Sciences et technologies émergentes : pourquoi tant de promesses?

Les technosciences (numériques, bio- et nanotechnologies, neurosciences, médecine personnalisée, biologie de synthèse) sont accompagnées de promesses fabuleuses à l'attention du public et des décideurs. L'économie des promesses qui en résulte affecte le régime de financement de la recherche et la gouvernance du changement sociotechnique. Elle crée de l'engouement, soutient la compétition scientifique, attire des ressources financières et légitime d'importantes dépenses publiques. Cet ouvrage met en évidence les cycles accélérés d'enthousiasme et de désillusion, les décalages entre horizons d'attente et les questions démocratiques qu'ils soulèvent. Fondé sur des recherches de terrain relevant de l'étude sociale des sciences et des techniques, de la philosophie et de l'histoire, il examine les formes alternatives d'organisation de la recherche, de participation citoyenne et de répartition des droits de propriété et des bénéfices, et montre qu'une forme de ralentissement des promesses, non des sciences, favoriserait l'articulation de ces dernières avec les besoins de la société. L'ambition des textes réunis ici est d'ouvrir le débat en langue française en interrogeant directement le régime des promesses technoscientifiques.

Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

Intertemporal and Spatial Depletion of Landfills

This paper generalizes Hotelling's (1931) theory of nonrenewable resources to situations where resource pools and their users are distributed spacially. Extraction and transport costs are assumed to be linear in the rate of extraction, but utilization of each deposit may require a setup cost.

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia.

In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.

On the Optimal Order of Natural Resource Use When the Capacity of the Inexhaustible Substitute is Limited.

Consider a general equilibrium framework where the marginal cost of extraction from several deposits of an exhaustible resource is constant in terms of an inexhaustible perfect substitute and differs between deposits. the instantaneous rate of production form the inexhaustible resource is subject to a capacity constraint.

Private Storage of Common Property

This paper examines a characteristic of common property problems unmodeled in the published literature: Extracted common reserves are aften stored privately rather than immediately. We examine the positive and normative effects of such storage.