It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.

Le juge en droit européen et international = The Judge in European and International Law

Le juge et son rôle ont été thématisés abondamment en théorie du droit, mais toujours sous l'angle du droit et du juge internes. On pensera ainsi aux questions des rapports entre justice et politique ou démocratie, ou encore au rôle créateur de droit du juge en cas de lacune juridique et à la légitimité du droit dit prétorien. Pour autant que l'on considère qu'il s'agisse bien d'un juge, le juge international ou européen et sa fonction judiciaire posent des problèmes de même type certes bien que plus aigus, mais aussi des difficultés nouvelles auxquelles la théorie du droit n'a pas encore donné de réponses. Le présent ouvrage tente d'identifier ces difficultés théoriques propres au juge international ou européen et d'apporter des débuts de réponse. Fruit du sixième colloque doctoral de l'Ecole doctorale Fondements du droit européen et international et quatrième volume de la collection du même nom, il réunit des contributions en anglais et en français rédigées par des doctorants des universités suisses romandes et alémaniques et d'universités européennes partenaires, mais aussi d'intervenants externes invités aux différentes sessions du colloque.

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economictheory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Shouldcorporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two majorcontributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analyticalframework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insightsinto how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed bytheir employees.

Audit report on the Webster County Metropolitan Law Enforcement Telecommunications Board for the years ended June 30, 2007 and June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Webster County Metropolitan Law Enforcement Telecommunications Board for the years ended June 30, 2007 and June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy for the year ended June 30, 2007

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy Performance Report FY2012

The Iowa Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) was created by an act of the Iowa legislature in 1967 with its purpose being to upgrade law enforcement to professional status. The specific goals were to maximize training opportunities for law enforcement officers, to coordinate training and to set standards for the law enforcement services.

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy FY2008 Annual Report and Performance Report

Annual Report Created by Academy Director E.A. (Penny) Westfall

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Iowa Law Enforcement Academy

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, Strategic Plan, 2007

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, goals and mission.

Fick's law adapted to cationic diffusion in a semi-infinite solid: application to spinel megacrystals

In alkaline lavas, the chemical zoning of megacrystals of spinel is due to the cationic exchange between the latter and the host lava. The application of Fick's law to cationic diffusion profiles allows to calculate the time these crystals have stayed in the lava. Those which are in a chemical equilibrium were in contact with the lava during 20 to 30 days, whereas megacrystals lacking this equilibrium were in contact only for 3 or 4 days. The duration of the rise of an ultrabasic nodule in the volcanic chimney was calculated by applying Stokes' law.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.