e que culminou na CF/88, cuja característica essencial foi sua definição como a Carta Magna mais democrática que se tem nota no Brasil. Dessa carta, analisamos os artigos que inferem sobre a autonomia universitária e o financiamento da educação superior. Com base na discussão sobre o Estado regulador brasileiro e nas indicações fornecidas pela ciência do Direito constitucional, realizamos a análise da legislação pós-constitucional que define as políticas para a educação superior brasileira direcionada ao financiamento desse nível de ensino e à autonomia da universidade. Tendo como referência o texto constitucional, discorremos sobre o instituto jurídico do controle de constitucionalidade. O estudo apontou que grande parte das normas jurídicas infraconstitucionais, que regulamenta a educação superior brasileira, atua contra legem mater, quando, por exemplo, dispõe contra o art. 207 ao interferir sobre a escolha de dirigentes universitários, ferindo a capacidade da universidade se auto-legislar sobre assuntos que lhe são próprios, ou quando desvincula percentuais assegurados para o financiamento da educação superior, no caso da emenda constitucional de revisão n. 1/1994 e Emenda Constitucional n. 10/1996, ferindo princípios constitucionais e reproduzindo interesses do Estado capitalista neoliberal. O estudo apresenta contribuição para o campo das políticas públicas educacionais, vez que possibilita reflexões sobre a forma pela qual o direito público subjetivo à educação, assegurado no texto constitucional, vem sendo negado sistematicamente e de forma sucessiva pelos governos pós CF/88 que adotam o modelo de Estado neoliberal.

A democracia participativa na jurisdição constitucional brasileira: o amicus curiae enquanto mediador democrático no controle concentrado de constitucionalidade no Supremo Tribunal Federal

This master thesis aims to research the tension established between the judicial review and democratic theory which was always present in the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. In this regard, the expansion of the Brazilian constitutional jurisdiction checked after the occurrence of the Federal Constitution of 1988 and the inertia of the Legislature in disciplinary relevant legal aspects of Brazilian society contributed to a hyperactivity of the Supreme Court. However, in a complex society of context, as is the Brazilian society, there are contained demands and political controversies that hardly would be well represented or resolved through the action of the Court of ministers at the expense of other government bodies. Among the supremacy of Parliament and the legitimacy deficit of these magistrates, is the constitutional text and the social fabric that makes this legal status of the political. Participatory democracy established by the guidelines of the Federal Constitution requires this perspective when the Supreme Court acting in place of concentrated constitutionality control. In a plural society, there is no reason to get rid of state decision moments popular participation. Lack the Supreme Court, this time, the democratizing perception that the institute brings to the interior of the Court, as state determination of space in which to come together and meet the aspirations of society and state claims. The dissertation investigates thus the possibility of amicus curiae Institute serve as a mediator of the democratic debate, to assist the Supreme Court in the preparation of the decision is, historically, that which is of greater legitimacy, from the perspective of a theory participatory democracy. Analyzes, likewise, the unfolding of abstract judicial review in the context of Brazilian law. Proposes, incidentally, a rereading of the separation of powers, with the call for the Judiciary be careful not to become the protagonist of national political decisions. It maintains, finally, that procedural opening the interpreters of the constitution, through the amicus curiae Institute, shows up as able to decrease the legitimacy deficit in the performance of the Brazilian Supreme Court.

The law of zoning. A review of the constitutionality of zoning regulations which control buildings in accordance with a general plan of municipal development.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

A second order control-volume finite-element least-squares strategy for simulating diffusion in strongly anisotropic media

An unstructured mesh �nite volume discretisation method for simulating di�usion in anisotropic media in two-dimensional space is discussed. This technique is considered as an extension of the fully implicit hybrid control-volume �nite-element method and it retains the local continuity of the ux at the control volume faces. A least squares function recon- struction technique together with a new ux decomposition strategy is used to obtain an accurate ux approximation at the control volume face, ensuring that the overall accuracy of the spatial discretisation maintains second order. This paper highlights that the new technique coincides with the traditional shape function technique when the correction term is neglected and that it signi�cantly increases the accuracy of the previous linear scheme on coarse meshes when applied to media that exhibit very strong to extreme anisotropy ratios. It is concluded that the method can be used on both regular and irregular meshes, and appears independent of the mesh quality.