Are central bank independence reforms necessary for achieving low and stable inflation?
Data(s) |
2013
|
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Resumo |
Using data on the occurence of central bank independence (CBI) reforms in 131 countries during 1980-2005, we test whether they were important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability. CBI reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average 3.31% when countries with historically high inflation rates are included. But countries with lower inflation have reduced it without institutional reforms granting central banks more independence, undermining the theoretical time-inconsistency case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI reforms have helped reduce inflation variability. |
Formato |
application/pdf |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Högskolan Dalarna, Nationalekonomi Högskolan Dalarna, Nationalekonomi Högskolan Dalarna, Nationalekonomi HUI Research |
Relação |
HUI Working Papers ; 95 |
Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
Tipo |
Report info:eu-repo/semantics/report text |