The European Central Bank’s quantitative easing programme: limits and risks. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2016/04, February 2016

The European Central Bank (ECB) has made a number of significant changes to the original guidelines of its quantitative easing (QE) programme since the programme started in January 2015. These changes are welcome because the original guidelines would have rapidly constrained the programme’s implementation. The changes announced expand the universe of purchasable assets and give some flexibility to the ECB in the execution of its programme. However, this might not be enough to sustain QE throughout 2017, or if the ECB wishes to increase the monthly amount of purchases in order to provide the necessary monetary stimulus to the euro area to bring inflation back to 2 percent. To increase the programme’s flexibility, the ECB could further alter the composition of its purchases. The extension of the QE programme also raises some legitimate questions about its potential adverse consequences. However, the benefits of this policy still outweigh its possible negative implications for financial stability or for inequality. The fear that the ECB’s credibility will be undermined because of its QE programme also seems to be largely unfounded. On the contrary, the primary risk to the ECB’s credibility is the risk of not reaching its 2 percent inflation target, which could lead to expectations becoming disanchored.

The effectiveness of the European Central Bank’s Asset Purchase Programme. Bruegel Policy Contribution issue 2016 10 June 2016

Since the end of 2014, inflation has been at or very close to zero. With very little ability to move the actual interest rate further into negative territory, the ECB has resorted to unconventional measures. The latest of these includes a programme to purchase corporate bonds, which started on 8 June 2016.

A központi bankok társadalmi felelőssége (Social responsibility of central banks)

A szerzők tanulmányukban bemutatják a vállalati gyakorlatból ismert vállalati társadalmi felelősségvállalás (CSR) koncepció lehetséges központi banki értelmezését, kitérve a központi bankok gazdasági, jogi, etikai és filantróp (jótékonysági) felelősségére. Megközelítésüket az amerikai (FED), az európai (EKB) és a magyar (MNB) központi bank gyakorlatán keresztül mutatják be. Dolgozatuk alapgondolata, hogy egy valóban felelős intézmény minden rendelkezésére álló eszközzel a társadalmi jólétet segíti elő, ahogy a társadalom tagjai vonatkozásában Adam Smith megfogalmazta bő kétszáz évvel ezelőtt. ____ This paper studies a possible interpretation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) known from business translated to the sphere of central banks, including the central banks’ economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic (charity) responsibilities. The authors’ approach is presented through practices of the American (FED), the European (ECB), and the Hungarian (MNB) Central Banks. The main idea in this paper is that a responsible organisation uses all means possible to improve social wealth, as stated by Adam Smith in relevance to the members of the society over two hundred years ago.

A Prudent Central Banker

This paper studies monetary policy in an economy where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around optimal inflation. In particular, positive deviations from the optimum can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations in the policy maker's loss function. It is shown that under asymmetric preferences, uncertainty can induce a prudent behavior on the part of the central banker. Since the prudence motive can be large enough to override the inflation bias, optimal monetary policy could be implemented even in the absence of rules, reputation, or contractual mechanisms. For certain parameter values, a deflationary bias can arise in equilibrium.

The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets, the Natural Rate of Unemployment

This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.

Are central bank independence reforms necessary for achieving low and stable inflation?

Using data on the occurence of central bank independence (CBI) reforms in 131 countries during 1980-2005, we test whether they were important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability. CBI reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average 3.31% when countries with historically high inflation rates are included. But countries with lower inflation have reduced it without institutional reforms granting central banks more independence, undermining the theoretical time-inconsistency case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI reforms have helped reduce inflation variability.

Determinants and effects of central bank independence reforms

This thesis consists of four empirically oriented papers on central bank independence (CBI) reforms.    Paper [1] is an investigation of why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to control the economy. A new data-set, including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during 1980-2005, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country had been characterized by high variability in inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.    Paper [2], using a difference-in-difference approach, studies whether CBI reform matters for inflation performance. The analysis is based on a dataset including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during the period of 1980-2005. CBI reform is found to have contributed to bringing down inflation in high-inflation countries, but it seems unrelated to inflation performance in low-inflation countries.    Paper [3] investigates whether CBI-reforms are important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability, using a random-effects random-coefficients model to account for heterogeneity in the effects of CBI-reforms on inflation. CBI-reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average by 3.31 percent, but the effect is only present when countries with historically high inflation rates are included in the sample. Countries with more modest inflation rates have achieved low inflation without institutional reforms that grant central banks more independence, thus undermining the time-inconsistency theory case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI-reforms have contributed to lower inflation variability    Paper [4] studies the relationship between CBI and a suggested trade-off between price variability and output variability using data on CBI-levels, and data the on implementation dates of CBI-reforms. The results question the existence of such a trade-off, but indicate that there may still be potential gains in stabilization policy from CBI-reforms.

Em busca da autonomia operacional do Banco Central do Brasil como instrumento de estabilização da moeda

Os Bancos Centrais têm, como função principal, zelar pela moeda, de modo a assegurar a estabilidade financeira de seus países. A partir de tal premissa, buscaremos demonstrar que o Banco Central do Brasil necessita de autonomia operacional, a ser regulamentada em lei, a fim de cumprir com sua missão, que é de natureza essencialmente técnica. Em que pese o fato de questão de se implementar, no Brasil, um Banco Central dotado de autonomia não ser consensual, buscaremos demonstrar as vantagens deste modelo, como fator de obtenção de estabilidade monetária. No Brasil, o Banco Central (BACEN), além de arcar com uma enorme gama de atribuições, encontra-se sujeito a pressões governamentais, em face de projetos de curto prazo, não necessariamente compatíveis com a tarefa de estabilização monetária, que pode requerer uma atuação de longo prazo. A autonomia desejada para o BACEN não significa que ele venha a se tomar independente, pelo contrário, uma vez que ele terá que assumir a responsabilidade de atingir metas pré-determinadas pelo Governo, obrigando-se a prestar contas de sua atuação à sociedade, de modo transparente. Para tanto, é preciso que ele seja dotado de autonomia administrativa, orçamentária e operacional, dentro de limites estabelecidos por lei. Ao destacarmos a autonomia do BACEN, trazemos a tona um fator pertinente à questão que é inflação. Trata-se de um processo que corrói a economia, e, quando se toma crônica, 111 como vinha ocorrendo no Brasil até os anos 90, leva à instabilidade e dificulta um planejamento de longo prazo. A necessidade de se controlar a inflação, em muitos países, levou-os a adotar uma política monetária com metas inflacionárias - Inflatíon Targeting. Os países que adotaram o regime de metas inflacionárias conferiram autonomia aos seus Bancos Centrais, pois tanto mais autonomia, tanto mais credibilidade. Desta forma, países como o Chile, a Nova Zelândia, a Alemanha e os demais países que compõem a União Europeia lograram controlar a inflação. Para que o BACEN cumpra com o que lhe compete, exercendo eficientemente o seu papel, é curial, portanto, que seja dotado de autonomia orçamentária, administrativa e operacional, devendo ser regulamentado o art. 192 da Constituição Federal, através de Lei Complementar. Uma vez assegurada legalmente a autonomia de que o Banco Central do Brasil necessita, ter-se-á um meio valioso de controle da inflação, assegurando a estabilidade da moeda e permitindo que o desenvolvimento seja implementado no prazo adequado, permitindo um planejamento estratégico de longo prazo para o país.

Estudo das intervenções diárias do Banco Central do Brasil sobre o mercado de câmbio nacional, sua volatilidade e conseqüência na procura por proteção

As intervenções efetuadas pelo Banco Central do Brasil têm sido freqüentes no mercado de câmbio à vista nestes últimos anos. Essas intervenções geram incremento das reservas internacionais do país, mas podem gerar também, entre outros, efeitos sobre o ritmo da apreciação da moeda nacional e também sobre a volatilidade do mercado. O presente trabalho buscou identificar se tais intervenções resultaram em alterações da volatilidade do mercado, concluindo que houve efeito de redução desta volatilidade em apenas uma faixa dentro do universo do volume de compras realizadas pelo Banco Central. Secundariamente buscou-se observar qual foi a demanda dos agentes de mercado na contratação de instrumentos de proteção (hedge) cambial em resposta dessas alterações da volatilidade. Não foi verificado qualquer efeito acerca da busca de proteção. A análise foi baseada no período compreendido entre janeiro de 2001 e maio de 2007, sendo que a identificação do efeito das intervenções sobre a volatilidade do mercado utilizou o modelo GARCH, e a análise subseqüente, de influência sobre a busca de proteção, foi baseada no modelo SARIMA.

Um Banco Central do Brasil independente: à procura de uma estrutura administrativa autônoma e descentralizada

o tema sobre a estrutura administrativa mais adequada para um Banco Central do Brasil, que procura sua autonomia, se desenrola a partir da situação administrativa do BACEN, que se apresenta no dias de hoje, e os questionamentos a respeito de sua independência, nos Capítulos 1 e 2, passando por modelos teóricos de estrutura administrativa e por modelos funcionais de Bancos Centrais independentes, comparados entre si e com o modelo brasileiro, nos Capítulos 3 e 4. Em seguida, são demonstrados os empenhos que se efetivam em realidade para que o BACEN chegue à sua autonomia, através de projetos que tramitam no Congresso Nacional e do Plano de Ação Estratégica para o BACEN, referidos nos Capítulos 5 e 6, até se chegar às opiniões de especialistas, no Capítulo 7, que serviram para reforçar a conclusão de que a mudança organizacional em busca da autonomia do Banco Central do Brasil não é apenas em decorrência do levantamento de aspectos técnicos, políticos e econômicos e, sim, uma consequência de um processo maior de integração entre estes e os aspectos comportamentais e administrativos dessa organização.

Central bank independence and its relationship to inflation

Includes bibliography

Central bank intervention and exchange rate behaviour : empirical evidence for India

This paper examines the causal relationship between central bank intervention and exchange returns in India. Using monthly data from December 1997 to December 2011, the empirical results derived from the CCF approach of Cheung and Ng (1996) suggest that there is causality-in-variance from exchange rate returns to central bank intervention, but not vice versa. These findings are robust in the sense that they hold in cases where the returns were measured from either the spot rate or the forward rate. Therefore, the results of this paper suggest that the Indian central bank has intervened in the foreign exchange market to respond to exchange rate volatility, although the volatility has not been influenced by central bank intervention in the form of net purchases of foreign currency in the market.

The Central Bank and bank credits in the Philippines : a survey on effectiveness of monetary policy and its measures

In the post-Asian crisis period, bank loans to the manufacturing sector have shown a slow recovery in the affected countries, unexceptionally in the Philippines. This paper provides a literacy survey on the effectiveness of the Central Bank’s monetary policy and the responsiveness of the financial market, and discusses on the future works necessary to better understand the monetary policy effectiveness in the Philippines. As the survey shows, most previous works focus on the correlation between the short-term policy rates and during the period of monetary tightening and relatively less interest in quantitative effectiveness. Future tasks would shed lights on (1) the asset side – other than loan outstanding – of banks to analyze their behavior/preference in structuring portfolios, and (2) the quantitative impacts during the monetary easing period.

Central bank cooperation during the great recession. Bruegel Policy Contribution. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/08, 20 June 2013

During the Great Recession, central banks went well beyond their normal operations and provided liquidity in unlimited amounts, in foreign currency and to foreign banks. Central bank cooperation took the form of a swap network, and amounted to an episode of global monetary policy. However, though bank cooperation will continue to contribute to global governance, the swap network should not be made permanent and given an institutional basis to provide international lending of last resort. Swaps are a monetary policy tool and should continue to be decided on by central banks like all other monetary policy tools,to avoid impinging on their independence, which a difficult historical process has shown to be the best basis for price stability.