Kallikrein genes are associated with lupus and glomerular basement membrane-specific antibody-induced nephritis in mice and humans.

Immune-mediated nephritis contributes to disease in systemic lupus erythematosus, Goodpasture syndrome (caused by antibodies specific for glomerular basement membrane [anti-GBM antibodies]), and spontaneous lupus nephritis. Inbred mouse strains differ in susceptibility to anti-GBM antibody-induced and spontaneous lupus nephritis. This study sought to clarify the genetic and molecular factors that maybe responsible for enhanced immune-mediated renal disease in these models. When the kidneys of 3 mouse strains sensitive to anti-GBM antibody-induced nephritis were compared with those of 2 control strains using microarray analysis, one-fifth of the underexpressed genes belonged to the kallikrein gene family,which encodes serine esterases. Mouse strains that upregulated renal and urinary kallikreins exhibited less evidence of disease. Antagonizing the kallikrein pathway augmented disease, while agonists dampened the severity of anti-GBM antibody-induced nephritis. In addition, nephritis-sensitive mouse strains had kallikrein haplotypes that were distinct from those of control strains, including several regulatory polymorphisms,some of which were associated with functional consequences. Indeed, increased susceptibility to anti-GBM antibody-induced nephritis and spontaneous lupus nephritis was achieved by breeding mice with a genetic interval harboring the kallikrein genes onto a disease-resistant background. Finally, both human SLE and spontaneous lupus nephritis were found to be associated with kallikrein genes, particularly KLK1 and the KLK3 promoter, when DNA SNPs from independent cohorts of SLE patients and controls were compared. Collectively, these studies suggest that kallikreins are protective disease-associated genes in anti-GBM antibody-induced nephritis and lupus.

Let's talk: how communication affects contract design

We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency and effectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts are much more frequent and considerably more productive, both for buyers and sellers. Also, both buyer and seller earn considerably more from flexible with communication than rigid without communication. Our results show quite strongly that communication, a normal feature in contracting, can remove the potential cost of flexibility (disagreements caused by conflicting perceptions). We offer an explanation based on social norms.

Association between obesity indices and cardiovascular risk factors in late adolescence in the Seychelles.

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: The ability of different obesity indices to predict cardiovascular risk is still debated in youth and few data are available in sub Saharan Africa. We compared the associations between several indices of obesity and cardiovascular risk factors (CVRFs) in late adolescence in the Seychelles. METHODS: We measured body mass index (BMI), waist circumference, waist/hip ratio (WHiR), waist/height ratio (WHtR) and percent fat mass (by bioimpedance) and 6 CVRFs (blood pressure, LDL-cholesterol, HDL-cholesterol, triglycerides, fasting blood glucose and uric acid) in 423 youths aged 19-20 years from the general population. RESULTS: The prevalence of overweight/obesity and several CVRFs was high, with substantial sex differences. Except for glucose in males and LDL-cholesterol in females, all obesity indices were associated with CVRFs. BMI consistently predicted CVRFs at least as well as the other indices. Linear regression on BMI had standardized regression coefficients of 0.25-0.36 for most CVRFs (p<0.01) and ROC analysis had an AUC between 60%-75% for most CVRFs. BMI also predicted well various combinations of CVRFs: 36% of male and 16% of female lean subjects (BMI P90). CONCLUSION: There was an elevated prevalence of obesity and of several CVRFs in youths in Seychelles. BMI predicted single or combined CVRFs at least as well as other simple obesity indices.

Iowa Gender Wage Study, 1999

In 1993, Iowa Workforce Development (then the Department of Employment Services) conducted a survey to determine if there was a gender gap in wages paid. The results of that survey indicated that women were paid 68 cents per dollar paid to males. We felt a need to determine if this relationship of wages paid to each gender has changed since the 1993 study. In 1999, the Commission on the Status of Women requested that Iowa Workforce Development conduct research to update the 1993 information. A survey, cosponsored by the Commission on the Status of Women and Iowa Workforce Development, was conducted in 1999. The results of the survey showed that women earned 73 percent of what men earned when both jobs were considered. (The survey asked respondents to provide information on a primary job and a secondary job.) The ratio for the primary job was 72 percent, while the ratio for the secondary job was 85 percent. Additional survey results detail the types of jobs respondents had, the types of companies for which they worked and the education and experience levels. All of these characteristics can contribute to these ratios. While the large influx of women into the labor force may be over, it is still important to look at such information to determine if future action is needed. We present these results with that goal in mind. We are indebted to those Iowans, female and male, who voluntarily completed the survey. This study was completed under the general direction of Judy Erickson. The report was written by Shazada Khan, Teresa Wageman, Ann Wagner, and Yvonne Younes with administrative and technical assistance from Michael Blank, Margaret Lee and Gary Wilson. The Iowa State University Statistical Lab provided sampling advice, data entry and coding and data analysis.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Altruism, Equity, and Reciprocity in a Gift-Exchange Experiment: An Encompassing Approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent models of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism- based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches, thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determining the relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition, the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we find that intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruistic considerations all play a significant role in players' decisions.

Financiamento dos Sistema de Saude

Este Relatório sobre a Saúde no Mundo foi produzido sob a direcção geral de Carissa Etienne, Assistente do Director-Geral, Sistemas e Serviços de Saúde e Anarfi Asamoa-Baah, Director Geral Adjunto. Os redactores principais froam David B Evans, Riku Elovainio e Gary Humphreys; com contribuições de Daniel Chisholm, Joseph Kutzin, Sarah Russell, Priyanka Saksena e Ke Xu. Contribuições sob a forma de caixas de texto e análises foram fornecidos por: Ole Doetinchem, Adelio Fernandes Antunes, Justine Hsu, Chandika K. Indikadahena, Jeremy Lauer, Nathalie van de Maele, Belgacem Sabri, Hossein Salehi, Xenia Scheil-Adlung (ILO) and Karin Stenberg. Sugestões e comentários foram recebidos dos Directores Regionais, Assistentes do Director-Geral e respectivas equipas. Análises, dados e revisões da organização do texto, vários rascunhos ou secções específicas foram fornecidos por (em adição às pessoas jáacima mencionadas): Dele Abegunde, Michael Adelhardt, Hector Arreola, Guitelle Baghdadi-Sabeti, Dina Balabanova, Dorjsuren Bayarsaikhan, Peter Berman, Melanie Bertram, Michael Borowitz, Reinhard Busse, Alexandra Cameron, Guy Carrin, Andrew Cassels, Eleonora Cavagnero, John Connell, David de Ferranti, Don de Savigny, Varatharajan Durairaj, Tamás Evetovits, Josep Figueras, Emma Fitzpatrick, Julio Frenk, Daniela Fuhr, Ramiro Guerrero, Patricia Hernandez Pena, Hans V Hogerzeil, Kathleen Holloway, Melitta Jakab, Elke Jakubowski, Christopher James, Mira Johri, Matthew Jowett, Joses Kirigia, Felicia Knaul, Richard Laing, Nora Markova, Awad Mataria, Inke Mathauer, Don Matheson, Anne Mills, Eduardo Missoni, Laurent Musango, Helena Nygren-Krug, Ariel Pablos-Mendez, Anne-Marie Perucic, Claudia Pescetto, Jean Perrot, Alexander Preker, Magdalena Rathe, Dag Rekve, Ritu Sadana, Rocio Saenz, Thomas Shakespeare, Ian Smith, Peter C Smith, Alaka Singh, Ruben Suarez Berenguela, Tessa Tan-Torres Edejer, Richard Scheffler, Viroj Tangcharoensathien, Fabrizio Tediosi, Sarah Thomson, Ewout van Ginneken, Cornelis van Mosseveld e Julia Watson. A redacção do Relatório foi informada por muitos indivíduos de várias instituições que forneceram documentos de suporte; estes documentos de suporte podem ser encontrados em: http://www.who.int/healthsystems/topics/financing/healthreport/whr_background/en Michael Reid editou as cópias do Relatório, Gaël Kernen produziu as figuras e Evelyn Omukubi forneceu o valioso apoio secretarial e administrativo. O desenho e paginação foi feito por Sophie Guetaneh Aguettant e Cristina Ortiz. Ilustração por Edel Tripp (http://edeltripp.daportfolio.com). A tradução foi realizada por Jorge Cabral e Aurélio Floriano e revista por Aurélio Floriano e Paulo Ferrinho, do Instituto de Higiene e Medicina Tropical, da Universidade Nova de Lisboa - Lisboa, Portugal. A publicação foi produzida com o apoio da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP), sob autorização do Director Geral da Organização Mundial da Saúde (OMS). As informações contidas neste Relatório não podem, de forma alguma, ser tomadas como a expressão das posições da CPLP

Investigation Into the Timeliness of the Death Notification to the Surviving Spouse of a Motor Vehicle Accident Victim, 2005

Report: #05-02 Kirke C. Quinn, Attorney for Jo Anne Holland, first contacted the Ombudsman by letter dated January 2, 2004. Quinn also addressed his letter to the Governor’s Office, Iowa State Patrol (ISP), and Iowa Department of Public Safety (DPS). Quinn characterized his letter as a complaint against ISP regarding “the method and manner of reporting the death of Ross Holland to his surviving spouse.” According to Quinn, Mrs. Holland “went through hours of misery as a result of the patrol’s inattention to a tragic situation.” On January 7, 2004, the Ombudsman asked ISP Major Gary Hoskins, Supervisor of Field Operations, how ISP and DPS intended to respond to Mr. Quinn’s letter. Major Hoskins stated he would refer Quinn’s letter of complaint to DPS’ Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) for investigation and response. After speaking with Major Hoskins, the Ombudsman told Mr. Quinn that DPS would do an internal investigation and if he were not satisfied with the results he could contact the Ombudsman again. On March 29, 2004, Mr. Quinn contacted the Ombudsman and stated he was not satisfied with DPS’ response. Quinn stated he would send a copy of the response to the Ombudsman, along with a letter stating his outstanding issues and concerns. In his letter to the Ombudsman, dated May 5, Quinn simply stated: “Please find enclosed [a] copy of the letter received from the Department of Public Safety. We think this is an absolute outrage. We welcome your input.”

Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship

Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We finda consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidenceand discuss implications.

Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic environments. This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. An experiment was conducted in which subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the employee, but highly beneficial to the employer. The wage-determination process was common knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism. The slope of the effort/wage profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.

Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyzewhether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions dependon the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment thesecond player responds to the first player s observed actionwhile in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action foreach and every possible first player move, without firstobserving this move. Our analysis centers on the degree towhich subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniaryrewards, as a response to others actions. Our results show nodifference in behavior between the two treatments. We also findevidence of the stability of subjects preferences with respectto their behavior over time and to the consistency of theirchoices as first and second mover.

An experiment on Nash implementation

We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nashimplementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a fine on non designated dissidents. We offer some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the mixed strategy equilibria of the game.