E501 ESAPP Project Report 2003

Annual project report. Project description, budget, impact, achievement of objectives and outputs, and appraisal by Management Team.

E410 ESAPP Project Report 2004

Annual project report. Project description, budget, impact, achievement of objectives and outputs, and appraisal by Management Team.

E306 ESAPP Project Report 2004

Annual project report. Project description, budget, impact, achievement of objectives and outputs, and appraisal by Management Team.

E503 ESAPP Project Report 2004

Annual project report. Project description, budget, impact, achievement of objectives and outputs, and appraisal by Management Team.

E307 ESAPP Project Report 2004

Annual project report. Project description, budget, impact, achievement of objectives and outputs, and appraisal by Management Team.

E207 ESAPP Project Report 2004

Annual project report. Project summary, list of outputs, follow-up activities, appraisal by Management Team and budget

E411 ESAPP Project Report 2004

Annual project report. Project description, budget, impact, achievement of objectives and outputs, and appraisal by Management Team.

E605 ESAPP Project Report 2004

Annual project report. Project description, budget, impact, achievement of objectives and outputs, and appraisal by Management Team.

E603 ESAPP Project Report 2004

Annual project report. Project description, budget, impact, achievement of objectives and outputs, and appraisal by Management Team.

E606 ESAPP Project Report 2004

Annual project report. Project description, budget, impact, achievement of objectives and outputs, and appraisal by Management Team.

E607 ESAPP Project Report 2004

Annual project report. Project description, budget, impact, achievement of objectives and outputs, and appraisal by Management Team.

E204 ESAPP Project Report 2004

Annual project report. Project description, budget, impact, achievement of objectives and outputs, and appraisal by Management Team.

Transfer Pricing in the Decentralized Multinational Corporation

This paper considers how the multinational corporation's transfer price responds to changes in international corporate effective tax rates. It extends the decentralized decision-making analysis of transfer pricing in the context of different tax rates. It adopts and extends Bond's (1980) model of the decentralized multinational corporation that assumes centralized transfer pricing. The direction of transfer price change is as expected, while the magnitude of change is likely to be less than predicted by the Horst (1971), centralized decision-making model. The paper extends the model further by assuming negotiated transfer pricing, where the analysis is partitioned into perfect and imperfect information cases. The negotiated transfer pricing result reverts to the Horst (1971), or centralized decision-making, result, under perfect information. Under imperfect information, the centralized decision-making result obtains when top management successfully informs division general managers or it successfully implements a non-monetary reward scheme to encourage division general managers to cooperate. Under simplifying assumptions, centralized decision-making dominates decentralized decision-making, while negotiated transfer pricing weakly dominates centralized transfer pricing.

President Chain Store Corporation's Hsu Chong-Jen: A Case Study of a Salaried Manager in Taiwan

Salaried managers have been increasing in top management of many Taiwanese companies. Why and how have their roles become more important? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the complicated relationships between salaried managers and the founders' families who appoint them to top-management positions. This paper examines the case of Hsu Chung-Jen, the president of President Chain Store Corporation. PCSC operates Taiwan's 7-ELEVENs, the largest convenience store chain on the island. He may be regarded as the most advanced salaried manager in Taiwan today.

Executive Managers in Large Mexican Family Businesses

The involvement of members of owners' families in the running of large family businesses in Mexico is decreasing. Although family members still hold key posts such as that of CEO, other executive posts tend to be delegated to professional salaried managers. Top managers, including family members, share some common characteristics. They are young compared with managers in other developed countries, their quality as human resources is high, and many of them are graduates of overseas MBA courses. Most of them are sufficiently experienced. Improvement of quality among top managers is a recent phenomenon in Mexico, and has been encouraged mainly by the following two factors. First, globalization of business activities was promoted by intense competition among firms under conditions of market liberalization. In order to equip themselves with the ability to cope with the globalization of their operations, large family businesses tried hard to improve the quality of top management, by training and educating existing managers, and/or by recruiting managers in the outside labor market. Second, developments in the Mexican economy during the 1990s led to a growth in the labor market for top managers Thus, business restructuring caused by bankruptcy, as well as mergers and acquisitions, privatization and so on, led to the dismissal of business managers who then entered the labor market in large numbers. The increasing presence of these managers in the labor market helped family businesses to recruit well-qualified senior executives.