A genealogical map of the concept of habit

The notion of information processing has dominated the study of the mind for over six decades. However, before the advent of cognitivism, one of the most prominent theoretical ideas was that of Habit. This is a concept with a rich and complex history, which is again starting to awaken interest, following recent embodied, enactive critiques of computationalist frameworks. We offer here a very brief history of the concept of habit in the form of a genealogical network-map. This serves to provide an overview of the richness of this notion and as a guide for further re-appraisal. We identify 77 thinkers and their influences, and group them into seven schools of thought. Two major trends can be distinguished. One is the associationist trend, starting with the work of Locke and Hume, developed by Hartley, Bain, and Mill to be later absorbed into behaviorism through pioneering animal psychologists (Morgan and Thorndike). This tradition conceived of habits atomistically and as automatisms (a conception later debunked by cognitivism). Another historical trend we have called organicism inherits the legacy of Aristotle and develops along German idealism, French spiritualism, pragmatism, and phenomenology. It feeds into the work of continental psychologists in the early 20th century, influencing important figures such as Merleau-Ponty, Piaget, and Gibson. But it has not yet been taken up by mainstream cognitive neuroscience and psychology. Habits, in this tradition, are seen as ecological, self-organizing structures that relate to a web of predispositions and plastic dependencies both in the agent and in the environment. In addition, they are not conceptualized in opposition to rational, volitional processes, but as transversing a continuum from reflective to embodied intentionality. These are properties that make habit a particularly attractive idea for embodied, enactive perspectives, which can now re-evaluate it in light of dynamical systems theory and complexity research.

A campanha presidencial de 2006 e as estratégias utilizadas por eleitores para o processamento das informações políticas

Esta é uma tese centrada nas estratégias empregadas pelos eleitores para o processamento das informações sobre a política, no contexto da campanha presidencial brasileira de 2006. Propusemos, neste trabalho, um modelo estatístico para o processamento da informação sobre a política, construído a partir da contribuição de estudos realizados nos campos de conhecimento das ciências sociais, da economia, da psicologia cognitiva e da comunicação, e, sobretudo, a partir das evidências extraídas de nosso desenho de pesquisa. Este combinou métodos qualitativo, quantitativo e a análise das estratégias retóricas empregadas por candidatos e partidos políticos no Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral (HGPE), elemento dinâmico de nosso estudo, por sintetizar os fluxos de informação no ambiente das campanhas políticas. Esse conjunto de abordagens metodológicas, foi empregado para o estudo de caso do eleitor belo-horizontino, inserido no complexo ambiente informacional das campanhas presidenciais. Com informações incompletas, o eleitor precisou escolher em quem acreditar, lidando com a incerteza dos resultados do pleito e com a incerteza em relação ao comportamento futuro dos atores, cioso de que as retóricas da campanha estavam orientadas para a persuasão. O nosso trabalho procurou mapear as estratégias empregadas pelos eleitores na seleção de temas do debate para a atenção e para o processamento das novas informações sobre a política, adquiridas em interações múltiplas ao longo da campanha. Essa complexa tarefa foi destinada à escolha de por quem ser persuadido. Procuramos responder, neste trabalho, a partir das evidências empíricas, várias preocupações deste campo de conhecimento, entre elas: 1) Em meio a tantos temas abordados na disputa entre partidos e candidatos, quais deles e por que o indivíduo escolhe para prestar atenção e acreditar? 2) Que variáveis intermedeiam e qual o seu peso nesse processo de interação com as novas informações para explicar a tomada de decisão? 3) As prioridades da agenda política do eleitor se alteram ao longo da campanha? 4) Os eleitores ampliam o repertório mais geral de informação sobre a política? 5) As percepções sobre avaliação de governo e em relação aos temas prioritários da agenda do eleitor se alteram ao longo da campanha?

A paisagem sonora eletrônica: a construção de novas audibilidades no cinema

Novas tecnologias, entendidas como parte integrante dos ambientes midiáticos contemporâneos, ajudam a conformar novos modelos perceptivos. O surgimento e a proliferação de tecnologias de síntese e de modelagem de sons por meios eletrônicos recria a relação entre o espaço presente no filme e as referências significantes que possuímos desse espaço. Os sons destacam-se dos objetos empíricos, alargando o campo de significações e de afetações sensoriais. Ao criar novas relações entre o corpo do espectador e uma inédita paisagem sonora eletrônica, novas tecnologias de som, como parte de um processo mais amplo das mídias, demandam um maior envolvimento da plateia. Dispositivos de imersão, efeitos especiais, uma nova distribuição espacial do ambiente sonoro, maior fidelidade e potência, reproduzem o encantamento físico despertado pelos primeiros cinemas. Para analisar o surgimento de novas audibilidades, novas formas de investigar o mundo a partir dessas tecnologias e dessa atual paisagem sonora, este trabalho procura uma abordagem tríplice. Inicialmente, procuramos fazer uma descrição de cunho fenomenológico da experiência cinematográfica. Em seguida, utilizamos propostas da Teoria das Materialidades para falar das afetações físicas induzidas pelo espaço sonoro eletrônico. Por último, utilizamos a perspectiva das ciências cognitivas que nos diz que corpo, cérebro e ambiente neste caso um ambiente extremamente tecnológico fazem parte de um mesmo processo dinâmico

Embodied Artificial Intelligence

This book is devoted to the rapidly growing highly interdisciplinary field of embodied artificial intelligence involving researchers from areas as diverse as computer science, engineering, cognitive science, neuroscience, biology, ...

Cognition from the bottom up: on biological inspiration, body morphology, and soft materials.

Traditionally, in cognitive science the emphasis is on studying cognition from a computational point of view. Studies in biologically inspired robotics and embodied intelligence, however, provide strong evidence that cognition cannot be analyzed and understood by looking at computational processes alone, but that physical system-environment interaction needs to be taken into account. In this opinion article, we review recent progress in cognitive developmental science and robotics, and expand the notion of embodiment to include soft materials and body morphology in the big picture. We argue that we need to build our understanding of cognition from the bottom up; that is, all the way from how our body is physically constructed.

Aspects of Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue. SemDial 2010, 14th Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue

The papers collected in this book cover a range of topics in semantics and pragmatics of dialogue. All these papers were presented at SemDial 2010, the 14th Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue. This 14th edition in the SemDial series, also known as PozDial, took place in Poznań (Poland) in June 2010, and was organized by the Chair of Logic and Cognitive Science (Institute of Psychology, Adam Mickiewicz University). From over 30 submissions overall, 14 were accepted as full papers for plenary presentation at the workshop, and all are included in this book. In addition, 10 were accepted as posters, and are included here as 2-4 page short papers. Finally, we also include abstracts from our keynote speakers. We hope that the ideas gathered in this book will be a valuable source of up-to-date achievements in the field, and will become a valuable inspiration for new ones. We would like to express our thanks to all those who submitted to and participated in SemDial 2010, especially the invited speakers: Dale Barr (University of Glasgow), Jonathan Ginzburg (King's College London), Jeroen Groenendijk (University of Amsterdam) and Henry Prakken (Utrecht University, The University of Groningen). Last but not least, we would like to thank everybody engaged in the workshop organization -- the chairs, the local organizing committee for their hard work in Poznań, and the programme committee members for their thorough and helpful reviews.

Bring ART into the ACT

ACT is compared with a particular type of connectionist model that cannot handle symbols and use non-biological operations that cannot learn in real time. This focus continues an unfortunate trend of straw man "debates" in cognitive science. Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, neural models of cognition can handle both symbols and sub-symbolic representations, and meets the Newell criteria at least as well as these models.

Prototypes, exemplars, and theoretical & applied ethics

Concepts are mental representations that are the constituents of thought. EdouardMachery claims that psychologists generally understand concepts to be bodies of knowledge or information carrying mental states stored in long term memory that are used in the higher cognitive competences such as in categorization judgments, induction, planning, and analogical reasoning. While most research in the concepts field generally have been on concrete concepts such as LION, APPLE, and CHAIR, this paper will examine abstract moral concepts and whether such concepts may have prototype and exemplar structure. After discussing the philosophical importance of this project and explaining the prototype and exemplar theories, criticisms will be made against philosophers, who without experimental support from the sciences of the mind, contend that moral concepts have prototype and/or exemplar structure. Next, I will scrutinize Mark Johnson's experimentally-based argument that moral concepts have prototype structure. Finally, I will show how our moral concepts may indeed have prototype and exemplar structure as well as explore the further ethical implications that may be reached by this particular moral concepts conclusion. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

The beginnings of expertise for ballads

To study the beginning stages of expertise, 14 students, who were inexperienced with ballads, heard and recalled a series of 5 ballads over the course of 5 weeks. Compared with their first recall of the first ballad, their first recall of the fifth ballad had one and a half times as many words, two times as many rhyming words, and three times as much line structure evident in the written recall protocols. Compared with novices, the 14 beginning experts more often filled in blank spaces in novel ballads with words of the correct number of syllables and more often chose the original stanza of a novel ballad that was paired with a changed version of the stanza. The beginning experts were also able to compose, in 20 min, ballads about two thirds as long as the 10-stanza ballads they learned. Thirty characteristics were identified in the set of the five learned ballads. The ballads composed by the beginning experts used over half of these. The beginning experts also explicitly stated about one quarter of these 30 characteristics, but there was no statistical relationship between the characteristics used and the characteristics stated. Memory expertise is viewed as a pervasive aspect of cognition in which people make use of a variety of regularities in the material to be learned. © 1993 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.

The use of cues for attention in ancient Greek art: aspects that influence concentration in the work of art and its elements

The goal of this study is to identify cues for the cognitive process of attention in ancient Greek art, aiming to find confirmation of its possible use by ancient Greek audiences and artists. Evidence of cues that trigger attention’s psychological dispositions was searched through content analysis of image reproductions of ancient Greek sculpture and fine vase painting from the archaic to the Hellenistic period - ca. 7th -1st cent. BC. Through this analysis, it was possible to observe the presence of cues that trigger orientation to the work of art (i.e. amplification, contrast, emotional salience, simplification, symmetry), of a cue that triggers a disseminate attention to the parts of the work (i.e. distribution of elements) and of cues that activate selective attention to specific elements in the work of art (i.e. contrast of elements, salient color, central positioning of elements, composition regarding the flow of elements and significant objects). Results support the universality of those dispositions, probably connected with basic competencies that are hard-wired in the nervous system and in the cognitive processes.

Children’s attributions of belief to humans and God: cross-cultural evidence

The capacity to attribute beliefs to others in order to understand action is one of the mainstays of human cognition. Yet it is debatable whether children attribute beliefs in the same way to all agents. In this paper, we present the results of a false-belief task concerning humans and God run with a sample of Maya children aged 4–7, and place them in the context of several psychological theories of cognitive development. Children were found to attribute beliefs in different ways to humans and God. The evidence also speaks to the debate concerning the universality and uniformity of the development of folk-psychological reasoning.

Are causal and intervention judgments inextricably linked? A developmental study.

The application of the formal framework of causal Bayesian Networks to children's causal learning provides the motivation to examine the link between judgments about the causal structure of a system, and the ability to make inferences about interventions on components of the system. Three experiments examined whether children are able to make correct inferences about interventions on different causal structures. The first two experiments examined whether children's causal structure and intervention judgments were consistent with one another. In Experiment 1, children aged between 4 and 8years made causal structure judgments on a three-component causal system followed by counterfactual intervention judgments. In Experiment 2, children's causal structure judgments were followed by intervention judgments phrased as future hypotheticals. In Experiment 3, we explicitly told children what the correct causal structure was and asked them to make intervention judgments. The results of the three experiments suggest that the representations that support causal structure judgments do not easily support simple judgments about interventions in children. We discuss our findings in light of strong interventionist claims that the two types of judgments should be closely linked. © 2011 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.


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