Welfare Effort and Poverty from the Monetary and Capabilities Approach: A Cross-Country Analysis in Latin American and the Caribbean (1990-2010)

There is abundant empirical evidence on the negative relationship between welfare effort and poverty. However, poverty indicators traditionally used have been representative of the monetary approach, excluding its multidimensional reality from the analysis. Using three regression techniques for the period 1990-2010 and controlling for demographic and cyclical factors, this paper examines the relationship between social spending per capita —as the indicator of welfare effort— and poverty in up to 21 countries of the region. The proportion of the population with an income below its national basic basket of goods and services (PM1) and the proportion of population with an income below 50% of the median income per capita (PM2) were the two poverty indicators considered from the monetarist approach to measure poverty. From the capability approach the proportion of the population with food inadequacy (PC1) and the proportion of the population without access to improved water sources or sanitation facilities (PC2) were used. The fi ndings confi rm that social spending is actually useful to explain changes in poverty (PM1, PC1 and PC2), as there is a high negative and signifi cant correlation between the variables before and after controlling for demographic and cyclical factors. In two regression techniques, social spending per capita did not show a negative relationship with the PM2. Countries with greater welfare effort for the period 1990-2010 were not necessarily those with the lowest level of poverty. Ultimately social spending per capita was more useful to explain changes in poverty from the capability approach.

The Impact of income support programs on transitions to employment

The income support programs are created with the purpose of fighting both, the poverty trap and the inactivity trap. The balance between both is fragile and hard to find. Thus, the goal of this work is to contribute to solve this issue by finding how income support programs, particularly the Portuguese RSI, affect transitions to employment. This is made through duration analysis, namely using Cox and Competing Risks models. A particular feature is introduced in this work as it incorporates the possibility of Defective Risks. The estimated hazard elasticity with respect to the amount of RSI received for individuals who move to employment is -0,41. More than a half of RSI receivers stays for more than a year and the probability of never leaving to employment is 44%. The results appear to indicate that RSI has affected negatively transitions to employment.

Basic Income, Republican Freedom, and Effective Market Power

This article examines republican arguments for a basic income that turn on a right to exit the labour market. It gives criteria for the maintenance of republican freedom in markets, arguing that a right to exit or effective market power will guarantee republican freedom in markets. The article then considers whether a basic income is either sufficient or necessary to protect republican freedom both in labour markets and elsewhere. If a basic income is necessary to protect republican freedom in the labour market, I argue it is not sufficient to protect that freedom elsewhere. If citizens lack the means to maintain their republican freedom in the labour market, then there may be other spheres of life where they are vulnerable to subordination, whether or not they have a basic income. Some sociological evidence on cultural consumption patterns is presented.

Targeting the poor: a macroeconomic analysis of cash transfer programs

This paper introduces cash transfers targeting the poor in an incomplete markets model with heterogeneous agents facing idiosyncratic risk. These transfers change the degree of insurance in the economy and affect precautionary motives asymmetrically, leading the poorest households to decrease savings proportionally more than their richer counterparts. In a model economy calibrated to Brazil, once the cash transfer program is adopted, wealth inequality and social welfare increase, poverty decreases, while employment and income inequality remain about the same. Imperfect access to financial markets is important for these results, whereas whether the program is funded with lump sum or distortive taxes is not.

Three essays on local demand for public services

Local provision of public services has the positive effect of increasing the efficiency because each locality has its idiosyncrasies that determine a particular demand for public services. This dissertation addresses different aspects of the local demand for public goods and services and their relationship with political incentives. The text is divided in three essays. The first essay aims to test the existence of yardstick competition in education spending using panel data from Brazilian municipalities. The essay estimates two-regime spatial Durbin models with time and spatial fixed effects using maximum likelihood, where the regimes represent different electoral and educational accountability institutional settings. First, it is investigated whether the lame duck incumbents tend to engage in less strategic interaction as a result of the impossibility of reelection, which lowers the incentives for them to signal their type (good or bad) to the voters by mimicking their neighbors’ expenditures. Additionally, it is evaluated whether the lack of electorate support faced by the minority governments causes the incumbents to mimic the neighbors’ spending to a greater extent to increase their odds of reelection. Next, the essay estimates the effects of the institutional change introduced by the disclosure on April 2007 of the Basic Education Development Index (known as IDEB) and its goals on the strategic interaction at the municipality level. This institutional change potentially increased the incentives for incumbents to follow the national best practices in an attempt to signal their type to voters, thus reducing the importance of local information spillover. The same model is also tested using school inputs that are believed to improve students’ performance in place of education spending. The results show evidence for yardstick competition in education spending. Spatial auto-correlation is lower among the lame ducks and higher among the incumbents with minority support (a smaller vote margin). In addition, the institutional change introduced by the IDEB reduced the spatial interaction in education spending and input-setting, thus diminishing the importance of local information spillover. The second essay investigates the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution. In particular, the study provides an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed in Pauly (1973), incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers (Van de Wale, 1998). First, the discussion is motivated by allowing for an “iceberg cost” of participation in the programs for the poor individuals in Pauly’s original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel of municipalities based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, all the distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a 1-hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders (2002) but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in targeting determination in Brazil, and thus, in the determination of the demand for redistribution. Lastly, the results indicate that ‘size matters’; i.e., the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. The third essay aims to empirically test the validity of the median voter model for the Brazilian case. Information on municipalities are obtained from the Population Census and the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court for the year 2000. First, the median voter demand for local public services is estimated. The bundles of services offered by reelection candidates are identified as the expenditures realized during incumbents’ first term in office. The assumption of perfect information of candidates concerning the median demand is relaxed and a weaker hypothesis, of rational expectation, is imposed. Thus, incumbents make mistakes about the median demand that are referred to as misperception errors. Thus, at a given point in time, incumbents can provide a bundle (given by the amount of expenditures per capita) that differs from median voter’s demand for public services by a multiplicative error term, which is included in the residuals of the demand equation. Next, it is estimated the impact of the module of this misperception error on the electoral performance of incumbents using a selection models. The result suggests that the median voter model is valid for the case of Brazilian municipalities.

Evidence of eligibility manipulation for conditional cash transfer programs

This paper assesses whether eligibility for conditional cash transfer programs have been manipulated, as well as the impact of this phenomenon on time allocation within households. To perform this analysis, we use data from the 2006 PNAD (Brazilian national household survey) and investigate the eligibility manipulation for the Bolsa Família (Family Stipend) program during this time period. The program assists families with a monthly per capita income of around R$120.00 (US$60.00). By applying the tests developed by McCrary (2008), we find suggestive evidence that individuals manipulate their income by voluntarily reducing their labor supply in order to become eligible to the program. Moreover, the reduction in labor supply is greater among women, especially single or divorced mothers. This evidence raises some concern about the unintended consequences related to the eligibility criteria utilized by Bolsa Família, as well as the program’s impact on individuals living in extreme poverty.

O novo federalismo social e o Rio: desenho de programas complementares de transferência de renda condicionada

Brazilian public policy entered in the so-called new social federalism through its conditional cash transfers. States and municipalities can operate together through the nationwide platform of the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP), complementing federal actions with local innovations. The state and the city of Rio de Janeiro have created programs named, respectively, Renda Melhor (RM) and Família Carioca (FC). These programs make use of the operational structure of the BFP, which facilitates locating beneficiaries, issuing cards, synchronizing payment dates and access passwords and introducing new conditionalities. The payment system of the two programs complements the estimated permanent household income up to the poverty line established, giving more to those who have less. Similar income complementation system was subsequently adopted in the BFP and the Chilean Ingreso Ético Familiar, which also follow the principle of estimation of income used in the FC and in the RM. Instead of using the declared income, the value of the Rio cash transfers are set using the extensive collection of information obtained from the Single Registry of Social Programs (Cadastro Único): physical configuration of housing, access to public services, education and work conditions for all family members, presence of vulnerable groups, disabilities, pregnant or lactating women, children and benefits from other official transfers such as the BFP. With this multitude of assets and limitations, the permanent income of each individual is estimated. The basic benefit is defined by the poverty gap and priority is given to the poorest. These subnational programs use international benchmarks as a neutral ground between different government levels and mandates. Their poverty line is the highest of the first millennium goal of the United Nations (UN): US$ 2 per person per day adjusted for the cost of living. The other poverty line of the UN, US$ 1.25, was implicitly adopted as the national extreme poverty line in 2011. The exchange of methodologies between federal entities has happened both ways. The FC began with the 575,000 individuals living in the city of Rio de Janeiro who were on the payroll of the BFP. Its system of impact evaluation benefited from bi-monthly standardized examinations. In the educational conditionalities, the two programs reward students' progress, a potential advantage for those who most need to advance. The municipal program requires greater school attendance than that of the BFP and the presence of students’ parents at the bimonthly meetings held on Saturdays. Students must achieve a grade of 8 or improve at least 20% in each exam to receive a bi-monthly premium of R$50. In early childhood, priority is given to the poor children in the program Single Administrative Register (CadÚnico) to enroll in kindergarten, preschools and complementary activities. The state program reaches more than one million people with a payment system similar to the municipal one. Moreover, it innovates in that it transfers awards given to high school students to savings accounts. The prize increases and is paid to the student, who can withdraw up to 30% annually. The total can reach R$3,800 per low-income student. The State and the city rewarded already education professionals according to student performance, now completing the chain of demand incentives on poor students and their parents. Increased performance is higher among beneficiaries and the presence of their guardians at meetings is twice compared to non beneficiaries; The Houston program, also focuses on aligning the incentives to teachers, parents and students. In general, the plan is to explore strategic complementarities, where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The objective is to stimulate, through targets and incentives, synergies between social actors (teachers, parents, students), between areas (education, assistance, work) and different levels of government. The cited programs sum their efforts and divide labor so as to multiply interactions and make a difference in the lives of the poor.

Cash-cum-in-kind transfers and income tax function

This paper investigates income tax revenues response to tax rate changes taking into consideration that cash-cum-in-kind transfers are used as a redistributive package to the community. First, we show that when cash and in-kind transfers are not tied to be substitute instruments, a marginal income tax increase may unambiguously decrease the quantity supplied of labor (and tax revenues therein). Next, we show that whenever the government chooses the optimum provision for the publicly provided good the tax revenue function has a negatively-sloped part with respect to tax rates except for one case. Last, we consider Brazilian data - PNAD - from 1976 to 2008 to test our theoretical implications. Our estimations suggest a weak evidence in favor of the existence of a La er-type curve for Brazilian income tax revenues data. Moreover, wend that the actual average income tax rate seems to be below the estimated optimum level. In a shorter sample from 1996-1999, we nd evidence that labor supply decreases with tax rate when cash and in-kind transfers are in play. Using a pseudo-panel from the same shorter sample, we try to estimate the elasticity of taxable income, following Creedy and Gemmell (2012) and Saez et al. (2009). We explore a small tax reform between 1997 and 1998 that a ected only the higher income tax bracket, and evidence that Brazil is on the revenue reducing side of the La er Curve, at least for individuals in the higher income tax bracket.

The income distribution problem in Latin America and the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Income poverty and unsatisfied basic needs

Incluye Bibliografía