Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.

Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure

We explore the implications for the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization when people spreferences for goods and services, which classic treatments of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972)place in the purview of local governments, exhibit specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970), orsolidarity. We find that a system in which the central government provides a common minimumlevel of the publicly provided good, and local governments are allowed to use their ownresources to provide an even higher local level, performs better from an efficiency perspectiverelative to all other systems analyzed for a relevant range of preferences over solidarity.

Openness, government size and the terms of trade

This paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size of government, both theoretically and empirically. We show that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels: (1) a terms of trade externality, whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and (2) the demand for insurance, whereby trade raises risk and public transfers. We provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms. First, we show how their relative strength depends on a key parameter, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Second, while the terms of trade externality leads to inefficiently large governments, the increase in public spending due to the demand for insurance is optimal. We show that large volumes of trade may result in welfare losses if the terms of trade externality is strong enough while small volumes of trade are always beneficial. Third, we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and the size of government and test whether it is consistent with the terms of trade externality or the demand for insurance. Our findings suggest that the positive relationship is remarkably robust and that the terms of trade externality may be the driving force behind it, thus raising warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments.

Optimal information transmission in organizations: Search and congestion

We propose a stylized model of a problem-solving organization whoseinternal communication structure is given by a fixed network. Problemsarrive randomly anywhere in this network and must find their way to theirrespective specialized solvers by relying on local information alone.The organization handles multiple problems simultaneously. For this reason,the process may be subject to congestion. We provide a characterization ofthe threshold of collapse of the network and of the stock of foatingproblems (or average delay) that prevails below that threshold. We buildupon this characterization to address a design problem: the determinationof what kind of network architecture optimizes performance for any givenproblem arrival rate. We conclude that, for low arrival rates, the optimalnetwork is very polarized (i.e. star-like or centralized ), whereas it islargely homogenous (or decentralized ) for high arrival rates. We also showthat, if an auxiliary assumption holds, the transition between these twoopposite structures is sharp and they are the only ones to ever qualify asoptimal.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement

When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design of the object being procured affects the resulting degree of competition. This paper highlights the interaction between theoptimal procurement mechanism and the design choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizingthe market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity.

The choice of titling system in land

This paper analyzes the choice of the socially optimal titling systemassuming rational individual choices about recording, assurance andregistration decisions. It focuses on the enforcement of propertyrights on land under private titling and the two existing publictitling systems, recording and registration. When the reduction in theexpected costs of eviction compensates the higher cost of initialregistration, it is more efficient to introduce a registration systemrather than a recording system. The development of private "titleassurance" improves the standing of recording as compared toregistration. This improvement depends, however, on the efficiency ofthe assurance technology and, also, on corrective taxation that isneeded to align individual optimization, which disregards the transferelement in eviction, with social objectives.

Nominal debt as a burden on monetary policy

We study the effects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate unanticipated inflation increases the cost of the outstanding debt even if no unanticipated inflation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the optimal sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively until these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commtiment to fiscal policy. If there is full commitment to an optimal fiscal policy, then the resulting monetary policy is the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Identification of optimal structural connectivity using functional connectivity and neural modeling.

The complex network dynamics that arise from the interaction of the brain's structural and functional architectures give rise to mental function. Theoretical models demonstrate that the structure-function relation is maximal when the global network dynamics operate at a critical point of state transition. In the present work, we used a dynamic mean-field neural model to fit empirical structural connectivity (SC) and functional connectivity (FC) data acquired in humans and macaques and developed a new iterative-fitting algorithm to optimize the SC matrix based on the FC matrix. A dramatic improvement of the fitting of the matrices was obtained with the addition of a small number of anatomical links, particularly cross-hemispheric connections, and reweighting of existing connections. We suggest that the notion of a critical working point, where the structure-function interplay is maximal, may provide a new way to link behavior and cognition, and a new perspective to understand recovery of function in clinical conditions.

Which is the optimal sampling strategy for habitat suitability modelling

Designing an efficient sampling strategy is of crucial importance for habitat suitability modelling. This paper compares four such strategies, namely, 'random', 'regular', 'proportional-stratified' and 'equal -stratified'- to investigate (1) how they affect prediction accuracy and (2) how sensitive they are to sample size. In order to compare them, a virtual species approach (Ecol. Model. 145 (2001) 111) in a real landscape, based on reliable data, was chosen. The distribution of the virtual species was sampled 300 times using each of the four strategies in four sample sizes. The sampled data were then fed into a GLM to make two types of prediction: (1) habitat suitability and (2) presence/ absence. Comparing the predictions to the known distribution of the virtual species allows model accuracy to be assessed. Habitat suitability predictions were assessed by Pearson's correlation coefficient and presence/absence predictions by Cohen's K agreement coefficient. The results show the 'regular' and 'equal-stratified' sampling strategies to be the most accurate and most robust. We propose the following characteristics to improve sample design: (1) increase sample size, (2) prefer systematic to random sampling and (3) include environmental information in the design'