Adómorál és adócsalás - társadalmi preferenciák és korlátozott racionalitás = Tax morale and tax system: social preferences and bounded rationality

Az adócsalásnak egy olyan modellcsaládját vizsgáljuk, ahol az egykulcsos adó kizárólag a közjavakat finanszírozza. Két megközelítés összehasonlítására összpontosítunk. Az elsőben minden dolgozó jövedelme azonos, és ebből minden évben annyit vall be, amennyi maximalizálja a nála maradó jövedelemből fedezhető fogyasztás nyújtotta hasznosság és a jövedelembevallásból fakadó hasznosság összegét. A második hasznosság három tényező szorzata: a dolgozó exogén adómorálja, a környezetében előző évben megfigyelt átlagos jövedelembevallás és saját bevallásából fakadó endogén hasznossága. A második megközelítésben az ágensek egyszerű heurisztikus szabályok szerint cselekszenek. Míg az optimalizáló modellben hagyományos Laffer-görbékkel találkozunk, addig a heurisztikán alapuló modellekben (lineárisan) növekvő Laffer-görbék jönnek létre. E különbség oka, hogy a heurisztikán alapuló modellben egy sajátos viselkedésfajta jelentkezik: számos ágens ingatag helyzetbe kerül, amelyben altruizmus és önzés között ingadozik. ________ The authors study a family of models of tax evasion, where a flat-rate tax only finances the provision of public goods and audits and wage differences are ne-glected. The paper focuses on comparing two modelling approaches. The first is based on optimizing agents, endowed with social preferences, their utility being the sum of private consumption and moral utility. The second approach involves agents acting according to simple heuristics. While the traditionally shaped Laffer curves are encountered in the optimizing model, the heuristics models exhibit (linearly) increasing Laffer curves. This difference is related to a peculiar type of behaviour: within the agent-based approach lurk a number of agents in a moral state of limbo, alternating between altruism and selfishness.

Belief and Bounded Rationality

Predictive accounts of belief ascription, either following the principle of charity or Dennett's intentional stance, have proved popular recently. However, such accounts require us first to treat agents as perfectly rational agents and then revise this assumption as appropriate. I argue that such downwards revision is no easy task and that several proposed accounts are not satisfactory. I propose a way of characterising agent's belief states which shares Dennett's approach but avoids treating agents as perfectly rational, and develop a formal account in terms of fan models.

Regions of rationality: Maps for bounded agents

An important problem in descriptive and prescriptive research in decision making is to identify regions of rationality, i.e., the areas for which heuristics are and are not effective. To map the contours of such regions, we derive probabilities that heuristics identify the best of m alternatives (m > 2) characterized by k attributes or cues (k > 1). The heuristics include a single variable (lexicographic), variations of elimination-by-aspects, equal weighting, hybrids of the preceding, and models exploiting dominance. We use twenty simulated and four empirical datasets for illustration. We further provide an overview by regressing heuristic performance on factors characterizing environments. Overall, sensible heuristics generally yield similar choices in many environments. However, selection of the appropriate heuristic can be important in some regions (e.g., if there is low inter-correlation among attributes/cues). Since our work assumes a hit or miss decision criterion, we conclude by outlining extensions for exploring the effects of different loss functions.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. Wereplace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probability p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a kind of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one,with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interimtypes, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.

Herbert A. Simon and the concept of rationality: boundaries and procedures

This paper discusses Herbert A. Simon's conception of rationality in two of its principal general definitions: bounded rationality and procedural rationality. It argues that the latter is the one that better synthesizes the author's view about rational behavior and that the former fills mainly a critical function. They are complementarily used by Simon in this sense. In spite of that, it is argued that it is the low degree of specificity of the concept of bounded rationality one of the reasons for its relatively greater success.

The end of the opportunism vs trust debate: bounded reliability as a new envelope concept in research on MNE governance

Modern transaction cost economics (TCE) thinking has developed into a key intellectual foundation of international business (IB) research, but the Williamsonian version has faced substantial criticism for adopting the behavioral assumption of opportunism. In this paper we assess both the opportunism concept and existing alternatives such as trust within the context of IB research, especially work on multinational enterprise (MNE) governance. Case analyses of nine global MNEs illustrate an alternative to the opportunism assumption that captures more fully the mechanisms underlying failed commitments inside the MNE. As a substitute for the often-criticized assumption of opportunism, we propose the envelope concept of bounded reliability (BRel), an assumption that represents more accurately and more completely the reasons for failed commitments, without invalidating the other critical assumption in conventional TCE (and internalization theory) thinking, namely the widely accepted envelope concept of bounded rationality (BRat). Bounded reliability as an envelope concept includes two main components, within the context of global MNE management: opportunism as intentional deceit, and benevolent preference reversal. The implications for IB research of adopting the bounded reliability concept are far reaching, as this concept may increase the legitimacy of comparative institutional analysis in the social sciences.

Organizational behaviour: An emotions perspective

This opening chapter provides an overview of organizational behavior theory and research and the paradigms that have dominated the field to date. Running through a discussion of rational notions of organizational behavior, to concepts of bounded rationality and most recently the call for bounded emotionality perspectives, we identify for the reader what a bounded emotionality perspective adds to the understanding of organizations. We then provide an overview of the remaining chapters in the book and how they contribute to the book's objectives.

A incubação das micro, pequenas e médias empresas (MPMEs) em Portugal : uma discussão sobre custos de transacção, dimensão competitiva e a cadeia de valor

RESUMO: Este trabalho tem por objectivo discutir as formas como as incubadoras de empresas contribuem para a criação da cadeia de valores de Micros, Pequenas e Médias Empresas (MPMEs) permitindo a redução dos seus custos de transacção. Para melhor compreender a forma como se reduzem os custos de transacção é importante conhecer os pressupostos comportamentais que provocam a existência de tais custos: a racionalidade limitada, porque a nossa forma de pensar tem limitações; e o oportunismo, porque há pessoas com comportamentos desonestos envolvidas no negócio. O verdadeiro poder explicativo da teoria dos custos de transacção está, no entanto, na análise de três variáveis que determinam se esses custos serão mais baixos numa estrutura hierárquica ou num mercado. Estas três variáveis são: a especificidade de activos - se uma transacção envolve ou não activos específicos à actividade da empresa; a incerteza - qual o grau de incerteza em encontrar um produto ou serviço externo à empresa; e a frequência - e se um bem ou serviço é frequentemente utilizado ou não. As incubadoras de empresas são actualmente consideradas como uma iniciativa essencial ao desenvolvimento socioeconómico regional, e nacional. Estas instituições contribuem para corrigir ineficiências no mercado, conferindo às empresas uma capacidade de inovação tecnológica que garante empregos e a criação de riquezas, aumentando o bem-estar da sociedade. O sucesso da sua actuação resume-se à capacidade para gerar dimensões virtuais que contribuem para a cadeia de valores, permitindo as MPMEs, a redução dos seus custos de transacção. ABSTRACT: This work aims to discuss the relevant forms how incubators contribute to the value chain of a in micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME´s) reducing their transaction costs. To better understand how transaction costs can be reduced one must recognize the behavioral assumptions that are behind there existence; bounded rationality - because our way of thinking has limitations and opportunism - because there are dishonest people involved in the business. The true cost theory´s explanatory power comes from the analyses of the three variables that determine whether those costs will be lower in a hierarchical structure or a market structure. These three variables are: specificity of assets - if the transaction involves or not specific assets in for the firm´s activity; the uncertainty - what is the degree of uncertainty in finding a product or service external to the firm; and the frequency - what is the frequency of the good or service use. Business incubators are currently regarded as a key initiative for the national or regional economic development. The institutions contribute to correct market inefficiencies, improving the capacity of firms to produce technological innovations that guaranty jobs and wealth creation increasing welfare. The success of this all boils down to the capacity to create virtual dimensions that contributes to the MSME´s value chain reducing transaction costs.

Stock market volatility and learning

Introducing bounded rationality in a standard consumption-based asset pricing model with time separable preferences strongly improves empirical performance. Learning causes momentum and mean reversion of returns and thereby excess volatility, persistence of price-dividend ratios, long-horizon return predictability and a risk premium, as in the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), but for lower risk aversion. This is obtained, even though our learning scheme introduces just one free parameter and we only consider learning schemes that imply small deviations from full rationality. The findings are robust to the learning rule used and other model features. What is key is that agents forecast future stock prices using past information on prices.

A Model of Near-Rational Exuberance

We study how the use of judgement or “add-factors” in forecasting may disturb the set of equilibrium outcomes when agents learn using recursive methods. We isolate conditions under which new phenomena, which we call exuberance equilibria, can exist in a standard self-referential environment. Local indeterminacy is not a requirement for existence. We construct a simple asset pricing example and find that exuberance equilibria, when they exist, can be extremely volatile relative to fundamental equilibria.

Moody choice

If choices depend on the decision maker's mood, is the attempt to derive any consistency in choice doomed? In this paper we argue that, even with full unpredictability of mood, the way choices from a menu relate to choices from another menu exhibits some structure. We present two alternative models of 'moody choice' and show that, in either of them, not all choice patterns are possible. Indeed, we characterise both models in terms of consistency requirements of the observed choice data.

A Salience Theory of Choice Errors

We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a 'consideration set' prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative specific salience and by the rationality of the agent (his general propensity to consider all alternatives). The model turns out to include a logit formulation as a special case. In general, it has a rich set of implications both for exogenous parameters and for a situation in which alternatives can a¤ect their own salience (salience games). Such implications are relevant to assess the link between 'revealed' preferences and 'true' preferences: for example, less rational agents may paradoxically express their preference through choice more truthfully than more rational agents.

Finite Horizon Learning

Incorporating adaptive learning into macroeconomics requires assumptions about how agents incorporate their forecasts into their decision-making. We develop a theory of bounded rationality that we call finite-horizon learning. This approach generalizes the two existing benchmarks in the literature: Eulerequation learning, which assumes that consumption decisions are made to satisfy the one-step-ahead perceived Euler equation; and infinite-horizon learning, in which consumption today is determined optimally from an infinite-horizon optimization problem with given beliefs. In our approach, agents hold a finite forecasting/planning horizon. We find for the Ramsey model that the unique rational expectations equilibrium is E-stable at all horizons. However, transitional dynamics can differ significantly depending upon the horizon.

Stochastic Choice and Consideration Sets

We model a boundedly rational agent who suffers from limited attention. The agent considers each feasible alternative with a given (unobservable) probability, the attention parameter, and then chooses the alternative that maximises a preference relation within the set of considered alternatives. We show that this random choice rule is the only one for which the impact of removing an alternative on the choice probability of any other alternative is asymmetric and menu independent. Both the preference relation and the attention parameters are identi fied uniquely by stochastic choice data.