Modelo de gestão integrada dos contratos públicos eletrónicos orientados ao valor público

Tese de Doutoramento em Tecnologias e Sistemas de Informação.

Precedentes Romanos acerca de la protección al más débil

La protección de la parte más débil en toda relación jurídica, fuere de índole contractual o no, debe ser objetivo prioritario del Derecho. Ahora bien, éste se plasma en normas que son las que rigen la vida social, las cuales muchas veces no contemplan estas prioridades. Lo que crea la paradoja de que existan normas legales, pero no legítimas. El desarrollo social hace que esas leyes queden retrasadas, lo que las hace devenir inútiles para los fines que se tuvieron en vista al crearlas. Partiendo de aquí es importante recurrir al Derecho Romano. Quien piense a éste como una colección de reglas añejas y obsoletas, se equivoca. Quien lo considere arqueología jurídica, también se equivoca. Y yerra igualmente el que limita (y degrada) su importancia reduciéndolo a un mero antecedente de los códigos actuales. Es la equivocación de los dogmáticos, pero una visión humanista razona diferente. El Derecho Romano es la ratio scripta, el Derecho Natural en acto, y como tal conserva su vigencia. El extremo y salvaje liberalismo olvidó y desnaturalizó muchos de sus principios, cuya actualidad deseamos rescatar: El respeto a la ancianidad, regímenes tuitivos, como el amparo del pródigo, la defensa del más débil en un contrato. El trabajo y el trabajador, el asesoramiento gratuito. Los ejemplos resultan numerosísimos. Sobre este tema pretendemos investigar, presentando soluciones romanas a problemas actuales, y demostrando así que un marco normativo superador del que actualmente tenemos es posible.

Befristete Arbeitsverträge : Ein praxisorientierter Leitfaden

This master thesis explains fixed-term contracts in practice. To illustrate this point, examples are provided for better understanding. It will be discussed at both the fixed-term with an objective reason and without objective reason. The second variant is also called moderate Expiration Calendar. Not only the benefits and advantages for the employer are enumerated, but also the special challenges and problems that may arise. Particularly with regard to the prohibition of previous employment.This thesis presents the interests fo employers and companies. The central research question is: What are the possibilities of limitation and there is the prohibition of previous employment unconstitutional? A special attention is given to the contractual formulation examples of limited contracts. It deals exclusively with applicable German and European law. A comparison with previous case-law does not take place in this master thesis.

Venture capital meets contract theory: risky claims or formal control?

This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.

Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Developing discontinuous Galerkin methods for the resolution of the incompressible Navier-Stokes equations

Informe de investigación elaborado a partir de una estancia en el Laboratorio de Diseño Computacional en Aeroespacial en el Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Estados Unidos, entre noviembre de 2006 y agosto de 2007. La aerodinámica es una rama de la dinámica de fluidos referida al estudio de los movimientos de los líquidos o gases, cuya meta principal es predecir las fuerzas aerodinámicas en un avión o cualquier tipo de vehículo, incluyendo los automóviles. Las ecuaciones de Navier-Stokes representan un estado dinámico del equilibrio de las fuerzas que actúan en cualquier región dada del fluido. Son uno de los sistemas de ecuaciones más útiles porque describen la física de una gran cantidad de fenómenos como corrientes del océano, flujos alrededor de una superficie de sustentación, etc. En el contexto de una tesis doctoral, se está estudiando un flujo viscoso e incompresible, solucionando las ecuaciones de Navier- Stokes incompresibles de una manera eficiente. Durante la estancia en el MIT, se ha utilizado un método de Galerkin discontinuo para solucionar las ecuaciones de Navier-Stokes incompresibles usando, o bien un parámetro de penalti para asegurar la continuidad de los flujos entre elementos, o bien un método de Galerkin discontinuo compacto. Ambos métodos han dado buenos resultados y varios ejemplos numéricos se han simulado para validar el buen comportamiento de los métodos desarrollados. También se han estudiado elementos particulares, los elementos de Raviart y Thomas, que se podrían utilizar en una formulación mixta para obtener un algoritmo eficiente para solucionar problemas numéricos complejos.

Scotland: A New Fiscal Settlement

Executive Summary Many commentators have criticised the strategy currently used to finance the Scottish Parliament – both the block grant system, and the small degree of fiscal autonomy devised in the Calman report and the UK government’s 2009 White Paper. Nevertheless, fiscal autonomy has now been conceded in principle. This paper sets out to identify formally what level of autonomy would be best for the Scottish economy and the institutional changes needed to support that arrangement. Our conclusions are in line with the Steel Commission: that significantly more fiscal powers need to be transferred to Scotland. But what we can then do, which the Steel Commission could not, is to give a detailed blueprint for how this proposal might be implemented in practice. We face two problems. The existing block grant system can and has been criticised from such a wide variety of points of view that it effectively has no credibility left. On the other hand, the Calman proposals (and the UK government proposals that followed) are unworkable because, to function, they require information that the policy makers cannot possibly have; and because, without borrowing for current activities, they contain no mechanism to reconcile contractual spending (most of the budget) with variable revenue flows – which is to invite an eventual breakdown. But in its attempt to fix these problems, the UK White Paper introduces three further difficulties: new grounds for quarrels between the UK and Scottish governments, a long term deflation bias, and a loss of devolution.

The economics of power and control

John Hardman Moore outlines his joint research with Oliver Hart, looking at the economics of power and control and the foundations of contractual incompleteness

Policy Shocks and Contract Renegotiation: Who Gets Raked Over the Coals?

Changes in climate policy have large influence on businesses. Firms anticipate and respond to such changes, but what if they have already engaged in a longterm relationship with other firms or customers at the time of policy change? For example, coal supply to power stations is typically based on long-term contracts, while the nature of the buyer-supplier relationship may well be affected substantially by climate regulations. However, there has been little evidence on whether or how firms amend their contractual agreements in response to a change in policy.

Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue, and penalties based on profits. Our analysis is the first to compare these regimes in terms of their impact on both (i) the prices charged by those cartels that do form; and (ii) the number of stable cartels that form (deterrence). We show that the class of penalties based on profits is identical to the class of fixed penalties in all welfare-relevant respects. For the other three types of penalty we show that, for those cartels that do form, penalties based on the overcharge produce lower prices than those based on profit) while penalties based on revenue produce the highest prices. Further, in conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the overcharge out-perform those based on profits, which in turn out-perform those based on revenue in terms of their impact on each of the following welfare criteria: (a) average overcharge; (b) average consumer surplus; (c) average total welfare.

Los elementos esenciales del contrato de compraventa: tratamiento jurisprudencial

En el present treball són objecte d’anàlisi el tractament jurisprudencial d’aquells elements del contracte de compravenda – consentiment, objecte i causa -, concurrència o no dels quals determina si ens trobem davant un supòsit flagrant de nul•litat absoluta (inexistència contractual) o bé si es tracta d’una mera anul•labilitat d’un contracte que existeix i produeix efectes. L’anàlisi de la jurisprudència permetrà delimitar i diferenciar aquells supòsits que incidint en els elements essencials del contracte de compravenda produeixen la nul•litat radical i, per tant, la inexistència jurídica de l’acte realitzat; i aquells altres que afectant igualment als elements essencials no tenen incidència suficient per a provocar la nul•litat absoluta, donant lloc a la mera anul•labilitat. De l’anàlisi a desenvolupar es conclouran els criteris que segueix la jurisprudència per a determinar quan les eventuals irregularitats o anomalies en la formació del contracte tenen força suficient per a originar la inexistència jurídica de la compravenda. Certament, els eventuals vicis de cadascun dels elements essencials del contracte atenen a causes diverses que seran analitzades en aquest treball.

Incentives in university technology transfers

There are two main ways in which the knowledge created in universities has been transferred to firms: licensing agreements and the creation of spin-offs. In this paper, we describe the main steps in the transfer of university innovations, the main incentive issues that appear in this process, and the contractual solutions proposed to address them.

Work, risk and health: differences between immigrants and natives in Spain

We analyze the impact of working and contractual conditions, particularly exposure to job risks, on the probability of acquiring a disability. We postulate a model in which this impact is mediated by the choice of occupation, with a level of risk associated to it. We assume this choice is endogenous, and that it depends on preferences and opportunities in the labour market, both of which may differ between immigrants and natives. To test this hypothesis we use data from the Continuous Sample of Working Lives of the Spanish SS system. It contains individual, job and firm information of over a million workers, including a representative sample of immigrants. We find that risk exposure increases the probability of permanent disability by 5.3%; temporary employment also influences health. Migrant status -with differences among regions of origin- significantly affects both disability and the probability of being employed in a risky occupation. Most groups of immigrants work in riskier jobs, but have lower probability of becoming disabled. Nevertheless, our theoretical hypothesis that disability and risk are jointly determined is not valid for immigrants: i.e. for them working conditions is not a matter of choice in terms of health.

Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the optimal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts. Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms operating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term contracts to save on the junior workers' wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not) hire workers through long-term contracts.

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may be optimal at early stages of economic development and when access to information is limited. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Better institutions, in the form of a richer contracting environment and less severe informational frictions, speed up the transition to short-term relationships.