Are central bank independence reforms necessary for achieving low and stable inflation?


Autoria(s): Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov; Landström, Mats; Rudholm, Niklas
Data(s)

2013

Resumo

Using data on the occurence of central bank independence (CBI) reforms in 131 countries during 1980-2005, we test whether they were important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability. CBI reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average 3.31% when countries with historically high inflation rates are included. But countries with lower inflation have reduced it without institutional reforms granting central banks more independence, undermining the theoretical time-inconsistency case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI reforms have helped reduce inflation variability.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:du-13537

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Högskolan Dalarna, Nationalekonomi

Högskolan Dalarna, Nationalekonomi

Högskolan Dalarna, Nationalekonomi

HUI Research

Relação

HUI Working Papers ; 95

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Tipo

Report

info:eu-repo/semantics/report

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