Spectral efficiency in reference-signal-assisted low-power wireless communication

Expressions relating spectral efficiency, power and Doppler spectrum are derived for low-power Rayleighfaded wireless channels with proper complex signaling. Noside information on the state of the channel is assumed at the receiver. Rather, periodic reference signals are postulated inaccordance with the functioning of most wireless systems. In contrast with most previous studies, which relied on block-fading channel models, a continuous-fading model is adopted. This embeds the Doppler spectrum directly in thederived expressions thereby imbuing them with practical significance.

Large-system analysis of a CDMA dynamic channel under a Markovian input process

We study the minimum mean square error (MMSE) and the multiuser efficiency η of large dynamic multiple access communication systems in which optimal multiuser detection is performed at the receiver as the number and the identities of active users is allowed to change at each transmission time. The system dynamics are ruled by a Markov model describing the evolution of the channel occupancy and a large-system analysis is performed when the number of observations grow large. Starting on the equivalent scalar channel and the fixed-point equation tying multiuser efficiency and MMSE, we extend it to the case of a dynamic channel, and derive lower and upper bounds for the MMSE (and, thus, for η as well) holding true in the limit of large signal–to–noise ratios and increasingly large observation time T.

Efficiency-based evaluation of aligners for industrial applications

This paper presents a novel efficiencybased evaluation of sentence and word aligners. This assessment is critical in order to make a reliable use in industrial scenarios. The evaluation shows that the resourcesrequired by aligners differ rather broadly. Subsequently, we establish limitation mechanisms on a set of aligners deployed as web services. These results, paired with the quality expected from the aligners, allow providers to choose the most appropriate aligner according to the task at hand.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Efficiency of recombinant human TNF in human cancer therapy.

Recombinant human tumour necrosis factor (TNF) has a selective effect on angiogenic vessels in tumours. Given that it induces vasoplegia, its clinical use has been limited to administration through isolated limb perfusion (ILP) for regionally advanced melanomas and soft tissue sarcomas of the limbs. When combined with the alkylating agent melphalan, a single ILP produces a very high objective response rate. In melanoma, the complete response (CR) rate is around 80% and the overall objective response rate greater than 90%. In soft tissue sarcomas that are inextirpable, ILP is a neoadjuvant treatment resulting in limb salvage in 80% of the cases. The CR rate averages 20% and the objective response rate is around 80%. The mode of action of TNF-based ILP involves two distinct and successive effects on the tumour-associated vasculature: first, an increase in endothelium permeability leading to improved chemotherapy penetration within the tumour tissue, and second, a selective killing of angiogenic endothelial cells resulting in tumour vessel destruction. The mechanism whereby these events occur involves rapid (of the order of minutes) perturbation of cell-cell adhesive junctions and inhibition of alphavbeta3 integrin signalling in tumour-associated vessels, followed by massive death of endothelial cells and tumour vascular collapse 24 hours later. New, promising approaches for the systemic use of TNF in cancer therapy include TNF targeting by means of single chain antibodies or endothelial cell ligands, or combined administration with drugs perturbing integrin-dependent signalling and sensitizing angiogenic endothelial cells to TNF-induced death.

Strong minimax lower bounds for learning

Minimax lower bounds for concept learning state, for example, thatfor each sample size $n$ and learning rule $g_n$, there exists a distributionof the observation $X$ and a concept $C$ to be learnt such that the expectederror of $g_n$ is at least a constant times $V/n$, where $V$ is the VC dimensionof the concept class. However, these bounds do not tell anything about therate of decrease of the error for a {\sl fixed} distribution--concept pair.\\In this paper we investigate minimax lower bounds in such a--stronger--sense.We show that for several natural $k$--parameter concept classes, includingthe class of linear halfspaces, the class of balls, the class of polyhedrawith a certain number of faces, and a class of neural networks, for any{\sl sequence} of learning rules $\{g_n\}$, there exists a fixed distributionof $X$ and a fixed concept $C$ such that the expected error is larger thana constant times $k/n$ for {\sl infinitely many n}. We also obtain suchstrong minimax lower bounds for the tail distribution of the probabilityof error, which extend the corresponding minimax lower bounds.

Minimax lower bounds for the two-armed bandit problem

We obtain minimax lower bounds on the regret for the classicaltwo--armed bandit problem. We provide a finite--sample minimax version of the well--known log $n$ asymptotic lower bound of Lai and Robbins. Also, in contrast to the log $n$ asymptotic results on the regret, we show that the minimax regret is achieved by mere random guessing under fairly mild conditions on the set of allowable configurations of the two arms. That is, we show that for {\sl every} allocation rule and for {\sl every} $n$, there is a configuration such that the regret at time $n$ is at least 1 -- $\epsilon$ times the regret of random guessing, where $\epsilon$ is any small positive constant.

Contagion and efficiency in gross and net interbank payment systems

The increased fragility of the banking industry has generatedgrowing concern about the risks associated with the paymentsystems. Although in most industrial countries differentinterbank payment systems coexist, little is really knownabout their propierties in terms of risk and efficiency. Wetackle this question by comparing the two main types ofpayment systems, gross and net, in a framework whereuncertainty arises from several sources: the time ofconsumption, the location of consumption and the return oninvestment. Payments across locations can be made either bydirectly transferrring liquidity or by transferring claimsagainst the bank in the other location. The two mechanism areinterpreted as the gross and net settlement systems ininterbank payments. We characterize the equilibria in the twosystems and identify the trade-off in terms of safety andefficiency.