La Ley de Preferencias Arancelarias Andinas y el Proceso ALCA (Tema Central)

El autor analiza la Ley de Preferencias Arancelarias Andinas como política unilateral concedida por EE.UU. a países andinos (excepto Venezuela) dirigidas a promover las exportaciones andinas a mercados estadounidenses y la sustitución de cultivos ilícitos. El artículo explora las implicaciones de esta ley, y contrapone varios enfoques sobre su efectividad, unos en el sentido de que la ATPA no ha tenido una incidencia significativa en la modificación de la producción o la estructura exportadora de las naciones beneficiarias, y otros que mencionan que esta ley sí ha promovido importantes flujos de inversión entre EE.UU. y los países andinos.

Productivity, labour cost and export adjustment: Detailed results for 24 EU countries. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/11, 12 July 2012

As a background document for Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/11 ‘Compositional effects on productivity, labour cost and export adjustment’, this working paper presents detailed results for 24 EU countries on: • The sectoral changes in the economy; • The unit labour costs (ULC) based real effective exchange rate (REER) and its main components; • Export performance. • The ULC-REERs are calculated: • For the total economy, the business sector (excluding agriculture, construction and real estate activities), and some main sectors; • Using both actual aggregates and fixed-weight aggregates, as the latter are free from the impacts of compositional changes; • Against 30 trading partners and against three subsets of trading partners: euro-area, non-euro area EU, non-EU.

Dirty tariffication revisited: The EU and sugar

It is widely believed that a number of countries, including the EU, engaged in dirty tariffication during the Uruguay Round of trade talks. This article examines the EU’s record on sugar and finds little evidence to substantiate the claim. However, world prices increased between the base period (1986-88) and the date of implementation (1995), and so tariffication resulted in an increase in the tax that would have been charged on sugar imports into the EU. As well, the Special Safeguard provisions meant that a substantial additional levy could be charged.

The EU's Export Refunds on Processed Foods: Legitimate in the WTO?

Export subsidies on processed foods are an important trade policy instrument for the European Union. GATT Article XVI legitimised the use of export subsidies on primary agricultural products, under certain circumstances, but forbade the use of export subsidies on non-primary products. However it was never satisfactorily resolved whether export subsidies could be paid on the primary agricultural products incorporated into processed products, such as pasta. The Uruguay Round Agreements, and particularly the Agreement on Agriculture (the URAA), apparently legitimised the EU’s practice of paying export subsidies on incorporated agricultural products, at least while the Peace Clause was in force. With the demise of the Peace Clause the question arises whether GATT Article XVI has any residual force, given that the range of primary agricultural products exempted by Article XVI from the ban on export subsidies is narrower than the list of agricultural products covered by the URAA.

Decoupling EU farm support: Does the new single payment scheme fit within the green box?

Recent reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has led to a further decoupling of farm support. The EU believes that the new Single Payment Scheme, which replaces the former system of area and headage payments to farmers, tied to production, will qualify for green-box status in the WTO. We examine this contention, particularly in light of the recent WTO panel report on upland cotton.

Fruit and vegetables, and the role they have played in determining the EU’s aggregate measurement of support

In its periodic declarations of domestic support to the WTO, the EU has progressively reduced its amber-box declarations in line with its changing system of farm support. Surprisingly, however, in 2007/08 it managed to more than halve its amber box compared with that of the previous year, easily achieving the reduction targets being touted in the Doha Round. This was largely due to a change in the calculations for fresh fruits and vegetables. These had been linked to the entry price system, which was not affected by the 2008 fruit and vegetables reform. Why the EU chose to make this change during the ongoing Doha Round negotiations remains unclear.

Measuring the impacts of distortions in the European Union cotton sector: a partial equilibrium analysis using the ATPSM model framework

The “cotton issue” has been a topic of several academic discussions for trade policy analysts. However the design of trade and agricultural policy in the EU and the USA has become a politically sensitive matter throughout the last five years. This study utilizing the Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model (ATPSM) aims to gain insights into the global cotton market, to explain why domestic support for cotton has become an issue, to quantify the impact of the new EU agricultural policy on the cotton sector, and to measure the effect of eliminating support policies on production and trade. Results indicate that full trade liberalization would lead the four West African countries to better terms of trade with the EU. If tariff reduction follows the so-called Swiss formula, world prices would increase by 3.5%.

Comércio internacional, politica comercial brasileira e a atuação da Câmara de Comércio Exterior (CAMEX) na condução das políticas para o setor

The proposal of this study is to present an assessment of the performance of the Brazilian Government Chamber of Foreign Trade (Camex), which is a board of the Council of Government responsible for the formulation, implementation and coordination of the Brazilian trade policy. The study begins with a historical approach to the international trade and the Brazilian foreign trade, mentioning its origins, features and interfaces with the economic development of the country. Based on the approach aforementioned, several interviews were made with authorities, who have remarkable knowledge about the subject, in order to obtain their views, experiences and suggestions concerning the performance of Camex since its creation in 1995. The list of interviewees includes authorities that are currently responsibles for the conduct of the policy on foreign trade, representatives of the organized society, and authorities who were in important positions in this segment of the federal public administration, regarding both the Minister of State, as Director of Cacex and the Executive Secretary of Camex. The conclusions of the study indicate that the Camex has not been succeeding in fully exercise its mandate of formulate, implement and coordinate the foreign trade policy of Brazil. A combination of factors contributes to this situation, especially its small strutcure, the fact that some ministries compete in the segment of foreign trade ¿don't understand¿ Chamber¿s real purpose, and, at last, the absence of a political mandate"(words taken from Motta Veiga) that would fortify its existing legal mandate. Finally, the study suggests some changes in the current organizational modeling of Camex, especially in its hierarchical position in the federal public administration."

Multiple equilibria and protectionism

In a nonnative approach, I analyze trade policies when the industrial sector genentes positive extemalities in production, and there are adjustments costs to changing production from one sector to the other. Protectionist trade policy can make workers intemalize the benetits from moving into the industrial sector, but it is a second best policy as it also causes consumption distortions. I show that if the govemment is able to fully commit to its tariff schedule for the future, the welfare maximizing policy is to maintain a positive tariff forever, even after all adjustment has already taken place . However, if the govemment is not able to commit at all, the only time consistent policy is zero tariff at any point in time. The time inconsistency of the full commitment policy is derived from the fact that in the model only production needs interference, and the production distortion is lagged one period with respect to the tariff wbile the consumption distortion is simultaneous to the tariff. In the intermediary case, i.e., when the government can commit for a limited period of time, the time consistent optimal tariff will be positive but lower than the "full commitment" tariff. This result indicates that some institutions that have always been considered pure sources of inefficiency, such as protectionist lobbying, may in fact be welfare improving in some cases!

After the demise of neoliberalism but not of conservatism, a third developmentalism?

Neoliberalism and developmentalism are the two alternative forms of economic and political organization of capitalism. Since the 2008 global financial crisis we see the demise of neoliberalism in rich countries, as state intervention and regulation increased, opening room for a third historical developmentalism (the first was mercantilism, the second, Fordism). Not only because of major market failures, not only because the market is definitely unable to assure financial stability and full employment, an active macroeconomic policy is being required. Modern economies are divided into a competitive and a non-competitive sector; for the coordination of the competitive sector the market is irreplaceable and regulation as well as strategic industrial policy will be pragmatically adopted following the subsidiarity principle, whereas for the non-competitive sector, state coordination and some state ownership are usually more efficient. Besides, the fact that capitalist economies are increasingly diversified and complex is an argument against the two extremes – against statism as well as neoliberalism – in so far that they require market coordination combined with increased regulation. But the third developmentalism probably will not be progressive as was the second, because the social-democratic political parties are disoriented. They won the battle for the welfare state, which neoliberalism was unable to dismantle, but the competition of low wage developing countries and immigration continue to offer arguments to conservative political parties that defend the reduction of the cost of labor contracts or the or precarization of labor.

The manufacturing industry in Brazil in the era of global value chains

This article presents a comprehensive and detailed overview of the international trade performance of the manufacturing industry in Brazil over the last decades, emphasizing its participation in Global Value Chains. It uses information from recent available global inputoutput tables such as WIOD (World Input-output database) and TIVA (Trade in Value Added, OECD) as well as complementary information from the GTAP 8 (Global Trade Analysis Project) database. The calculation of a broad set of value added type indicators allows a precise contextualization of the ongoing structural changes in the Brazilian industry, highlighting the relative isolation of its manufacturing sector from the most relevant international supply chains. This article also proposes a public policy discussion, presenting two case studies: the first one related to trade facilitation and the second one to preferential trade agreements. The main conclusions are twofold: first, the reduction of time delays at customs in Brazil may significantly improve the trade performance of its manufacturing industry, specially for the more capital intensive sectors which are generally the ones with greater potential to connection to global value chains; second, the extension of the concept of a “preferential trade partner” to the context of the global unbundling of production may pave the way to future trade policy in Brazil, particularly in the mapping of those partners whose bilateral trade relations with Brazil should receive greater priority by policy makers.

The manufacturing industry in Brazil in the era of global value chains

This article presents a comprehensive and detailed overview of the international trade performance of the manufacturing industry in Brazil over the last decades, emphasizing its participation in Global Value Chains. It uses information from recent available global inputoutput tables such as WIOD (World Input-output database) and TIVA (Trade in Value Added, OECD) as well as complementary information from the GTAP 8 (Global Trade Analysis Project) database. The calculation of a broad set of value added type indicators allows a precise contextualization of the ongoing structural changes in the Brazilian industry, highlighting the relative isolation of its manufacturing sector from the most relevant international supply chains. This article also proposes a public policy discussion, presenting two case studies: the first one related to trade facilitation and the second one to preferential trade agreements. The main conclusions are twofold: first, the reduction of time delays at customs in Brazil may significantly improve the trade performance of its manufacturing industry, specially for the more capital intensive sectors which are generally the ones with greater potential to connection to global value chains; second, the extension of the concept of a “preferential trade partner” to the context of the global unbundling of production may pave the way to future trade policy in Brazil, particularly in the mapping of those partners whose bilateral trade relations with Brazil should receive greater priority by policy makers

Rules of origin: an unfinished negotiation

Many countries are also engaged in trade negotiations on FTAs. RO are a central theme on each of theses fronts. A detailed analysis of the key questions surrounding the harmonization process is compelling, given that RO talks at the WTO will affect the negotiation of FTAs. Many developing countries are waiting the results from WTO to define their own RO. Since the impasse continues, they are creating their own systems and multiplying different ROs to satisfy their needs. This article seeks to provide some clues why it was impossible, till now, to finish this multilateral negotiation. It is organized as follows: i) review of the main issues in the ARO; ii) present the main points of contention in the harmonization work; iii) analyze the implications of a harmonized system of rules of origin to the other major WTO agreements as well as to other national trade policy instruments; and to present some possible scenarios how to conclude the negotiation