Monetary arrangements for emerging economies

In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.

Ataques especulativos sobre dívidas e regimes monetários

A tese pretende conhecer de forma profunda a metodologia de ataques especulativos sobre dívidas, desenvolvida por Cole e Kehoe (1996), e tem três objetivos principais: (i) aplicá-la a outros países, além do México, que é feito na versão original; (ii) entender a opção de um país dolarizar, em relação à alternativa de manter sua moeda local, quando a economia depende da entrada de capitais financeiros internacionais; e (iii) estudar a união monetária como uma terceira alternativa de regime monetário, em comparação com a dolarização e o regime de moeda local. O modelo de crises da dívida de Cole-Kehoe é aplicado às economias da Coréia, da Rússia e do Brasil. Modifica-se este modelo para incluir dívida denominada em moeda local, que é totalmente adquirida pelos consumidores nacionais e que dá ao governo a possibilidade de obter receitas por meio da cobrança de um imposto inflacionário sobre estes ativos. As receitas obtidas desta forma podem ser utilizadas para pagar os banqueiros internacionais e evitar uma crise da dívida externa, que ocorreria, em caso contrário. Considera-se também, neste caso, que o banco central possa estar sujeito a pressões de seu governo para gerar estas receitas. Analogamente, para representar um país pertencente a uma união monetária, inclui-se dívida denominada em moeda comum e um governo central no modelo original. A política monetária da união está subordinada à decisão conjunta de todos os países membros. Supõe-se também que o banco central da união possa sofrer pressões políticas de alguns governos nacionais sem disciplina fiscal e dispostos a obter receitas de imposto inflacionário sobre a dívida. Na dolarização, a política monetária está submetida a do banco central do país âncora e, portanto, não há possibilidade de o governo gerar receitas extraordinárias sobre a dívida, a menos que haja forte simetria dos choques que atingem a economia dolarizada e o país âncora. Considerando estas peculiaridades dos três regimes monetários, os níveis de bem-estar são caracterizados e avaliados numericamente para o Brasil. Além disso, obtém-se a política ótima do governo para a dívida em dólar, segundo os três regimes.

Essays on international finance, default and inflation

This thesis is composed by three papers, each one of them corresponding to one chapter. The first and the second chapters are essays on international finance appraising default and inflation as equilibrium outcomes for crisis time, in particular, for confidence crisis time that leads to speculative attack on the external public debt issued by emerging economies. With this background in mind, welfare effects from adopting common currency (chapter 1) and welfare effects from increasing the degree of economic openness (chapter 2) are analyzed in numerical exercises, based on DSGE framework. Cross-countries results obtained are then presented to be compared with empirical evidence and to help on understanding past policy decisions. Some policy prescriptions are also suggested. In the third chapter we look to the inflation targeting regime applied to emerging economies that are subject to adverse shocks, like the external debt crisis presented in the previous chapters. Based on a more theoretical approach, we appraise how pre commitment framework should be used to coordinate expectations when policymaker announcement has no full credibility and self fulfilling inflation may be possible.

Hedge Funds como Potencializadores de Ataques Especulativos

Esta dissertação tem por objetivo investigar a hipótese de que os Hedge Funds, com sua maneira agressiva de operar e de se alavancar nos mercados financeiros, seriam capazes de potencializar os ataques especulativQs so.fIidos por diversos países nos últimos anos. Como referencial teórico, foram apresentados os modelos maIS discutidos de CrIses cambiais de pnmeIra, segunda e terceira geração. Ainda para sustentar a conclusão de que os Hedge Funds potencializam os ataques especulativos, apresentamos o papel desempenhado pelos Hedge Funds nas recentes cnses cambiais como referencial prático. Esta dissertação está estruturada em três seções, além da Introdução, da Conclusão e da Bibliografia. A primeira apresenta a Indústria dos Hedge Funds e seus principais conceitos; a segunda apresenta alguns dos modelos de crises cambiais mais discutidos na literatura e os modelos de Calvo de 1999 e Corsetti et aI. (2000); e a terceira fala sobre as crises cambiais recentes e o papel desempenhado pelos Hedge Funds nestas crises.

Conflito entre as Áreas-Fim e Áreas-Meio: O Caso do Banco do Brasil S.A

The work below, in its speculative fraction, analyses the causes of conflict existent be-tween the different areas of the present companies. The work also expose the main conse-quences of the conflict and the responses of the high executives. Through several authors point of view it also contains fragments about the participation of mediators, as instruments of cooperation and solutions of conflicts, in the interdepartamental conflict and how we must deal with the conflict in the companies. In its experimental section, tries to identify the past facts, the symptoms, the causes and the sources of the conflict in the areas of Banco do Brasil and the interrelation with the existent research about the theme. At last, presents the conclusions and recommendations of the author of the work and the suggestions of the employees that were analyzed, with the objective of improving the rela-tions between the different areas of Banco do Brasil.

RST: Reuse through Speculation on Traces

In this thesis, we present a novel approach to combine both reuse and prediction of dynamic sequences of instructions called Reuse through Speculation on Traces (RST). Our technique allows the dynamic identification of instruction traces that are redundant or predictable, and the reuse (speculative or not) of these traces. RST addresses the issue, present on Dynamic Trace Memoization (DTM), of traces not being reused because some of their inputs are not ready for the reuse test. These traces were measured to be 69% of all reusable traces in previous studies. One of the main advantages of RST over just combining a value prediction technique with an unrelated reuse technique is that RST does not require extra tables to store the values to be predicted. Applying reuse and value prediction in unrelated mechanisms but at the same time may require a prohibitive amount of storage in tables. In RST, the values are already stored in the Trace Memoization Table, and there is no extra cost in reading them if compared with a non-speculative trace reuse technique. . The input context of each trace (the input values of all instructions in the trace) already stores the values for the reuse test, which may also be used for prediction. Our main contributions include: (i) a speculative trace reuse framework that can be adapted to different processor architectures; (ii) specification of the modifications in a superscalar, superpipelined processor in order to implement our mechanism; (iii) study of implementation issues related to this architecture; (iv) study of the performance limits of our technique; (v) a performance study of a realistic, constrained implementation of RST; and (vi) simulation tools that can be used in other studies which represent a superscalar, superpipelined processor in detail. In a constrained architecture with realistic confidence, our RST technique is able to achieve average speedups (harmonic means) of 1.29 over the baseline architecture without reuse and 1.09 over a non-speculative trace reuse technique (DTM).

A study of behavioral finance: background, theories and application

Behavioral finance, or behavioral economics, consists of a theoretical field of research stating that consequent psychological and behavioral variables are involved in financial activities such as corporate finance and investment decisions (i.e. asset allocation, portfolio management and so on). This field has known an increasing interest from scholar and financial professionals since episodes of multiple speculative bubbles and financial crises. Indeed, practical incoherencies between economic events and traditional neoclassical financial theories had pushed more and more researchers to look for new and broader models and theories. The purpose of this work is to present the field of research, still ill-known by a vast majority. This work is thus a survey that introduces its origins and its main theories, while contrasting them with traditional finance theories still predominant nowadays. The main question guiding this work would be to see if this area of inquiry is able to provide better explanations for real life market phenomenon. For that purpose, the study will present some market anomalies unsolved by traditional theories, which have been recently addressed by behavioral finance researchers. In addition, it presents a practical application of portfolio management, comparing asset allocation under the traditional Markowitz’s approach to the Black-Litterman model, which incorporates some features of behavioral finance.

Determinantes do fluxo de fundos de investimento no Brasil

Nesse trabalho, procuramos identificar fatores sistemáticos que expliquem uma variação significativa nos fluxos destinados às diversas categorias de fundos de investimento brasileiros, a partir de análises de uma amostra de dados agregados de captações e resgates nesses produtos. O estudo buscou avaliar a existência de padrões de comportamento comuns aos investidores de fundos locais através da análise da migração de fluxos entre as diversas classes de fundos. Foram inicialmente tratados os fatores não comportamentais conhecidos que impactam o fluxo dos fundos, a variável dependente. Esses fatores conhecidos foram apurados através de uma revisão dos trabalhos acadêmicos dos mercados internacional e local. Após esse tratamento foi aplicado o método de decomposição de valores singulares (SVD - Singular Value Decomposition), com o objetivo de avaliarmos os efeitos comportamentais agrupados dos investidores. A decomposição em valores singulares sugere como principais fatores comuns comportamentos de entrada e saída de fundos em massa e migrações entre as classes de fundos de menor e as de maior risco, o que Baker e Wurgler (2007) chamaram de demanda especulativa, e que, segundo esses e outros autores pesquisados, poderia ser interpretada como uma proxy do sentimento dos investidores. Guercio e Tkac (2002) e Edelen et al. (2010), encontraram em suas pesquisas evidências da diferença de comportamento entre investidores de atacado e de varejo, o que foi detectado para a classes de fundos de Renda Variável no caso do presente estudo sobre o mercado brasileiro. O entendimento das variações na tolerância a risco dos investidores de fundos de investimento pode auxiliar na oferta de produtos mais compatíveis com a demanda. Isso permitiria projetar captações para os produtos com base nas características dessa oferta, o que também desenvolvemos nessa pesquisa para o caso das categorias de fundos Multimercado e Renda variável, através de um modelo de espaço de estados com sazonalidade determinística e inicialização SVD. O modelo proposto nesse trabalho parece ter conseguido capturar, na amostra avaliada (2005-2008), um comportamento que se manteve fora da amostra (2009-2011), validando, ao menos na amostra considerada, a proposta de extração dos componentes principais agregados do comportamento dos investidores de fundos brasileiros.

Modeling and predicting the CBOE market volatility index

This paper performs a thorough statistical examination of the time-series properties of the daily market volatility index (VIX) from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The motivation lies not only on the widespread consensus that the VIX is a barometer of the overall market sentiment as to what concerns investors' risk appetite, but also on the fact that there are many trading strategies that rely on the VIX index for hedging and speculative purposes. Preliminary analysis suggests that the VIX index displays long-range dependence. This is well in line with the strong empirical evidence in the literature supporting long memory in both options-implied and realized variances. We thus resort to both parametric and semiparametric heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR) processes for modeling and forecasting purposes. Our main ndings are as follows. First, we con rm the evidence in the literature that there is a negative relationship between the VIX index and the S&P 500 index return as well as a positive contemporaneous link with the volume of the S&P 500 index. Second, the term spread has a slightly negative long-run impact in the VIX index, when possible multicollinearity and endogeneity are controlled for. Finally, we cannot reject the linearity of the above relationships, neither in sample nor out of sample. As for the latter, we actually show that it is pretty hard to beat the pure HAR process because of the very persistent nature of the VIX index.

Especulative (sic) attack on exchange rate target zone regime : the uncertainty case

We present a continuous time target zone model of speculative attacks. Contrary to most of the literature that considers the certainty case, i.e., agents know for sure the Central Bank behavior in the future, we build uncertainty into the madel in two different ways. First, we consider the case in whicb the leveI of reserves at which the central bank lets the regime collapse is uncertain. Alternatively, we ana1ize the case in which, with some probability, the government may cbange its policy reducing the initially positive trend in domestic credito In both cases, contrary to the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, speculators face a cost of launching a tentative attack that may not succeed. Such cost induces a delay and may even prevent its occurrence. At the time of the tentative attack, the exchange rate moves either discretely up, if the attack succeeds, or down, if it fails. The remlts are consistent with the fact that, typically, an attack involves substantial profits and losses for the speculators. In particular, if agents believed that the government will control fiscal imbalances in the future, or alternatively, if they believe the trend in domestic credit to be temporary, the attack is postponed even in the presence of a signal of an imminent collapse. Finally, we aIso show that the timing of a speculative attack increases with the width of the target zone.

Dynamic hedging with stocastic differential utility

In this paper we study the dynamic hedging problem using three different utility specifications: stochastic differential utility, terminal wealth utility, and we propose a particular utility transformation connecting both previous approaches. In all cases, we assume Markovian prices. Stochastic differential utility, SDU, impacts the pure hedging demand ambiguously, but decreases the pure speculative demand, because risk aversion increases. We also show that consumption decision is, in some sense, independent of hedging decision. With terminal wealth utility, we derive a general and compact hedging formula, which nests as special all cases studied in Duffie and Jackson (1990). We then show how to obtain their formulas. With the third approach we find a compact formula for hedging, which makes the second-type utility framework a particular case, and show that the pure hedging demand is not impacted by this specification. In addition, with CRRA- and CARA-type utilities, the risk aversion increases and, consequently the pure speculative demand decreases. If futures price are martingales, then the transformation plays no role in determining the hedging allocation. We also derive the relevant Bellman equation for each case, using semigroup techniques.

Buy-or-sell auctions

This paper develops a game theoretic model of a "Buy-or-Sell" auction. Participants have to submit both a bid and an offer price for up to one of the many units of the good being auctioned. The bid-ask spread is set in advance by the auctioneer. Such an auction was used by the Central Bank of Brazil to intervene in the foreign exchange market during the exchange rate crawling-peg regime (1995-1999). I investigate whether such mechanism is more effective than standard intervention auctions to prevent speculative attacks in the context of managed exchange rate regimes.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.