Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach

We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups.

Game over : empieza el juego.

El artículo forma parte de una sección de la revista dedicada a innovación educativa: el valor educativo de los videojuegos

Desarrollo de las competencias de colaboraci??n con el uso del Serious Game MetaVals

Resumen basado en el de la publicaci??n

Find the difference! : eye tracking study on information seeking behavior using an online game

With the advent of digital era web applications have become inevitable part of our lives. We are using the web to manage even the financially or ethically sensitive issues. For this reason exploration of information seeking behavior is an exciting area of research. Current study provides insight on information seeking behavior using a classic ‘Find the Difference’ game. 50 university students between the age of 19 and 26 participated in the study. Eye movement data were recorded with a Tobii T120 device. Participants carried out 4 continuous tasks. Each task included two pictures side by side with 7 hidden differences. After finishing the tasks, participants were asked to repeat the game with the same picture set. This data collection methodology allows the evaluation of learning curves. Additionally, participants were asked about their hand preference. For the purpose of analysis the following metrics were applied: task times (including saccades), fixation count and fixation duration (without saccades). The right- and left-hand side on each picture was selected as AOI (Area of Interest) to detect side preference in connection with hand preference. Results suggest a significant difference between male and female participants regarding aggregated task times (male 58.37s respectively female 68.37s), deviation in the number of fixations and fixation duration (apparently female have less but longer fixations) and also in the distribution of fixations between AOIs. Using eyetracking data current paper highlights the similarities and differences in information acquisition strategies respectively reveals gender and education (Arts vs. Sciences) dependent characteristics of interaction.

The EEAS and the Eastern Partnership: let the blame game stop. CEPS Commentary, 4 September 2012

In the first year and a half of its existence, the EEAS and its head have become the target of extensive criticism for the shortcomings of EU foreign policy; shortcomings that in fact date back to the creation of the European Union. The EU’s diplomatic service has been blamed variously for ‘lacking clarity,’ ‘acting too slowly’ and ‘being unable to bridge the institutional divide’. In this Commentary author Hrant Kostanyan argues that the EEAS’ discretionary power in the Eastern Partnership multilateral framework is restricted by the decision-making procedures between a wide range of stakeholders: the member states and the partner countries, as well as by the EU institutions, international organisations and the Civil Society Forum. Since this decision-making process places a substantial number of brakes on the discretionary power of the EEAS, any responsible analysis or critique of the service should take these constraints into consideration. Ultimately, the EEAS is only able to craft EU foreign policy insofar as it is allowed to do so.

Turing Test: Mindless Game?

The Turing Test, originally configured for a human to distinguish between an unseen man and unseen woman through a text-based conversational measure of gender, is the ultimate test for thinking. So conceived Alan Turing when he replaced the woman with a machine. His assertion, that once a machine deceived a human judge into believing that they were the human, then that machine should be attributed with intelligence. But is the Turing Test nothing more than a mindless game? We present results from recent Loebner Prizes, a platform for the Turing Test, and find that machines in the contest appear conversationally worse rather than better, from 2004 to 2006, showing a downward trend in highest scores awarded to them by human judges. Thus the machines are not thinking in the same way as a human intelligent entity would.