929 resultados para Suárez, Isidoro Ramón José, 1799-1846.
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Discorre sobre o significado da construção de Brasília e sua irreversibilidade. Apresenta dados sobre os custos desta, que desmentem as notícias sobre o fato. Enumera as medidas que necessitam serem tomadas para a consolidação da capital federal e solicita aos deputados a dar tramitação aos projetos pendentes para este fim.
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Fecha: 10-10-1936/31-1-1939 / Unidad de instalación: Carpeta 25 - Expediente 21 / Nº de pág.: 33 (28 mecanografiadas, 5 manuscritas)
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In real life strategic interactions, decision-makers are likely to entertain doubts about the degree of optimality of their play. To capture this feature of real choice-making, we present here a model based on the doubts felt by an agent about how well is playing a game. The doubts are coupled with (and mutually reinforced by) imperfect discrimination capacity, which we model here by means of similarity relations. We assume that each agent builds procedural preferences de ned on the space of expected payoffs-strategy frequencies attached to his current strategy. These preferences, together with an adaptive learning process lead to doubt-based selection dynamic systems. We introduce the concepts of Mixed Strategy Doubt Equilibria, Mixed Strategy Doubt-Full Equilibria and Mixed Strategy Doubtless Equilibria and show the theoretical and the empirical relevance of these concepts.
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Resumo da vida pública de José Bonifácio Lafayette de Andrada, em sua fase republicana. Inclui bibliografia, discursos, editoriais, prefácios, estudos históricos, artigos, conferências, recensões, entrevistas e declarações à imprensa.
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Binmore and Samuelson (1999) have shown that perturbations (drift) are crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria. We contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift. In particular, this article introduces a microeconomic model of drift based on the similarity theory developed by Tversky (1977), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Rubinstein (1988),(1998). An innovation with respect to those works is that we deal with similarity relations that are derived from the perception that each agent has about how well he is playing the game. In addition, the similarity relations are adapted to a dynamic setting. We obtain different models of drift depending on how we model the agent´s assessment of his behaviour in the game. The examples of the ultimatum game and the chain-store game are used to show the conditions for each model to stabilize elements in the component of Nash equilibria that are not subgame- perfect. It is also shown how some models approximate the laboratory data about those games while others match the data.
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Drift appears to be crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria in a component specifying different out-of-equilibrium behaviour. We propose a new microeconomic model of drift to be added to the learning process by which agents find their way to equilibrium. A key feature of the model is the sensitivity of the noisy agent to the proportion of agents in his player population playing the same strategy as his current one. We show that, 1. Perturbed Payoff-Positive and PayoffMonotone selection dynamics are capable of stabilizing pure non strict Nash equilibria in either singleton or nonsingleton component of equilibria; 2. The model is relevant to understand the role of drift in the behaviour observed in the laboratory for the Ultimatum Game and for predicting outcomes that can be experimentally tested. Hence, the selection dynamics model perturbed with the proposed drift may be seen as well as a new learning tool to understand observed behaviour.
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Fecha: 29-9-1947 / Unidad de instalación: Carpeta 25 - Expediente 23-4 / Nº de pág.: 1 (mecanografiada)
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Fecha: 29-12-1937 original (>1970 copia) / Unidad de instalación: Carpeta 48 - Expediente 8-9 / Nº de pág.: 3 (mecanografiadas)
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Fecha: 26-2-1985 / Unidad de instalación: Carpeta 48 - Expediente 7-8 / Nº de pág.: 4 (mecanografiadas)
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7 p.
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10 p.
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Coleção Marcio Moreira Alves.