A little learning is a dangerous thing? The ethics of teaching accidental tourists in higher education

This paper raises questions about the ethical issues that arise for academics and universities when under-graduate students enrol in classes outside of their discipline - classes that are not designed to be multi-disciplinary or introductory. We term these students ‘accidental tourists'. Differences between disciplines in terms of pedagogy, norms, language and understanding may pose challenges for accidental tourists in achieving desired learning outcomes. This paper begins a discussion about whether lecturers and universities have any ethical obligations towards supporting the learning of these students. Recognising that engaging with only one ethical theory leads to a fragmented moral vision, this paper employs a variety of ethical theories to examine any possible moral obligations that may fall upon lecturers and/or universities. In regards to lecturers, the paper critically engages with the ethical theories of utilitarianism, Kantianism and virtue ethics (Aristotle) to determine the extent of any academic duty to accidental tourists. In relation to universities, this paper employs the emerging ethical theory of organisational ethics as a lens through which to critically examine any possible obligations. Organisational ethics stems from the recognition that moral demands also exist for organisations so organisations must be reconceptualised as ethical actors and their policies and practices subject to ethical scrutiny. The analysis in this paper illustrates the challenges faced by lecturers some of whom, we theorise, may experience a form of moral distress facing a conflict between personal beliefs and organisational requirements. It also critically examines the role and responsibilities of universities towards students and towards their staff and the inherent moral tensions between a market model and demands for ‘good' learning experiences. This paper highlights the tensions for academics, between academics and universities and within university policy and indicates the need for greater reflection about this issue, especially given the many constraints facing lecturers and universities.

Criminal Justice Ethics : Cultivating the Moral Imagination

It is essential for those employed within the justice system to be able to competently and confidently work at the borders between ethics and the law. Criminal Justice Ethics offers a fresh new approach to considering ethical issues in a criminal justice context. Rather than simply offering a range of ethical dilemmas specific to various justice professionals, it provides extensive discussion of how individuals develop their 'moral imaginations' using ethical perspectives and practices, both as citizens of the world and as practitioners of justice. Starting from a consideration of the major ethical theories, this book sets the framework for an expansive discussion of ethics by moving from theory to consider the just society and the role of the justice professional within it. Each chapter provides detailed analysis of relevant ethical issues, and activities to engage students with the content, as well as review questions, which can be used for revision or examination. This book will help students to: • understand the various theoretical approaches to ethics, • apply these understandings to issues in society and the justice process, • assist in developing the ability to investigate, discuss, and analyse current ethical issues in criminal justice, • appreciate the diverse nature of ethical systems across cultures, • outline strategies for detecting and resolving ethical dilemmas. Rich with examples and ethical dilemmas from a broad range of contexts, this book's multicultural approach will appeal not only to criminal justice educators, but also to academics, students and practitioners approaching criminal justice from sociological, psychological or philosophical perspectives.

Playing Pranks: Traditions, communities & co-creative cultural performance practice

Pranks, hoaxes and practical jokes are co-creative cultural performance practices that appear across times, contexts and cultures. These practices include everyday play amongst families, friends and coworkers, entertainment programs such as Prank Patrol, Punked or Scare Tactics, and aesthetic and activist pranks perpetrated by situationist artists, guerrilla artists, and, most recently, culture ‘jammers’ or ‘hackers’ intent on turning capitalist systems back on themselves. Although it can, in common usage, describe almost any show off behaviour, a prank in the strictest definition of the term is a performance that deploys a very specific set of strategies. It is an act of trickery, mischief, or deceit, that must be taken as real, and momentarily cause real fear, anger or worry for an unwitting spectator-become-performer, who is meant to play along until the trick is revealed and their response can be represented back to the prankster, other spectators, or society as a whole, either for the sake of entertainment or for the sake of commentary on a cultural phenomenon. A prank, in this sense, deliberately blurs the boundaries between daily and dramatic performance. It creates a moment of uncertainty, in which both the prankster’s ability to be creative, clever, or culturally astute, and the prankee’s ability to play along, discern the trick, discern the point of the trick, and, in the end, be duped, be a good sport, or even play/pay the prankster back, are both put to the test. In this paper, I consider a number of pranking traditions popular where I am in Australia, from the community-building pranks of footballers, bucks parties and ‘drop bear’ tales told to tourists, to the more controversial pranks of radio shock jocks, activists and artists. I use performance, spectatorship and ethical theory to examine the engagement between prankster, pranked spectator, and other spectators, in this most distinctive sort of community-driven performance practice, and the way it builds and breaks status, social and other sorts of relationships within and between specific communities.

Ethics of Justification : A Defence of Contractualism

In What We Owe to Each Other, T.M. Scanlon formulated a new version of the ethical theory called contractualism. This theory took reasons considerations that count in favour of judgment-sensitive attitudes to be the fundamental normative notion. It then used normative reasons to first account for evaluative properties. For an object to be valuable, on this view, is for it to have properties that provide reasons to have favourable attitudes towards the bearer of value. Scanlon also used reasons to account for moral wrongness. His contractualism claims that an act is morally wrong if it is forbidden by any set of moral principles that no one could reasonably reject. My thesis consists of five previously published articles which attempt to clarify Scanlon s theory and to defend it against its critics. The first article defends the idea that normative reason-relations are fundamental against Joshua Gert. Gert argues that rationality is a more basic notion than reasons and that reasons can be analysed in terms of their rationally requiring and justifying dimensions. The second article explores the relationship between value and reasons. It defends Scanlon s view according to which reasons are the more basic than value against those who think that reasons are based on the evaluative realm. The last three articles defend Scanlon s views about moral wrongness. The first one of them discusses a classic objection to contractualist theories. This objection is that principles which no one could reasonably reject are redundant in accounting for wrongness. This is because we need a prior notion of wrongness to select those principles and because such principles are not required to make actions wrong or to provide reasons against wrong actions. The fourth article explores the distinctive reasons which contractualists claim there are for avoiding the wrong actions. The last article argues against the critics of contractualism who claim that contractualism has implausible normative consequences for situations related to the treatment of different-sized groups of people.

Yrityksen moraalinen velvollisuus yhteiskuntavastuun sidosryhmäteoriassa

Yritysten yhteiskuntavastuu sisältää monia merkityksiä ja on käsitteenä epäselvä. Tutkielman tarkoitus on hahmottaa ja selventää yhteiskuntavastuukeskustelussa käytettyjä käsitteitä ja teorioita. Sidosryhmäteoriasta on tullut keskeinen osa yhteiskuntavastuukeskustelua ja yhteiskuntavastuun muodostumisen selittäjä. Sidosryhmäteorian mukaan yritysten yhteiskuntavastuu koostuu erilaisista velvollisuuksista ja vastuista sidosryhmiään kohtaan. Sidosryhmät ovat tahoja, ihmisryhmiä tai entiteettejä, joihin yrityksen toiminta vaikuttaa, tai jotka ovat vaikuttaneet yrityksen toimintaan. Yritykset sidosryhmineen myös osittain mahdollistavat toistensa olemassaolon. Sidosryhmäteoria jäsentää yrityksen toimintaympäristöä ja siten yhteiskuntavastuu -käsitteen sisältöä. Tutkielma käsittelee sidosryhmäteorian suhdetta yhteiskuntavastuuseen ja erityisesti teorian moraalifilosofista viitekehystä. Esitän sidosryhmäteorian olevan seurauseettinen teoria, joka määrittelee yrityksen moraalisia velvollisuuksia. Yhteiskuntavastuu syntyy toisaalta yritysten toiminnan seurauksista sidosryhmille ja toisaalta sidosryhmien oikeuksien kunnioittamisesta. Seuraukset ja oikeudet ovat moraalisen velvollisuuden keskeisiä elementtejä. Tutkielmani keskittyy vastaamaan kysymyksiin, miksi ja miten yritys on vastuussa tai velvollinen sidosryhmille. Velvollisuuden rakentumiseen vastaan yhteiskuntavastuun sidosryhmäteorian, erityisesti R. Edward Freemanin muotoilun avulla ja Michael J. Zimmermanin moraalisen velvollisuuden käsitteen avulla. Yhdistämällä Freemanin ja Zimmermanin määritelmät esitän seurauseettisen sidosryhmäteorian moraaliseksi velvollisuudeksi seuraavaa määritelmää: ”Yrityksen pitää valita ja tehdä se teko, jonka voi tehdä, ja joka huomioi sidosryhmät, eli ryhmät ja yksilöt, joille koituu yrityksen toiminnasta seurauksia ja joiden oikeuksiin yrityksen toiminnalla on jotain vaikutuksia, siten, että teko aiheuttaa sidosryhmille enemmän hyötyä kuin haittaa sekä kunnioittaa sidosryhmien oikeuksia.” Zimmermanin ja Freemanin tekstien lisäksi keskeisiä lähteitä ovat useat yritysetiikka käsittelevät kokoelmateokset, kuten Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics (DesJardins & McCall 1985) ja Ethical Theory and Business (Beauchamp & Bowie 2001) Lopuksi esittelen moraalisen kollektiivisen agenttiuden ongelmaa, sillä usein esitetty kritiikki yhteiskuntavastuulle on, ettei kollektiivinen entiteetti kuten yritys voi kantaa moraalista vastuuta tai velvollisuutta. Esitän, ettei sidosryhmäteorian näkökulmasta kritiikki ole riittävä kumoamaan yrityksen moraalista velvollisuutta.

Film and literature in the legal classroom

The way in which law and lawyers are portrayed in popular film and literature is a fascinating subject not only for the social scientist but, more importantly, the lawyer and law student. Increasingly in law schools, films and classic literature with a legal theme are being used to identify various aspects of legal activity ranging from legal practice (i.e. intrinsic lawyer skills including legal argument, negotiation and advocacy) to various aspects of the legal process (e.g. the function of the judge and jury) as well as important elements of legal and ethical theory. This article focuses on the Law Through Film and Literature option which is offered to law students in the final year of their LLB (Hons) degree at Greenwich. The aim is to show how law-related film and literature can be a useful tool in the legal classroom, as well as providing some insights into how students have responded and developed as a result of their experiences on the course.

The good, the bad and the 'not so bad': reflecting on moral appraisal in practice

The aim of this paper is to facilitate reflection on the moral merit of practitioners in various contexts. Insight is gained from Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of moral character and an original framework for reflection is presented as an adjunct to ethical theory and principles considered when appraising others. In relation to states of character there is an irreconcilable difference between Kantian (deontic) and Aristotelian (aretaic) conceptions of the nature of full virtue (excellence of character), but at the same time it can be argued that in relation to practice their approaches complement each other. It is also argued that in relation to caring for the vulnerable, Aristotle’s conception of full virtue is more compelling than Kant’s. On the other hand, Kant’s notion of self - serving action is important in nursing and it therefore needs to be considered when reflecting on professional conduct. The conclusion reached is that Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of character appraisal should be used in a combined approach to moral appraisal. This approach draws on the accounts of both philosophers and offers valuable insight into moral character, professional conduct and, in a more formal setting, fitness to practise.

Dirty Hands and the Complicity of the Democratic Public

The alleged problem of the dirty hands of politicians has been much discussed since Michael Walzer’s original piece (Walzer 1974). The discussion has concerned the precise nature of the problem or sought to dissolve the apparent paradox. However there has been little discussion of the putative complicity, and thus also dirtying of hands, of a democratic public that authorizes politicians to act in its name. This article outlines the sense in which politicians do get dirty hands and the degree to which a democratic public may also get dirty hands. It separates the questions of secrecy, authorisation, and wrongfulness in order to spell out the extent of public complicity. Finally it addresses the ways in which those who do and those who do not acknowledge the problem of dirty hands erroneously discount or deny the problem of complicity by an appeal to the nature of democracy, a putatively essential need for political openness or to the scope of ideal theory.

Climate Change, national politics and grassroots action: an introduction

Climate change continues to dominate academic work within green/environmental politics. Indeed, there appears to be almost an inverse relationship between the lack of political leadership on tackling climate change and the growth in ever more sophisticated academic analyses of this complex and multifaceted problem. There is an increasing disjunction between the growth in our knowledge and understanding of the ethical, political, economic, sociological, cultural, and psychological aspects of climate change and the lack of political achievement in putting in place clear and binding targets, an agreed decarbonisation roadmap, and associated regulatory and policy instruments with enforcement. This gap might be taken as evidence that we do not need more reports on climate change. To quote that most unlikely of green politicians, Arnold Schwarzenegger, former Governor of California: ‘The debate is over. We know the science. We see the threat. And we know that the time for action is now’ (California Energy Commission 2007, p. 1). This special issue focuses on a variety of ways in which climate change is conceptualised in normative political and ethical theory, and addressed in policy and regulations.

'To do justice and judgement' : the place of passion in public life

Please consult the paper edition of this thesis to read. It is available on the 5th Floor of the Library at Call Number: Z 9999 P65 F47 2003

The Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Crisis and American Payday Lending: Two Studies in Vulnerability

Microcredit, a non-profit lending approach that is often championed as a source of women’s inclusion and empowerment, has in the past decade been followed by microfinance, a forprofit sibling of a different temperament. Microfinance in India is now in turmoil, precipitated by legislation in the state of Andhra Pradesh, which has encouraged withholding of payment, which in turn has frozen the market. This paper considers one precipitating condition of the crisis: the remarkable, new, and developing burden of formal economic debt that poor women in the state have only recently come to hold – debt that now surpasses one year’s family income, on average. The development of this lending sector follows upon innovation in lending to the poor of the global north over the past two decades, and the practices show noteworthy parallels. Both lending schemes have produced similar disproportionate burdens upon some low-status individuals within their respective economic orders, and both may exploit a vulnerability that is born of aspiration and produces great dysfunction for borrowers. This paper introduces the two lending schemes, sketches the parallels, and introduces the claim that ethical finance arrangements for the poor require attention to vulnerability, an under-utilized category in both liberal ethical theory and in finance.

Divulgación on-line de los códigos de buen gobierno en las IES y su determinación para el posicionamiento en el ranking QS

Dado el interés que se presenta con los temas de gobierno corporativo, este trabajo busca describir si la divulgación on-line de los contenidos de los códigos de buen gobierno, es determinante en el posicionamiento que tienen las Instituciones de Educación Superior (IES) en el ranking QS. Partiendo de una muestra de 20 IES, se recolectaron un conjunto de datos dicotómicos para 30 variables independientes y se relacionaron con la variable dependiente denominada posicionamiento en el ranking. A partir de lo anterior, se elaboró un trabajo descriptivo y correlacional con el fin de probar las hipótesis de investigación. Este estudio reveló que la divulgación on-line de los contenidos de los códigos de buen gobierno en las IES, no es determinante para el posicionamiento en el ranking QS.

Choices, chance and change: luck egalitarianism over time

The family of theories dubbed ‘luck egalitarianism’ represent an attempt to infuse egalitarian thinking with a concern for personal responsibility, arguing that inequalities are just when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, choice, but are unjust when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, luck. In this essay I argue that luck egalitarians should sometimes seek to limit inequalities, even when they have a fully choice-based pedigree (i.e., result only from the choices of agents). I grant that the broad approach is correct but argue that the temporal standpoint from which we judge whether the person can be held responsible, or the extent to which they can be held responsible, should be radically altered. Instead of asking, as Standard (or Static) Luck Egalitarianism seems to, whether or not, or to what extent, a person was responsible for the choice at the time of choosing, and asking the question of responsibility only once, we should ask whether, or to what extent, they are responsible for the choice at the point at which we are seeking to discover whether, or to what extent, the inequality is just, and so the question of responsibility is not settled but constantly under review. Such an approach will differ from Standard Luck Egalitarianism only if responsibility for a choice is not set in stone – if responsibility can weaken then we should not see the boundary between luck and responsibility within a particular action as static. Drawing on Derek Parfit’s illuminating discussions of personal identity, and contemporary literature on moral responsibility, I suggest there are good reasons to think that responsibility can weaken – that we are not necessarily fully responsible for a choice for ever, even if we were fully responsible at the time of choosing. I call the variant of luck egalitarianism that recognises this shift in temporal standpoint and that responsibility can weaken Dynamic Luck Egalitarianism (DLE). In conclusion I offer a preliminary discussion of what kind of policies DLE would support.