389 resultados para Shareholders
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Corporate governance can be understood like a management model that aims to build a good relationship between managers, controllers, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Implement corporate governance in an organization often requires a cultural change. Corporate governance as an organizational model needs reinforce cultural behaviors of its members so as which support the principles and values that increment the relationship between the organization and its stakeholders. The process of corporate structuring of an organization is largely determined by culture. Being the culture a set of organizational values that distinguishes one organization of other, it is natural that these organizations find adjustment difficulties during the implementation of international values. The organizations in the context of corporate governance can t think and act over themselves, but instead must think and take action on a set of actors who are strongly linked with them in order to achieve the same goals and objectives planned.
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Pós-graduação em Direito - FCHS
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In uncertainly economic scenarios, an economic feasibility analysis must be done to accept a project based on investment criteria, such as NPV and IRR, mainly because the shareholders tend to invest their budget in a project if it has a great chance to return their investments. The studied company outsources all of its foundry services, what makes it very dependent of its suppliers, because the products have a lower quality level, long delivery periods and high prices. Therefore, this work will analyze the project of building an iron-casting foundry to decrease the dependence of its suppliers. In order to develop this research, all needed data related to the construction of the foundry and sales were collected to create deterministic and probabilistic (Monte Carlo Simulation) cash flows using MsExcel® and Oracle's Crystal Ball® software. As a result, the project was found to be risky by the NPV and IRR in the case of this new production line supplying only the internal needs. However, when the company offers its services to the foundry market, the project turns to be feasible
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The importance of the capital market to Brazilian economic development, linked to the the fragility of a theoretical framework on the issue, case for developing this research. The agents operating in the capital market seek security and confidence for decision making on their investment in that sense we seek to address the concept and values of Corporate Governance to pay in the Brazilian capital market. The Corporate Governance, in its essence, is the system by which companies are directed and monitored, involving the relationship between shareholders and the board of companies, as well as a set of mechanisms and factors intended to minimize market failures. Seeking to confirm adherence to a more advanced system of corporate governance can result in a favorable financial performance, companies were investigated operating in the financial sector (intermediation, various services and insurance), listed by BM&FBOVESPA. The stock market ranks the corporate governance systems in three levels: Level 1 (rudimentary), Level 2 (intermediate) and New Market Level (advanced). To earn the impact of different levels of Corporate Governance for the outcome of the selected companies were calculated and analyzed accounting ratios of profitability, capital structure and liquidity from the Standardized Financial Statements (DFP), base year 2011, 2012 and 2013
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Executive compensation includes components intended to acquire and retain executives as well as to align their goals with those of shareholders. This paper focuses on retention compensation, commonly known as "golden handcuffs", including stock options, long-term incentive plans and restricted stock. The extant literature examines CEOs that change jobs despite their golden handcuffs, and argues that such compensation is not an effective means of executive retention. In this paper, I compare the golden handcuffs of a set of CEOs who change jobs to a matched set of those who do not in order to determine the efficacy of such compensation for executive retention. I find that restricted stock is positively related to CEO turnover whereas stock options are negatively related.
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This research examines the impact of a CEO’s statements of aggressiveness on his or her organization’s competitive moves and subsequent performance. Hypotheses were developed based on previous work in Upper Echelon Theory and competitive dynamics. Based on this prior literature, it was hypothesized aggressive statements by CEOs will be associated with more aggressive organizations. It was also hypothesized these more aggressive organizations would display better performance than less aggressive organizations. A content analysis of letters to shareholders and trade publications was performed. This data was analyzed using multiple regression in SPSS 17 to test the hypotheses that aggressive statements by CEOs are associated with aggressive organizations and higher performance. Aggression scores for the content analysis were generated using the software package DICTION. The sample for the study was the organizations with the most revenue in two industries, automobile manufacturing and retailing. Data collection covered a five-year time span from 2003-2007, with performance data lagged one year. Control variables employed included CEO tenure, CEO background, organization size, and organization age. The findings indicate that CEO statements of aggressiveness do not significantly impact the competitive aggressiveness or the performance of their organizations. The implications of these findings are discussed and potential avenues for future research in the area are outlined.
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Background: Exercise training is a non-pharmacological strategy for treatment of heart failure. Exercise training improves functional capacity and quality of life in patients. Moreover, exercise training reduces muscle sympathetic nerve activity (MSNA) and peripheral vasoconstriction. However, most of these studies have been conducted in middle-aged patients. Thus, the effects of exercise training in older patients are much less understood. The present study was undertaken to investigate whether exercise training improves functional capacity, muscular sympathetic activation and muscular blood flow in older heart failure patients, as it does in middle-aged heart failure patients. Design: Fifty-two consecutive outpatients with heart failure from the database of the Unit of Cardiovascular Rehabilitation and Physiology Exercise were divided by age (middle-aged, defined as 45-59 years, and older, defined as 60-75 years) and exercise status (trained and untrained). Methods: MSNA was recorded directly from the peroneal nerve using the microneurography technique. Forearm Blood Flow (FBF) was measured by venous occlusion plethysmography. Functional capacity was evaluated by cardiopulmonary exercise test. Results: Exercise training significantly and similarly increased FBF and peak VO2 in middle-aged and older heart failure patients. In addition, exercise training significantly and similarly reduced MSNA and forearm vascular resistance in these patients. No significant changes were found in untrained patients. Conclusion: Exercise training improves neurovascular control and functional capacity in heart failure patients regardless of age.
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The present research aims to study the special rights other than shares in Spanish Law and the protection of their holders in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union frame. Special rights other than shares are recognised as an independent legal category within legal systems of some EU Member States, such as Germany or Spain, through the implementation of the Third Directive 78/855/CEE concerning mergers of public limited liability companies. The above-cited Directive contains a special regime of protection for the holders of securities, other than shares, to which special rights are attached, consisting of being given rights in the acquiring company, at least equivalent to those they possessed in the company being acquired. This safeguard is to highlight the intimate connection between this type of rights and the company whose extinction determines the existence of those. Pursuant to the Directive 2005/56/CE on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, each company taking part in these operations shall comply with the safeguards of members and third parties provided in their respective national law to which is subject. In this regard, the protection for holders of special rights other than shares shall be ruled by the domestic M&A regime. As far as Spanish Law are concerned, holders of these special rights are recognized a right of merger information, in the same terms as shareholders, as well as equal rights in the company resulting from the cross-border merger. However, these measures are not enough guarantee for a suitable protection, thus considering those holders of special rights as special creditors, sometimes it will be necessary to go to the general protection regime for creditors. In Spanish Law, it would involve the recognition of right to the merger opposition, whose exercise would prevent the operation was completed until ensuring equal rights.
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Il tema oggetto della presente tesi di dottorato trae spunto dall'analisi dell'art. 2468 c.c. nel quale può dirsi contenuto il nucleo fondamentale della disciplina della partecipazione sociale. In primo luogo vi è un'analisi comparata dell'istituto in esame con quelli previsti negli altri paesi europei. Dopo una breve analisi di diritto comparato ci si è concentrati sulla legislazione italiana ed, in particolare, l'elaborato cerca di dare una risposta ai seguenti interrogativi: a) quali sono i “particolari diritti” ex art. 2468 c.c.? b) si può parlare di “categorie speciali di partecipazioni”? Con riferimento al primo interrogativo va considerato che il modello legale prevede che i diritti particolari attribuibili ai soci riguardano l’amministrazione della società o la distribuzione degli utili. Tale disciplina sussiste quando l’atto costitutivo attribuisce i particolari diritti senza disporre nulla sulla loro trasferibilità, modificabilità ed inerenza alla partecipazione sociale piuttosto che alla persona del socio. Ci si è chiesti quali siano i confini delle due categorie espressamente previste dall’art. 2468, 3 c.c. e se tale previsione sia tassativa piuttosto che esemplificativa, aprendosi quindi la strada alla libera determinabilità dei diritti sociali, alla stregua di quanto sancisce l’art. 2348, 2 c.c., in merito alle azioni “speciali”. Si giunge così alla conclusione che la previsione sia esemplificativa e che anche nelle s.r.l. le parti sono libere di attribuire ai soci diritti sociali diversi da quelli derivanti dal modello legale, nei limiti derivanti da specifiche norme imperative. Nel secondo capitolo sono stati approfonditi i principi dettati dall’art. 2468 c.c., la natura di tali "particolari diritti" ed i loro profili di qualificazione nonché le loro esplicazioni contenutistiche Nel terzo capitolo si è analizzato cosa accade ai "particolari diritti" in caso di vicende modificative. Nel quarto capitolo poi è stato affrontata la controversa questione relativa alla possibilità di creare delle “categorie di quote”.
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Scopo della presente trattazione è quello di andare ad osservare in che modo il legislatore della riforma abbia cercato di offrire una disciplina ad un fenomeno sempre più in espansione nell’economia italiana: i gruppi di impresa. In particolare, l’elaborato è composto da 3 nuclei. Il primo analizza la disciplina, introdotta nel 2003, relativa all’attività di direzione e coordinamento (art. 2497 c.c. e ss) rintracciandone le regole generali e il rapporto con le norme del codice civile. Una seconda parte approfondisce gli elementi costitutivi dell'attivita' di direzione e coordinamento, i presupposti affinche' si possa configurare una responsabilita' da parte della societa' capogruppo e i soggetti conivolti all'interno di un gruppo. La terza parte e' invece dedicata allo studio delle problematiche legate all’azione risarcitoria introdotta con la disposizione di cui all’art. 2497 c.c., soprattutto confrontando la posizione dei soci di minoranza con quella dei creditori sociali. In particolare, vengono descritte le modalità con le quali i soci e i creditori sociali possono esercitare l’azione a tutela dei propri interessi e dunque tentare di trovare pieno ristoro ai danni sofferti; danni che in qualche modo risultano legati alle scelte operate dal gruppo di comando e, più tecnicamente, dalla società che esercita l’attività di direzione e coordinamento, la c.d. capogruppo.
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La costruzione di un modello efficiente di corporate governance deve offrire una disciplina adeguata dei doveri contabili. Ciò nonostante, gli ordinamenti giuridici configurano i doveri di contabilità in modo incompleto, giacché l’inadempimento di questi non comporta una sanzione diretta per il soggetto inadempiente. Come informazione sulla situazione economica e finanziaria della società, esiste un interesse pubblico nella contabilità, e questa può servire come base di giudizio a soggetti interni ed esterni all’impresa, nell’adozione delle sue scelte. Disporre di un’informazione falsa o inesatta al riguardo può comportare un danno ingiustificato alla società stessa, ai soci o ai terzi, che potranno esercitare le azioni precise per il risarcimento del danno cagionato. Per evitare la produzione di questi danni, da una prospettiva preventiva, la corporate governance delle società di capitali può prevedere dei meccanismi di controllo che riducano il rischio di offrire un’informazione sbagliata. Questi controlli potranno essere esercitati da soggetti interni o esterni (revisori legali) alla struttura della società, ed avranno una configurazione diversa a seconda che le società adottino una struttura monistica o dualistica di governance. Questo ci colloca di fronte ad una eventuale situazione di concorrenza delle colpe, giacché i diversi soggetti che intervengono nel processo d’elaborazione dell’informazione contabile versano la sua attuazione sullo stesso documento: il bilancio. Risulta dunque cruciale determinare il contributo effettivo di ciascuno per analizzare il suo grado di responsabilità nella produzione del danno.
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This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.
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This dissertation investigates corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. This topic has recently attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the world and currently remains one of the most discussed topics in Banking. The core of the dissertation is constituted by three papers. The first paper generalizes the main achievements in the field of relevant study using the approach of meta-analysis. The second paper provides an empirical analysis of the effect of banking corporate governance on dividend payout. Finally, the third paper investigates empirically the effect of government bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. The dissertation uses a new hand-collected data set with information on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation structure for a sample of listed banks from 15 European countries for the period 2005-2010. The empirical papers employ such econometric approaches as Within-Group model, difference-in-difference technique, and propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. The main empirical results may be summarized as follows. First, we provide evidence that CEO power and connection to government are associated with lower dividend payout ratios. This result supports the view that banking regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the bank, and powerful bank CEOs can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the expense of minority shareholders. Next, we find that government bailout during 2007-2010 changes the banks’ ownership structure and helps to keep lending by bailed bank at the pre-crisis level. Finally, we provide robust evidence for increased control over the banks that receive government money. These findings show the important role of government when overcoming the consequences of the banking crisis, and high quality of governance of public bailouts in European countries.
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The dissertation contains five parts: An introduction, three major chapters, and a short conclusion. The First Chapter starts from a survey and discussion of the studies on corporate law and financial development literature. The commonly used methods in these cross-sectional analyses are biased as legal origins are no longer valid instruments. Hence, the model uncertainty becomes a salient problem. The Bayesian Model Averaging algorithm is applied to test the robustness of empirical results in Djankov et al. (2008). The analysis finds that their constructed legal index is not robustly correlated with most of the various stock market outcome variables. The second Chapter looks into the effects of minority shareholders protection in corporate governance regime on entrepreneurs' ex ante incentives to undertake IPO. Most of the current literature focuses on the beneficial part of minority shareholder protection on valuation, while overlooks its private costs on entrepreneur's control. As a result, the entrepreneur trade-offs the costs of monitoring with the benefits of cheap sources of finance when minority shareholder protection improves. The theoretical predictions are empirically tested using panel data and GMM-sys estimator. The third Chapter investigates the corporate law and corporate governance reform in China. The corporate law in China regards shareholder control as the means to the ends of pursuing the interests of stakeholders, which is inefficient. The Chapter combines the recent development of theories of the firm, i.e., the team production theory and the property rights theory, to solve such problem. The enlightened shareholder value, which emphasizes on the long term valuation of the firm, should be adopted as objectives of listed firms. In addition, a move from the mandatory division of power between shareholder meeting and board meeting to the default regime, is proposed.
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A fronte dal recepimento del direttiva SHR nel nostro ordinamento, realizzato dal d.lgs. 27/2010, il presente lavoro si propone anzitutto di analizzare l'attuale ruolo della delega di voto - sollecitata e non - per poi verificare quale sia l'interesse concretamente sotteso a un voto così esercitato, con particolare attenzione alla sollecitazione di deleghe di voto, oggi destinata espressamente (per la prevalente dottrina) a consentire al promotore il perseguimento di interessi propri. Le considerazioni riguardo all'interesse concretamente sotteso al voto esercitato per delega portano a vagliarne la rilevanza ai fini della nozione di controllo, ex art. 2359 c.c., la quale esclude espressamente dai voti rilevanti esclusivamente quelli esercitati "per conto terzi", e non, dunque, anche quelli esercitati nell'interesse proprio da un soggetto non titolare della partecipazione. Viene quindi affrontata la principale critica ad un controllo raggiunto per tale via e, più in generale, attraverso una delle varie forme di dissociazione tra titolarità della partecipazione e legittimazione all'esercizio del voto ad essa relativo, ovvero la apparente mancanza di stabilità. Considerando tuttavia che ogni ipotesi di controllo c.d. di fatto per definizione non gode di stabilità se non si scelga di ammettere una valutazione di tale requisito necessariamente prognostica ed ex ante, si giunge alla conclusione che la fattispecie di un controllo acquisito tramite sollecitazione di deleghe si distingue da altre ipotesi di controllo di fatto esclusivamente per la maggiore difficoltà dell'accertamento in fatto del requisito della stabilità. Si affronta infine la possibilità di garantire il diritto di exit (ovvero una tutela risarcitoria) del socio di minoranza che veda modificate le condizioni di rischio del proprio investimento a causa di una modifica del soggetto controllante derivante da sollecitazione di deleghe, tramite applicazione diretta della disciplina OPA ovvero riconducendo la fattispecie all'art. 2497quater, lett. d, ove ne ricorrano i presupposti.