Differences and reasons in IASB accounting standards between small and large companies

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Implementing quality management systems in small and medium construction companies: a contribution to a road map for success

Leadership and Management in Engineering, January 2009

Effects of a monetary union on a small peripheral country: Stabilization and competitiveness in Portugal

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

A technology diffusion perspective of Enterprise Resource Planning across European Small and Medium Enterprises: from determinants to Use to Value

Tese apresentada como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Gestão de Informação

The Role of Small RNAs and Ribonucleases in the Control of Gene Expression in Salmonella Typhimurium

Dissertation presented to obtain the Ph.D degree in Biology

Interplay of Exoribonucleases, Hfq and Small RNAs Structural Determinants in the Control of Gene Expression

Dissertation presented to obtain the Ph.D degree in Biology

A framework for developing motion-based games

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Informática

An existence result for discontinuous games

We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and show that it, together with a weak form of payoff security, is enough to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave normal form games. We show that our result generalizes the pure strategy existence theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and that it is neither implied nor does it imply the existence theorems of Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) and Reny (1999). Furthermore, we show that an equilibrium may fail to exist when, while maintaining weak payoff security, weak upper semicontinuity is weakened to reciprocal upper semicontinuity.

On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games

Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a). The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games. In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games.

How to create a relevant pool of users for Mobitto

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Business model analysis of Mobitto: How to solve the chicken and egg problem of a multi-sided platform?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The Internationalization of a Portuguese small and medium enterprise: The case of Vale da Rosa

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Collusion and reciprocity in infinitely repeated games

This paper extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The main finding of the paper is that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games, that is, the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms are selfish. The paper also finds that the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with reciprocal firms is worse for consumers than the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with selfish firms.