Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?: Evidence from an Early and Unregulated Capital Market

Why do firms pay dividends? To answer this question, we use a hand-collected data set of companies traded on the London stock market between 1825 and 1870. As tax rates were effectively zero, the capital market was unregulated, and there were no institutional stockholders, we can rule out these potential determinants ex ante. We find that, even though they were legal, share repurchases were not used by firms to return cash to shareholders. Instead, our evidence provides support for the information–communication explanation for dividends, while providing little support for agency, illiquidity, catering, or behavioral explanations. © The Authors 2013. Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of the European Finance Association]. All rights reserved.

HRM in knowledge intensive firms in Ireland

Featuring contributions from leading Irish academics Strategic HRM: Research and Practice in Ireland brings together a wealth of evidence on SHRM in Ireland. An invaluable resource for undergraduates and Masters students specialising in SHRM, it also serves as a reflective resource for experienced executives.

Linking response strategies adopted by construction firms during the 2007 economic recession to Porter’s generic strategies

The time period bridging the years 2007 to 2012 will be remembered as one characterised by dramatic changes in the Irish and UK construction industries. Construction companies witnessed unprecedented changes in the environment, namely the coincidence of a sharp economic downturn, the significant decline of public works, a reduction in lending, increased competition, and structural changes in the marketplace. Nevertheless, little has been documented on what response strategies construction companies adopt as a result of an economic recession. Based on four exploratory case studies, a taxonomy framework of the response strategies adopted by Irish and UK construction companies during the 2007 economic recession was developed relative to Porter’s (1980) generic strategies of cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. Porter’s model (1980) is a well known theoretical framework among business strategists and industrial economists worldwide. The analysis provides strong support for the adoption of cost leadership strategies as a means to surviving the 2007 economic recession. The case studies further suggest that cost control initiatives are one of the most important attributes in companies’ responses to the 2007 recession. The findings provide valuable assistance for construction contractors in developing effective strategies and thus reducing business failures during recessionary periods.

Structural Capital of University Spin-Out Firms: The Moderating Role of University Incubators

University incubators (UI) are generally believed to be important in the successful commercialisation of university spin-outs (USO) with over half of all UK Universities having established an on-campus UI. In this chapter we examine the value of UIs in the spin-out process, focusing on the structural networks of USOs located in a UI as compared to USOs in a University with no access to a UI. Our primary research question is therefore: to what extent does the structural network of USOs with access to an on-campus UI differ from USOs without? The research therefore con-tributes to a growing critique of the effectiveness of UIs in commercialis-ing academic research and the recognition of positive direct and indirect externalities from participation in networks. Through network mapping of all USOs from two research intensive universities, we profile and ana-lyse the formal and informal network ties of USOs to various partners in-ternal and external to the host university. Through interviews we also consider how these networks enhance the resources and capabilities of USOs. Our findings highlight significant differences, with USOs located in a UI having more informal but fewer formal ties, both to other USOs as well as within the host University. In contrast, location in an incuba-tor was not found to affect the extent and nature of ties with external or-ganisations. Reasons for these differences are examined through inter-views with the USOs and point to various factors including the proactive brokering role of incubator and university staff, university bureaucracy, the hidden networks of executive board members across USOs, university equity investment policy and complementary technologies.

Reconstructing ethical conduct within financial firms

This chapter explores whether ethical cultures can be created within a financial market context. Ongoing regulatory and legal actions, and press coverage of these, suggest that a definition of ethical problems in terms of ‘rogue traders’ and ‘bad apples’ would be inadequate, since entire business areas have been resorting to collusive illegal behaviour. The concept of ‘bad barrels’ seems to capture the situation rather better: the culture of firms fails to discourage transgression and indeed supports it. Unpacking the links between regulatory objectives and the cultural settings of firms and their employees, this chapter questions the chances of success of measures such as enhanced controls on individuals and restructured reward mechanisms. Financial firms typically have very flat, nodal structures, within which traders conceptualise themselves as an elite, in contrast to back office staff and also in contrast to managers. Traders’ functions and their occupational mobility mean that their linkages and attachments may be much stronger with others outside ‘their’ firm than their firm and those within it. Performance, camaraderie and their linkages are important in all work situations, yet all the more so for traders in financial markets. Thus, whether regulators and senior management combine to send a clear and consistent message to traders – or whether the logic of the financial marketplace leads some firms to continue send conflicting or ambivalent messages to them – misconduct is likely to continue to be a tough nut to crack.