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2000年に行われたエチオピア総選挙結果についての概観

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The election system is the pillar of Indian democracy. The system consists of various levels of elections to the Lok Sabha (the House of Representatives of the Union), State Legislative Assemblies, and Panchayati Raj Institutions (local self-governing bodies under State Governments). This article includes a review of studies related to the elections of Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies conducted up to the present time. Studies are divided into those based on aggregate data and those based on survey data of the individual electorate. This division has the advantage of providing data that may be used in different analytical areas. Voter turnout and votes polled by party are the two main variables to be explained. This review article thus shows what has been explained in voting behaviour in India up to the present time.

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Democracy is not necessarily consolidated simply by the introduction of formal democratic institutions. It is often observed in new democracies that democratic institutions are neglected and eroded in actual practice. Particularly, electoral fraud committed by a ruler is one of the main problems in this regard. This paper deals with two questions, (1) under what conditions does a ruler have an incentive to hold fair elections (or to rig elections), and (2) what makes a ruler prefer to establish an independent election governing institution? Assuming that a ruler prefers to maintain her power, basically she has an incentive to rig elections in order to be victorious in the political competition. A ruler, however, faces the risk of losing power if the opposition stages successful protests on a sufficiently large scale. If opponents are able to pose a credible threat to a ruler, she will have an incentive to hold fair elections. The problem is that information on electoral fraud is not shared by every player in the game. For the opposition, imperfect information deepens their coordination problems. Imperfect information, on the other hand, in some cases causes a problem for a ruler. If the opposition is sufficiently cohesive and have little tolerance of cheating, even unverified suspicions of fraud may trigger menacing protests. In such a case, a ruler has an incentive to establish an independent election commission to avoid unnecessary collisions by revealing the nature of the elections.

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本稿の目的は,インドの民主主義において顕著にみられる「反現職」または「現職批判」(antiincumbency)と呼ばれる現象を生みだしている要因を実証的に明らかにすることである。分析の対象として1965年から2009年にかけて主要な15州で行われた州議会選挙を取り上げ,在任期間中の経済変動が現職の州政権の再選可能性に与える影響を定量的に分析する。その結果,選挙直前の経済状況の良し悪しが州政権の交代・継続に重大な影響を及ぼしているということが実証的に明らかにされる。その一方で,在任していた期間全体の経済実績については,現職の州政権が再選される可能性に対して影響を与えているという結果は得られない。したがって,インドの民主主義体制の特徴である激しい政治変動の要因として,短期的な経済状況が非常に不安定であるということが重要な役割を果たしていると結論づけられる。さらに,連邦政府と州政府の関係が現職の州政権の再選可能性に大きな影響を与えているという結果も実証的に示される。

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Manual de introducción a los modelos estructurales de covarianzas.