950 resultados para Social welfare maximization
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Sesiones grupales: 01. ‘Una vida familiar’; 02. ‘Adaptación y vínculo de apego’; 03. ‘Cómo estimular el desarrollo infantil’; 04. ‘El arte de educar’; 05. ‘Adolescencia’. Programa de Salud Infantil y Adolescente de Andalucía (http://www.repositoriosalud.es/handle/10668/1741)
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Contiene: Guías para las visitas del PSIA-A individual; Guías específicas para familias; y Consejos específicos para adolescentes. En Guías específicas para familias: Bebé a bordo: una nueva vida familiar; Desarrollo psicológico y evolutivo saludable. Consejos para familias; La estimulación del desarrollo; El logro de la autonomía; El arte de educar; Aprender y divertirse al salir de clase; Llegó la adolescencia; Educación sexual; Consejos para prevenir la violencia de género; Consejos para prevenir el tabaquismo pasivo y el inicio del consumo de tabaco; ¿Qué deben saber acerca de las drogas o el alcohol?; Guía para acompañar a un menor en la pérdida de un ser querido; Consejos para fomentar la autoestima; Recomendaciones de actuación en caso de acoso escolar o bullying; Uso responsable de las nuevas tecnologías: Internet; Bebés con necesidades especiales; Familias en proceso de separación o divorcio. En Consejos específicos para adolescentes: Uso responsable de las nuevas tecnologías: Internet Programa de Salud Infantil y Adolescente de Andalucía; Consejos sobre el consumo de alcohol; ¿Qué debes saber acerca de las drogas?; Consejos para prevenir la violencia de género; Consejos sobre el consumo de tabaco. Programa de Salud Infantil y Adolescente de Andalucía (http://www.repositoriosalud.es/handle/10668/1741)
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Programa de Salud Infantil y Adolescente de Andalucía (http://www.repositoriosalud.es/handle/10668/1741)
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Boletín semanal para profesionales sanitarios de la Secretaría General de Calidad, Innovación y Salud Pública de la Consejería de Igualdad, Salud y Políticas Sociales
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BACKGROUND The objective of this research was to evaluate data from a randomized clinical trial that tested injectable diacetylmorphine (DAM) and oral methadone (MMT) for substitution treatment, using a multi-domain dichotomous index, with a Bayesian approach. METHODS Sixty two long-term, socially-excluded heroin injectors, not benefiting from available treatments were randomized to receive either DAM or MMT for 9 months in Granada, Spain. Completers were 44 and data at the end of the study period was obtained for 50. Participants were determined to be responders or non responders using a multi-domain outcome index accounting for their physical and mental health and psychosocial integration, used in a previous trial. Data was analyzed with Bayesian methods, using information from a similar study conducted in The Netherlands to select a priori distributions. On adding the data from the present study to update the a priori information, the distribution of the difference in response rates were obtained and used to build credibility intervals and relevant probability computations. RESULTS In the experimental group (n = 27), the rate of responders to treatment was 70.4% (95% CI 53.287.6), and in the control group (n = 23), it was 34.8% (95% CI 15.354.3). The probability of success in the experimental group using the a posteriori distributions was higher after a proper sensitivity analysis. Almost the whole distribution of the rates difference (the one for diacetylmorphine minus methadone) was located to the right of the zero, indicating the superiority of the experimental treatment. CONCLUSION The present analysis suggests a clinical superiority of injectable diacetylmorphine compared to oral methadone in the treatment of severely affected heroin injectors not benefiting sufficiently from the available treatments. TRIAL REGISTRATION Current Controlled Trials ISRCTN52023186.
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In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better ...scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries.
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This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between airport congestion and airline network structure. We find that the development of hub-and-spoke (HS) networks may have detrimental effects on social welfare in presence of airport congestion. The theoretical analysis shows that, although airline pro ts are typically higher under HS networks, congestion could create incentives for airlines to adopt fully-connected (FC) networks. However, the welfare analysis leads to the conclusion that airlines may have an inefficient bias towards HS networks. In line with the theoretical analysis, our empirical results show that network airlines are weakly infl uenced by congestion in their choice of frequencies from/to their hub airports. Consistently with this result, we con firm that delays are higher in hub airports controlling for concentration and airport size. Keywords: airlines; airport congestion; fully-connected networks, hub-and-spoke net- works; network efficiency JEL Classifi cation Numbers: L13; L2; L93
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We analyze the entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market in which an entrant and an incumbent compete in prices. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” With a sequential choice of quality, a quality-dependent marginal production cost, and a fixed entry cost, we relate the entry-quality decision and the entry-deterrence strategies to the level of entry cost and the degree of consumer heterogeneity. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well as an incumbent’s aggressive entry-deterrence strategies of increasing its quality level toward potential entry. Welfare evaluation confirms that social welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.
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This thesis concerns organizing a workshop about interaction in the various communities represented by Helsinki city's social welfare department. There were seventeen workshops altogether and they were organized in different communities; for example, in a children's daycare centre. The aim was to gain experience in the planning and organizing of these kinds of workshop. The workshops focused on dealing with interactive quetions arising out of the very community which was taking part in the workshop. These questions were discussed and handled using a technique called forum-statues. This means that the problems arising from the community were presented as living pictures to the group. There was also a short theoretical element concerning interactions between people, self-esteem, the different phases in developing a group, and the effects of conflicts in groups. There was a high degree of interest in the research and places were soon filled. The workshops consisted of a warming part with a lot of playing, a deepening part with questions arising out of the group, and a relaxation and feedback part at the end. The basis of the workshop was similar for all seventeen workshops. The athmosphere in workshops was discussive and open. The participants were engouraged to express there opinions and point of views. Feedback from the participantswas very positive. The participants obtained new points of view, according there fellow workers, and the community spirit improved. Shortage of time was, unfortunately, a problem. With more time, it would have been possible to go deeper into the problems of interaction within the community. Ceratinly, the research proved that there would be great demand for this kind of workshop in future.
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Infectious livestock disease creates externalities for proximate animal production enterprises. The distribution of production scale within a region should influence and be influenced by these disease externalities. Taking the distribution of the unit costs of stocking an animal as primitive, we show that an increase in the variance of these unit costs reduces consumer surplus. The effect on producer surplus, total surplus, and animal concentration across feedlots depends on the demand elasticity. A subsidy to smaller herds can reduce social welfare and immiserize the farm sector by increasing the extent of disease. While Nash behavior involves excessive stocking, disease effects can be such that aggregate output declines relative to first-best. Disease externalities can induce more adoption of a cost-reducing technology by larger herds so that animals become more concentrated across herds. For strategic reasons, excess overall adoption of the innovation may occur. Larger herds are also more likely to adopt biosecurity innovations, explaining why larger herds may be less diseased in equilibrium.
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We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjectschoose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and acostly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are themost frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent withoutrole uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with roleuncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four differenttypes of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse andCompetitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of SocialWelfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additionaltreatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in theexperiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctlyunderstand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions weremost frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim tomeasure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.
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This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.
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Site licensing of e-journals has been revolutionizing the way academicinformation is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned aboutthe possibility that publishers might abuse site licensing by practicingbundling. In this paper, we analyze the private and social incentives forthe publishers to use bundling in the context of STM electronic journalmarket. In the short run in which the number of journals is exogenouslygiven, we find a strong conflict between the two incentives: each publisherfinds bundling optimal and bundling increases the industry profit butreduces social welfare. However, in the long run we find that publishersmight have higher incentives to introduce new journals under bundlingthan without bundling and, in this case, bundling can reduce the industryprofit while increasing social welfare. Finally, we examine publishers incentive to provide links to the websites of the rival publishers underbundling and show that even asymmetric publishers have incentive tointerconnect.
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Um incremento do nível geral de preços pode ter impacto marcante no bem-estar económico e social, já que há perda de valor da moeda e consequente deterioração do poder de compra da população, conduzindo assim ao agravamento das condições e custo de vida. Contudo, torna-se necessário investigar as causas (fatores determinantes) da inflação, pois é uma das etapas fundamentais para o controlo do processo inflacionário. Neste sentido, o presente estudo tem como objetivo principal averiguar quais os determinantes da inflação em Cabo Verde. Para tal foi utilizado o método de co-integração, recentemente proposto por Pesaran et al. (2001) – Bound Test. Os resultados obtidos evidenciam que as componentes sazonais, cambiais, monetárias, orçamentais e externas explicam grande parte da Inflação em Cabo Verde.
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We model green markets in which purchasers, either firms orconsumers, have higher willingness-to-pay for lesspolluting goods. The effectiveness of pollution reductionpolicies is examined in a duopoly setting. We show thatduopolists' strategic behaviour may increase pollutionlevels. Maximum emission standards, commonly used in greenmarkets, improve the environmental features of products.Nonetheless, overall pollution levels will rise becausegovernment regulation also affects market shares and bootsfirms' sales. Consequently, social welfare may be reduced.We also explore the effects of technological subsidies andproduct charges, including differentiation of charges.